Revolts in Spain and Portugal - History

Revolts in Spain and Portugal - History

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A revolt breaks out in Spain when Colonel Rafael Reigo demands that the French constitution of 1812 be restored. Ferdinand VII does so on March 7, 1820. On August 24th a revolt against British regency in Portugal breaks out. A liberal constitutional monarchy is created and John VI living in exile in Brazil, is invited to head it.

Going into the 1800s, more than a few people in Spain's colonies were influenced by the Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions, and among these people was a growing dislike of Spain's restrictions over economic matters. There were restrictions on trading with foreigners, restrictions against growing crops that would compete with crops grown in Spain, and restrictions on making goods that would compete with goods made in Spain. Taxes imposed by Spanish authorities were also annoying. People of Spanish heritage born in Latin America were not participating in government the way that people of British heritage had been in Britain's colonies. Criólles (those born in America claiming pure Spanish blood) were living under the authoritarian tradition of the Spaniards. The Church and its Inquisition in Spanish America were dominated by Spaniards. The families of Spain's officials enjoyed their authority and higher status. They were haughty toward the Criólles as well as toward Indians, and the Criólles resented it and the soldiers from Spain. Many of them had a non-white in their family sometime in the 200 years since the Europeans had arrived in the New World, while people born in Spain prided themselves on their racial purity.

Father Miguel Hidalgo, father of Mexico's Independence

A turning point for Latin America was Napoleon's move into Spain and Portugal from 1808 to 1814 and Napoleon holding Spain's King Ferdinand VII captive. To the Criólles this made Spain's authorities in Latin America agents of the French. Criólles of both liberal and conservative persuasion formed committees (juntas) that declared their loyalty to King Ferdinand &ndash believed by some to be their divinely chosen authority. On May 25, 1810, a junta in Argentina claimed rule on behalf of Ferdinand VII. A junta in Santiago (Chile) declared independence on September 18, 1810, and in Asunción (Paraguay) independence was declared on May 14, 1811. A junta in Caracas declared independence on July 5, 1811, and independence was declared also in La Paz and in New Grenada in what today is Colombia. And fighting erupted between Spain's authorities in Latin America and those associated with the juntas.

Hildago and Morelos in New Spain (Mexico)

In Mexico City – the administrative center of New Spain &ndash a Crióllo junta declared its support for Ferdinand VII and for independence. New Spain extended from Panama north to the territories of Alto California, Nuevo Mexico and Texas. Nuevo Mexico included territory between Texas and Alto California as far north as what eventually would be called Wyoming. New Spain had a population of around 1.2 million whites, 2 million mestizos (part Indian, part white), 4 million Indians (about a million more than a century and a half earlier but down from 15 million at the time of Cortez), and there were blacks on the Caribbean coast. The Criólles were interested in maintaining their property and status vis-à-vis the Indians and mestizos.

A sixty-year-old ordained Roman Catholic priest, Miguel Hidalgo, in the village of Dolores (about 110 miles northwest of Mexico City) had a more radical response to events. Hidalgo was an intellectual who had drawn from the Enlightenment, and he dismissed popular notions concerning race and had been fighting for the well-being of Mexico's Indians and Mestizos, including a call for the return of lands stolen from the Indians. Pursuing this in the wake of the more conservative independence movement in Mexico City he organized an uprising for December 8, 1810. Then, in the early morning of September 15 Hidalgo was warned that Spanish authorities in the nearby town of Querétaro had learned of his plans and were sending a force against him. Hidalgo rang the church bell, calling his Indian and Mestizo followers to action. And, according to reports, he shouted:

Long live Ferdinand VII! Long live religion! Death to bad government!

Hidalgo's followers, with their farm tools as weapons, marched to the town of San Miguel thirty miles to the northwest of Dolores, picking up hundreds of combatants from farms and mines along the way. The militia of San Miguel joined the uprising. Hidalgo's army swelled to several thousand. Encouraged by their numbers, the insurgents began to sack shops and loot the houses of whites. Within a week, Hidalgo's army reached the town of Guanajuato, sixty miles farther northwest, their army now numbering around 50,000. And now they met resistance. Defending soldiers killed 2,000 of Hidalgo's men. Shocked by the reality of warfare, Hidalgo's men went on a rampage, killing all opponents they could, including those who surrendered.

Hildago's growing army moved on, taking one town after another. They defeated an army of 7,000 that had been sent against them. But Hidalgo's force was tiring, and rather than push for control of the capital, Mexico City, Hidalgo ordered his force to the nearby provincial capital, Guadalajara, for a rest. There he set up a government, with one small printing press, and he began training his army. He sent another priest, José Maria Morelos, and 25 men on a mission to capture Acapulco (on the coast in southern Mexico).

Moving against Hidalgo's rebellion, 6,000 soldiers moved through Guanajuato and approached Guadalajara. Hidalgo's army outnumbered the rival force thirteen to one, but the battle outside of town went badly for them, and they panicked and fled. Hidalgo, with about a thousand men, retreated north to Saltillo in the foothills of the Sierra Maestra mountains (near Monterrey). Those around Hildago replaced him as their leader while Spain's soldiers were capturing one town after another. And they captured Hidalgo. He was tried by the Inquisition, defrocked and executed in Chihuahua by firing squad on July 31, 1811.

José Maria Morelos, meanwhile, had gathered a force of around 9,000 men and was occupying towns and hills south of Mexico City. Following Napoleon's withdrawal from Spain and Ferdinand's return to power in 1814, King Ferdinand sent additional troops to Mexico. In 1815, the year of Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo, the Spaniards overwhelmed Morelos and his force, with 2,000 escaping to Puebla and about 1,000 to Oaxaca. Morelos stood before the Inquisition, was defrocked, and he too was executed by firing squad, on December 22, 1815.

Hidalgo's uprising and the war that followed to 1816 had killed between 200,000 and 500,000 people. If the deaths were 200,000 that would have been about one in 600 of a population that demographers have estimated for Mexico at around 6 million in 1815. This is equivalent to the US in the year 2000 (with a population of 280 million) losing in war something like 466,667.

Into the 21st century, Father Hildago was to be considered by the people of Mexico the father of Mexico's independence. In 1816 that independence had not yet arrived. The crushing of Hidalgo's revolt and suited the conservatism of those joyed by the defeat of Napoleon and what they saw as the defeat of the French Revolution and its philosophical foundation.

Spain and Rebellion in South America

Simón Bolivar was a Crióllo with a few drops of Indian and African blood and proud of it. He was born in Caracas into Venezuela's plantation society and into wealth, and in his late teens he enjoyed leisure in Europe. He was influenced by liberalism and the Enlightenment and acquired an admiration for Napoleon. In the year 1810, with Spain's King Ferdinand being held by Napoleon in luxurious captivity, Bolivar was back in Venezuela supporting Venezuela's pro-independence junta and at 27 having outgrown his youthful frivolity. The junta sent Bolivar back to Europe as the head of a delegation aiming at international support for independence. He returned in 1811 unsuccessful but with Venezuela's leading dissident, a vain revolutionary, Francisco de Miranda, who had been in exile in England.

In behalf of the junta in Caracas, Miranda declared Venezuela and New Grenada, in what today is Columbia, to be republics. The junta removed the trading restrictions that Spain had imposed. It exempted taxes from the sale of food, ended the paying of tribute to the government by Venezuela's Indians and prohibited slavery.

Battles were fought between Miranda's forces and a Spanish army that had been stationed in Venezuela, the Spanish forces winning considerable support among Venezuela's illiterate masses. In March 1812, an earthquake devastated Caracas. The Spanish clergy in Caracas claimed that the earthquake was God's anger against the sins of the rebel government. In July, Miranda's forces were defeated and the Spaniards regained control over Caracas.

Outside Caracas, small bands of rebels led by military chieftains continued their defiance of Spanish authority. Simón Bolivar built a force of 2,000 men and fought his way back to the city, entering in triumph on August 7, 1813. In 1814, following Ferdinand's freedom from Napoleon's captivity and more troops arriving from Spain, Bolivar was driven westward to New Granada.

Rebel forces could no longer claim power in the name of King Ferdinand, and Spanish forces were advancing against the rebels elsewhere in Spanish America. Bernardo O'Higgins, the leader of a liberal regime In Chile, was forced to flee with his army across the Andes mountains into Western Argentina, where he was welcomed by José de San Martín, the liberal-monarchist governor in the province of Cuyo. In Venezuela, the Spaniards put Miranda in a dungeon &ndash where he died in 1816. The Spanish drove Bolivar from New Grenada, Bolivar fleeing to Jamaica and Haiti. He was depressed and without any of his former wealth, but his hopes of creating a new order in South America soon revived.

In 1817, San Martín and O'Higgins went with their armies back across the Andes Mountains to Chile. There they defeated the Spanish and took power in the city of Santiago. They laid plans to sail north to Lima in Peru, the center of Spain's authority in Latin America, the most wealthy and economically successful of Spain's Latin American cities. It was a city filled with conservative Criólles who, with an abundance of slaves, had never had to dirty their hands with any kind of work.

On the Atlantic coast, in an area called Banda Oriental (northeast of Buenos Aires), another rebel force was having successes. It was led by José Gervasio Artigas who was allied with other cattle-raising, gaucho, landowners. He distrusted urbanites, broke with junta leaders in Buenos Aires and fought against Brazil's intrusions. Eventually he was to be known as the father of his country: Uruguay.

In 1817 Bolivar and a small force returned to Venezuela and established a base inland in the rain forest along the Orinoco River. There he gathered new recruits, new supplies and added to his reputation. The drive of Spain's forces into Venezuela's interior aroused people there into a more active rebellion. There, Bolivar allied himself with the rebellious cattle herdsmen, Indians and semi-nomadic hunters. He found that liberating slaves gave him added support and strength, and where he and his army went he gave slaves their freedom.

In 1818, Spain invaded Chile again and defeated O'Higgins at Cancha Rayada, but San Martín defeated the Spanish at the Battle of Maipu. Bolivar arrived Bogotá in August 1819, and Spain lost that area (New Grenada) to Bolivar. Bolivar organized what became Gran Colombia, a political unity that included what today is Ecuador, Colombia and Panama, and became its president on December 17, 1819.

King Ferdinand, meanwhile, was having trouble in Spain. After returning to power in 1814 he was pursuing a policy of absolutism, and he was not paying his army. In 1820, soldiers assembled for embarkation to the Americas revolted, and various groups in Spain joined the revolt. They drove Ferdinand from power. Bolivar moved with his army back to Venezuela and late that year he signed an armistice with the commander of Spain's forces there. In 1821, Bolivar's armistice with the Spanish ended. On June 21 he won the Battle of Carabobo (about ninety miles southwest of Caracas). A few days later Caracas fell to Bolivar and Venezuela was free of Spanish rule.

By now San Martín had landed in Peru, with the help of a British sea captain, Thomas Cochran. The invasion force was welcomed by rebellious inhabitants of coastal towns and they were joined by Peru's Indians. Lima's conservative forces fled inland. Spain's viceroy in Lima preferred negotiations to fighting and invited San Martín and his force into Lima, San Martín entering the city on July 12 amid celebrations in the streets. San Martín had not come to rule. All he wanted was Peru's independence. And he had Bolivar's help. In May 1822, Bolivar defeated Spain's supporters at Quito. In July, Bolivar met with San Martín, who was still combating Spain's supporters in the interior, and San Martín turned Peru over to Bolivar and returned to Chile.

In 1823, Europe's Holy Alliance delegated the French to put Ferdinand back onto his throne. Louis XVIII of France sent an army of 100,000 into Spain, and a bloodbath in Spain followed Ferdinand's restoration – killing on a scale said to have sickened his conservative "rescuers." Some managed to escape into exile, and Ferdinand, to reign ten more years. He restored archaic university programs and had to put down occasional revolts in various regions.

Britain meanwhile was enjoying trade with Latin America that had been denied by Spain, and Britain warned against any attempt to reestablish Spanish rule in Latin America. The United States was also enjoying its new freedom to trade with Latin America, and in December that year President James Monroe proclaimed what became known as the Monroe Doctrine, which was aimed at Russian designs on Alaska and also against Spain attempting to regain its lost colonies.

In August 1824, Bolivar launched an important battle at Junin, in what was soon to be called Bolivia in honor of Bolivar. Next, in December, fighting alongside a Peruvian force, Bolivar won the Battle of Ayacucho, 200 miles southeast of Lima. Spain was no longer a colonial power in South America.

Although the processes of modernization and reform set the stage for the wars for independence, it was the Napoleonic wars, and more specifically, Napoleon’s invasion of Spain, that triggered the wars for independence in Spanish America. This outline first looks at the rise of Napoleon and his efforts to dominate Europe. We then closely examine his invasion of Spain and Portugal, the flight of the Portuguese monarchy to Brazil, and the imprisonment of the king and crown prince of Spain. The French occupation of Spain and Portugal sets off a war of skirmishes and a British invasion. These events touch off a series of (mostly) failed wars for independence in Spanish America after 1808. The defeat of Napoleon and the return of Fernando VII in 1814 create another flashpoint that sets off a second series of wars in Spanish America, wars that largely succeed.

A. Napoleon’s armies invaded Spain and Portugal in 1807–1808, deposing the Iberian monarchies and severing the connections between Iberia and the Latin American colonies.

    1. The Portuguese royal family fled Lisbon for Brazil in 1807, and Napoleon imprisoned the Spanish king and crown prince in 1808.
    2. The Spanish Americans would have to decide how to rule their own lands with their king under French control.
    3. Before we look at these invasions and their consequences, we must first return to the French Revolution and events in Europe.

    B. After 1799, Napoleon emerged as the strongman in France he led his armies across Europe until 1815, deposing monarchs and dominating the entire continent.

      1. Napoleon Bonaparte is one of the more extraordinary figures in the history of the West.
      2. In 1803, Britain declared war on France, and the Austrian and Russian Empires soon joined in a coalition against Napoleon.
      3. Napoleon concentrated on closing off the continent to English trade.
      4. After signing a peace treaty with the young Tsar Alexander I in 1807, Portugal and Spain were the only “holes” in the continental blockade.

      The Spanish and Portuguese monarchies reacted in different ways to the Napoleonic invasions in 1807–1808.

      A. The Portuguese had long been allies of the English and had been preparing for a French invasion for more than a decade.

        1. The Braganzas had been the ruling family since 1640 Maria I had ascended to the throne in 1777.
        2. With the rise of the French revolutionary army in the 1790s, the Portuguese monarchy secretly began to plan for a possible invasion.
        3. When the French sent forces across Spain into Portugal in late 1807, the royal family chose to evacuate to Brazil under British escort.
        4. The Braganza family would reside in Brazil from 1808–1821, ruling their empire from Rio de Janeiro.

        B. Compared to the Spanish Bourbons, the Portuguese Braganzas appear to be one big, happy, and astute royal family.

          1. The Spanish monarch, Carlos IV, had assumed the throne at the age of 40 in 1788 on the death of his father, Carlos III.
          2. In the years leading up to the Napoleonic invasion, Manuel de Godoy (chief minister), the queen, the king, and the crown prince all conspired among themselves, against each other, and with Napoleon at various times.
          3. The wily Napoleon “invited” Carlos and Fernando to visit him in southern France in April 1808.
          4. Napoleon then placed his half-brother Joseph on the Spanish throne.

          The Spanish people resisted the French occupation with tenacity and at great cost.

          A. The Spanish confronted the overwhelming force of the French with a form of fighting that came to be known as guerrilla warfare.

            1. The great uprisings of May 1808 initiated a six-year struggle to regain Spanish independence.
            2. The Spanish attacked with regular troops and in irregular units that became justly famous.
            3. The British came to the aid of the Portuguese and Spanish to counter the French expansion.

            B. Across the country and in the absence of the true king, citizens formed juntas to rule in the name of the imprisoned Fernando VII.

              1. Many of these juntas joined together to form a “supreme” Central Junta.
              2. Across Spanish America, the colonists also formed juntas.
              3. This was a pivotal shift, with the “people” ruling through the juntas rather than the king.

              These momentous events in Spain triggered the wars for independence in Spanish America.

              A. A first set of wars broke out after 1808, led by the first wave of rebels.

                1. Most colonists were reluctant to break with Spain and chose to remain loyal to Fernando in his absence.
                2. As we shall see in the next series of outlines, some did choose to seize the opportunity of the moment and call for independence from Spain.
                3. The rebellions that broke out were nearly all defeated, with the great exceptions of Paraguay and Argentina.

                B. Ironically, the return of Fernando VII to power in 1814 triggered a second set of wars for independence.

                The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal

                During the 1970’s, Spain and Portugal made the political transition from corporatism to democracy. Spain is often viewed as the paradigm case for the transition to democracy model. If Spain’s experience was the generalizable case for the transition to democracy, wouldn’t Portugal’s path to democracy be similar because of the two nations’ similarities? Both countries shared a common geographical setting, history, religion, and corporatist dictatorships. However, markably different factors caused the political changes, producing different government and social structures in each society. Spain and Portugal may have similarities, but these factors cloud the very different processes that occurred in each country’s transition to democracy, bringing the appearance of correlation when in fact there is little. Can a meaningful model be developed around Spain’s experience if the country it had the most in common with followed a very different path? If Spain’s transition was vastly different to Portugal, how can its experience be applied to countries it has even less in common with? Or is it best to just compare two or more case studies without attempting to devise some kind of forced cursory commonality using a model?

                The Spanish Transition to Democracy

                The Spanish transition to democracy was a slow evolutionary process from Franco’s corporatist republic to King Juan Carlos I’s democratic monarchy. General Francisco Franco gained power in Spain after winning the Spanish Civil War in the 1930’s. He established an authoritarian, corporatist, centralized state ruled by his National Movement, a neo-one party apparatus. The Law of Succession, passed in 1947, established Spain as a traditional Catholic monarchy with Franco as Spain’s regent for life and gave him the power to name the next king. During the 1960’s, Spain developed economically, resulting in a larger educated middle class and a new urban working class. Catholic priests began to attack the Franco regime as undemocratic and against civil liberties. These factors, along with regional oppression of the Basque and Catalan groups, brought rise to organized opposition to Franco’s National Movement (Rinehart and Browning Seeley 40-47). The theory that economic development brings democracy would apply here to Spain, and may have helped the smooth evolution to democracy that occurred in the 1970’s.

                Despite new opposition to his power, Franco felt secure enough to name a successor, Prince Juan Carlos, grandson of the deposed Alfonso XIII. He skipped over Juan Carlos’s father, Don Juan, who had called for the overthrow of Franco and the establishment of Spanish democracy after World War II (Gunther 202). Juan Carlos had sworn allegiance to the National Movement, and Franco had personally supervised his successor’s education (Rinehart and Browning Steeley 55). Tension with Spain began to mount with the anticipation of Franco’s death in 1969. An economic slowdown brought general strikes, freedom of speech was again curtailed, and Spain returned to the level of oppression present in the 1940’s. In 1973, ETA, the Basque separatist group, successfully assassinated Franco’s Prime Minister, Luis Carrero Blanco. This state of uncertainty essentially dictated that Francoism would not survive Franco’s death, and some reforms would be required to prevent anarchy. Franco’s new Prime Minister Carlos Arias Navarro promised cautious reforms but was attacked by die-hard Francoists and reformers. When Franco finally died in November of 1975, Spain was ready for political change (48-49).

                When Juan Carlos came to power, there was no reason to expect that he would be the one to bring democracy to Spain. He dismissed Prime Minister Navarro in July 1976 after six months, but replaced him with another Francoist, Adolfo Suarez. Suarez’s links with the National Movement and the military’s allegiance to Juan Carlos allowed them to begin slow political reforms, like releasing some political prisoners. Later that year Suarez persuaded the corporatist Cortes to pass a political reform bill that would replace it with a bicameral, democratically elected body. This bill was then sent to the people of Spain for approval, using Franco’s 1945 Law on Referenda. It was approved by 98% of voters, giving Suarez and Juan Carlos a mandate for reform, not revolution. In February 1977 political parties were legalized, and the Communist Party was unbanned in April after Juan Carlos was able to gain military support for the action. In June, one and a half years after the death of Franco, democratic elections were held for the Cortes and a centrist coalition headed by Suarez, the UCD, formed the government. “The election results were a victory for both moderation and the desire for change. This boded well for the development for democracy in Spain… The political skill of Suarez, the courage and determination of Juan Carlos, and the willingness of opposition leaders to sacrifice their hopes for more radical social change to the more immediate goal of securing political democracy helped to end the polarization.” Autonomy, taken away by Franco, was returned to the Basque and Catalonia regions, and the task of drafting a new constitution to formally replace Franco’s state began (Rinehart and Browning Steeley 56-58).

                Suarez pursued a program of politics of consensus, and was able to gain support from all groups for a new constitution except from the Basque regional party and far right parties (Gunther 207). The Cortes passed the new Constitution in October 1978, and was approved by popular vote in December of that year. The Cortes was dissolved, and new elections were held in 1979, bringing the UCD to power again (Rinehart and Browning Steeley 60). The Franco era had officially came to an end. The Franquist state was able to utilize Franco’s policies to slowly democratize, prevent revolution, mass unrest, and opposition from the government itself to change. Spain’s transition to democracy was proven in 1981 when a Franquist general attempted a military coup and took the parliament hostage. General Tejero believed King Juan Carlos would support the coup, but instead used his popularity among the military to oppose Tejero and defend democracy (Graham 2-4).

                Scholars have lauded the Spanish transition to democracy. “Never before had a dictatorial regime been transformed into a pluralistic, parliamentary democracy without civil war, revolutionary overthrow, or defeat by a foreign power. The transition is all the more remarkable because the institutional mechanisms designed to maintain Franco’s authoritarian system made it possible to legislate a democratic constitutional monarchy into existence,” (Rinehart and Browning Steeley 55). The willingness of Spain’s political leaders to compromise, plus a growing level of economic development, allowed Spain to near-seamlessly evolve from Franco’s dictatorial state to a democratic monarchy. Unfortunately for Portugal, it lacked Spain’s evolutionary fortune.

                The Iberian Counterexample: The Portuguese Transition to Democracy

                Unlike Spain’s evolutionary path to democracy, Portugal followed a path of revolutionary upheaval. In 1910, a revolution displaced Portugal’s monarchy and established the First Republic. This period was marked by chaos and turbulence as 45 cabinets were in power, four of which were deposed by military coups. In 1928, Portugal’s military government appointed economist Dr. Antonio Salazar as Minister of Finance. Along with being a devout Catholic, Salazar had observed the perils of democratic government during the First Republic and feared the collapse of law and order to democratic principles. After successfully eliminating Portugal’s budget defect, Salazar was promoted to Prime Minister. Salazar formed the corporatist New State, and headed the sole political party, the National Union. He was able to rule by decree, answerable only to Portugal’s narrow elite of businessmen, generals, and church officials. Elections for the National Assembly and the President (who appointed the Prime Minister) occurred, but a secret police force and general repression kept Salazar’s support bodies in power. With the resources of Portugal’s overseas colonies, the country had no pressure to modernize like the rest of Western Europe (Schneidman 6-8). Portugal viewed its colonies as integral parts of the Portuguese state as overseas provinces, not subject to decolonization. Wars for independence broke out in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea in the 1960’s, and Portugal committed eighty percent of its troops to suppressing the insurgents. Salazar suffered a stroke in 1968, fell into a coma, and died the next year (Portugal: The New State).

                Marcello Caetano was appointed Salazar’s successor by President Americo Tomas. Caetano attempted to implement cautious reforms, but they were met with opposition from Tomas, who was able to utilize his power as president after Salazar’s departure from the political scene. The ongoing conflict in Portugal’s colonial possessions also threatened Caetano’s regime. In 1971, 41% of the state budget was devoted to military spending. Thousands fled conscription, and the military was forced to commission officers from outside the military academies. This made the military more prone to factionalism as the new officers were not committed to defending Portugal’s overseas possessions and reflected leftist ideologies. They formed the Armed Forces Movement, and in April of 1974 staged a coup that toppled Caetano and Tomas from power (Gunther 196-197).

                Portugal’s colonies soon gained independence, but Portugal itself faced years of coups, revolutionary turmoil, and interest group conflict before it completed its transition to democracy. Although the exact details of Portugal’s revolution and transition to democracy are beyond the scope of this paper, Portugal’s experience will be used as a counterexample to Spain. Portugal lacked the continuity in government present in Spain as different interim governments were formed, while the leaders of the former corporatist government were exiled and unable to provide the continuity necessary for a stable transition of power. The MFA moved to the left and purged its more moderate members. Agricultural lands were seized and banks nationalized, sending Portugal’s already weak economy into a tailspin. Multiple post-revolution coups were staged until a moderate gained power. This group then drafted a new constitution that favored a socialist ideology, unlike Spain’s neutral one that favored compromise and unity (Gunther 198-200). Although Spain was culturally heterogeneous compared to Portugal, that country’s rulers chose unity and democracy over personal gains. Spain’s primary interest groups stood to benefit from the shift away from Francoism. King Juan Carlos was able to unite the military, whereas in Portugal the military was fragmented and its members joined competing interest groups. Spain’s economy was developing, but Portugal’s was stuck in nineteenth century mercantilism with its colonies. Finally, Portugal’s different parties sought to impose their political will onto the county, creating chaos in the process. All of these factors kept Portugal from following Spain’s textbook transition to democracy.

                Future Research Applications

                The Spanish transition to democracy, followed by many others in the 1970’s, became a major source of study for scholars of comparative politics. Howard Wiarda, in the Introduction to Comparative Politics textbook, comments: “The vast spread of democracy, which was not predicted by most political scientists and was not foreseen [by earlier models], has meant the decline and discrediting of democracy’s primary alternatives.” Marxist-Leninism, authoritarianism, corporatism, and other regime styles have ended, and scholars like Francis Fukuyama feel democracy has triumphed. Wiarda warns that there are “different kinds, levels, and degrees” of democracy (100-101). This requires special attention when researching countries that claim democracy, as well as countries that have transitioned to democracy.

                In a 2002 article in World Affairs , Wiarda offers that the transition to democracy theory is so flawed that not only can it not be applied to Greece, Portugal, and Eastern Europe, but Spain itself, and thus new theories are needed. He feels scholars are taking the theories about Southern Europe at face value while deciding whether or not to use them in comparative research of Eastern Europe. Wiarda argues that the literature on Southern Europe failed to take into account political culture, and instead focused on institutional change. Changes under the authoritarian regimes, like economic reform and social change are often overlooked. Eastern Europe, unlike Portugal and Spain, had to make political, social, and economic change all at the same time. Spain’s transition was so different from its Southern and Eastern European counterparts that it is extremely difficult to formulate. He also discusses how international influences are often overlooked, as both Spain and Portugal had outside assistance in their transitions. Wiarda’s article concludes by arguing theories should be revised to reflect new facts. Models may only have cursory correlation between the Southern and Eastern European experiences, and instead researchers should examine the transition to democracy itself and its sources (Wiarda).

                Spain’s unique transition to democracy prevents it from serving as a comparative model with Portugal and other nations. Spain can serve as a role model for nations attempting a continual transition to democracy, but most changes to democracy seem to follow the rupture/revolutionary route. Today, Spain’s experience could be applied to another heterogeneous country: Iraq. Although the Saddam Hussein government was ruptured by outside intervention by the United States, Spain’s attempt at political consensus was able to prevent the internal fragmentation of the Spanish state. If the US is indeed willing to impose lasting democracy on Iraq, it should see to the stability of the country by promoting internal consensus among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. It may be impossible to develop a catch-all model for a transition to democracy, but past success stories like Spain can help newly democratizing countries avoid the problems Portugal faced which nearly derailed that country’s path to democracy.

                Works Cited

                De Queiroz, Mario. “Portugal: Evolution or Revolution? 30 Years On.” Global

                Information Network . New York: Apr 26, 2004, pg. 1.

                Graham, Robert. Spain : A Nation Comes of Age . New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984.

                Gunther, Richard. “Spain and Portugal.” Politics in Western Europe . Gerald A. Dorfman

                and Peter J. Duignan, eds. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988.

                Maxwell, Kenneth. “Spain’s Transition to Democracy: A Model for Eastern Europe?”

                Academy of Political Science . Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science

                1991, 38, 1 Social Science Module.

                “Portugal: The New State.” Library of Congress Country Studies .

                Rinehart, Robert and Jo Ann Browning Seeley. “Historical Setting.” Spain : A Country

                Study . Eric Solsten, ed. Washington: Federal Research Division of the Library of

                Schneidman, Witney. Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal’s Colonial

                Empire . Dallas: University Press of America, 2004.

                Wiarda, Howard J. Introduction to Comparative Politics: Concepts and Processes .

                Belmont : Wadsworth, 2000. 2 nd ed.

                Wiarda, Howard J. “Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Comparative Politics:

                Transitology and the Need for New Theory.” World Affairs . Washington: Spring 2002, Vol 164, Issue 4, pg 149.

                Written by: Chris Bailey
                Written for: Prof. Ahmadizadeh
                Date written: 2004

                Portugal: History

                There is little direct filiation between the Portuguese of today and the early tribes who inhabited this region, although the Portuguese long considered themselves descendants of the Lusitanians, a Celtic people who came to the area after 1,000 BC The Lusitanians had their stronghold in the Serra da Estrela. Under Viriatus (2d cent. BC) and under Sertorius (1st cent. BC), they stoutly resisted the Romans (see Lusitania). Other tribes, such as the Conii in Algarve, submitted more readily. Julius Caesar and Augustus completed the Roman conquest of the area, and the province of Lusitania thrived. Roman ways were adopted, and it is from Latin that the Portuguese language is derived.

                At the beginning of the 5th cent. AD, the whole Iberian Peninsula was overrun by Germanic invaders the Visigoths eventually established their rule, but in the north the Suevi established a kingdom that endured until late in the 6th cent., when they were absorbed by the Visigoths. Present-day Algarve was part of the Byzantine Empire during the 6th and 7th cent. In 711 the Visigoths were defeated by the Moors, who conquered the whole peninsula except for Asturias and the Basque Country. Muslim culture and science had a great impact, especially in the south. Religious toleration was practiced, but a large minority converted to Islam.

                It was during the long period of the Christian reconquest that the Portuguese nation was created. The kings of Asturias drove the Moors out of Galicia in the 8th cent. Ferdinand I of Castile entered Beira and took the fortress of Viseu and the city of Coimbra in 1064. Alfonso VI of Castile obtained French aid in his wars against the Moors. Henry of Burgundy married an illegitimate daughter of Alfonso VI and became (1095?) count of Coimbra and later count of Portucalense. Henry's son Alfonso Henriques, wrested power (1128) from his mother and maintained the independence of his lands. After a victory over the Moors in 1139, he began to style himself Alfonso I, king of Portugal. Spain recognized Portugal's independence in 1143 and the Pope did so in 1179. Alfonso's long reign (1128–85) was an important factor in Portugal's attainment of independence.

                Alfonso's successors were faced with the tasks of recapturing Alentejo and Algarve from the Moors and of rebuilding the areas devastated by the long wars. There was conflict with other Portuguese claimants and between the kings and powerful nobles, and there was continual strife between the crown and the church over land and power. Until the late 13th cent. the church was victorious, winning inviolability for ecclesiastic law as well as exemption from general taxation. Sancho I (1185–1211) captured the Moorish capital of Silves but could not hold it. Alfonso II (1211–23) summoned the first Cortes (council to advise the king). After Sancho II (1223–48) was deposed, Alfonso III (1248–79) took (1249) Algarve and thus consolidated Portugal. In Alfonso's reign the towns gained representation in the Cortes.

                The reconquest and resettlement aided local liberties, since forais (charters) guaranteeing municipal rights were granted in order to encourage settlement. As former serfs became settlers, serfdom declined (13th cent.), but in practice many servile obligations remained. Alfonso's son Diniz (1279–1325) attempted to improve land conditions. He also established a brilliant court and founded the university that became the Univ. of Coimbra. The reign of his son, Alfonso IV, is remembered chiefly because of the tragic romance of Inés de Castro, the mistress of Alfonso's son, Peter (later Peter I 1357–67) to avenge her fate, Peter, on his succession, had two of her murderers executed. Ferdinand I (1367–83) indulged in long Castilian wars. Ferdinand's heiress was married to a Castilian prince, John I of Castile after the death of Ferdinand, John claimed the throne.

                The Portuguese, largely due to the efforts of Nun'Álvares Pereira, defeated the Castilians in the battle of Aljubarrota (1385) and established John I, a bastard son of Peter, as king. At this time began the long alliance of Portugal with England. John founded the Aviz dynasty and his reign (1385–1433) commenced the most glorious period of Portuguese history. Portugal entered an era of colonial and maritime expansion. The war against the Moors was extended to Africa, and Ceuta was taken. Under the aegis of Prince Henry the Navigator, Portuguese ships sailed out along the coast of Africa. The Madeira Islands and the Azores were colonized. Duarte (1433–38) failed to take Tangier, but his son Alfonso V (1438–81) succeeded (1471) in doing so.

                Alfonso's attempt to gain the Castilian throne ended in defeat. Under his son John II (1481–95) voyages of exploration were resumed. Bartholomew Diaz rounded (1488) the Cape of Good Hope. By the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), Spain and Portugal divided the non-Christian world between them. During the glittering reign of Manuel I (1495–1521), Vasco da Gama sailed (1497–98) to India, Pedro Alvarez Cabral claimed (1500) Brazil, and Afonso de Albuquerque captured Goa (1510), Melaka (1511), and Hormoz (1515). The Portuguese Empire extended across the world, to Asia, Africa, and America. In 1497, as a precondition to his marriage with Ferdinand and Isabella's daughter, Manuel ordered the Jewish population to convert to Christianity or leave the country. Manuel's reign and that of John III (1521–57) marked the climax of Portuguese expansion.

                The slender resources of Portugal itself were steadily weakened by depletion of manpower and the neglect of domestic agriculture and industry. Government policy and popular ambition concentrated on the rapid acquisition of riches through trade with East Asia, but foreign competition and piracy steadily decreased profits from this trade. Lisbon was for a time the center of the European spice trade, but, for geographical considerations and because of limited banking and commercial facilities, the center of the trade gradually shifted to N Europe. The reign (1557–78) of Sebastian proved disastrous. His rash Moroccan campaign was a national catastrophe, and he was killed at Ksar el Kebir (1578) but the lack of certainty over his death led to a legend that he would return, and Sebastianism (a messianic faith) persisted into the 19th cent.

                The Aviz dynasty, founded by John I, disappeared with the death of Henry, the cardinal-king, in 1580. Philip II of Spain, nephew of John III, validated his claims to the Portuguese throne (as Philip I) by force of arms, and the long Spanish captivity (1580–1640) began. Spain's wars against the English and the Dutch cut off Portuguese trade with these nations moreover, the Dutch attacked Portugal's overseas territories in order to obtain for themselves direct access to the sources of trade. Eventually the Dutch were driven from Brazil, but most of the Asian empire was permanently lost. Portugal was never again a great power.

                Portugal was compelled to participate in Spain's wars against the Dutch and in the Thirty Years War. Finally in 1640 the Portuguese took advantage of the preoccupation of Philip IV with a rebellion in Catalonia to revolt and throw off the Spanish yoke. John of Braganza was made king as John IV (1640–56). Portugal, however, continued to be threatened by its larger neighbor. Alfonso VI (1656–67), weak in mind and body, signed the crown away to his brother Peter II (1667–1706), who was first regent and then king. The alliance with England was revived by the Treaty of Methuen (1703), which gave mutual trade advantages to Portuguese wines and English woolens, and Portugal reluctantly entered the War of the Spanish Succession against Louis XIV. Gold from Brazil helped to recreate financial stability by 1730, but it also freed John V (1706–50) from dependence on the Cortes (last called in 1677).

                Absolutism reached its height under John V and under Joseph (reigned 1750–77), when the marquês de Pombal was the de facto ruler of the land. Pombal attempted to introduce aspects of the Enlightenment in education, to achieve monarchical centralization, and to revitalize agriculture and commerce through the policies of mercantilism. His policies disturbed entrenched interests, and his new wine monopoly led to the Oporto tippler's rebellion, which Pombal put down harshly. He also won a long contest with the Jesuits, expelling them from the land. After the terrible earthquake of 1755, Pombal began the rebuilding of Lisbon on well-planned lines. Finances again became disorganized as Brazilian treasure dwindled.

                Most of Pombal's reforms were rescinded in the reign of Maria I (1777–1816) and her husband, Peter III. Under the regency of Maria's son (later John VI 1816–26) Portugal's alliance with Britain led to difficulties with France in 1807 the forces of Napoleon I marched on Portugal. The royal family fled (1807) to Brazil, and Portugal was rent by the Peninsular War. The French were driven out in 1811, but John VI returned only after a liberal revolution against the regency in 1820. He accepted a liberal constitution in 1822, and forces supporting him put down an absolutist movement under his son Dom Miguel. Brazil declared its independence, with Pedro I (John's elder son) as emperor.

                After John's death (1826) Pedro also became king of Portugal but abdicated in favor of his daughter, Maria II (reigned 1826–53), on condition that she accept a new charter limiting royal authority and marry Dom Miguel. Miguel instead seized the throne and defeated the liberals, but Pedro abdicated the Brazilian crown, came (1832) to Portugal and led the liberals in the Miguelist Wars. Maria was restored to the throne. Although her reign was marred by coups and dictatorship, the activities of moderates and liberals laid a groundwork for the reforms—penal laws, a civil code (1867), and commercial regulations—of the reigns of Peter V (1853–61 begun under the regency of Maria's husband Ferdinand II) and of Louis I (1861–89).

                Portuguese explorations in Africa strengthened Portugal's hold on Angola and Mozambique conflicting claims with Britain in E Africa were settled in 1891. To end the inefficiency and corruption of the late 19th-century parliamentary regime, Charles I (1889–1908) established (1906) a dictatorship under the conservative João Franco, but, in 1908, Charles and the heir apparent were assassinated. Manuel II succeeded to the throne, but in 1910 a republican revolution forced his abdication.

                The republic was established in 1910 with Teófilo Braga as president. The change of rule did not cure Portugal's chronic economic problems. Anticlerical measures aroused the hostility of the Roman Catholic Church. In World War I, Portugal was at first neutral, then joined (1916) the Allies. The economy deteriorated, and insurrections of both the right and the left made conditions worse. In 1926 a military coup overthrew the government, and General Carmona became president. António de Oliveira Salazar, the new finance minister, successfully reorganized the national accounts.

                Salazar became prime minister in 1932 he was largely responsible for the corporative constitution of 1933, which established what was destined to become the longest dictatorship in Western European history. Portugal was neutral in World War II but allowed the Allies to establish naval and air bases. It became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 but was not admitted to the United Nations until 1955. Under Salazar's New State, economic modernization lagged, with the result that Portugal fell increasingly behind the rest of Europe in the 1950s and 60s.

                Portugal's colony of Goa was seized by India in 1961. In Africa, armed resistance to Portuguese rule developed in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea in the early 1960s. On the domestic front, the 1958 antigovernment candidate, Gen. Humbert Delgado, contested the previously phony elections and received almost a quarter of the vote a constitutional amendment the following year changed the method of electing the president. Censorship of the press and of cultural activities grew especially severe in the mid-1960s, as student demonstrations were sternly repressed.

                In 1968, Salazar suffered a stroke and was replaced by Marcello Caetano as prime minister. Under Caetano repression was eased somewhat and limited economic development programs were started in Portugal and in the overseas territories. The continuing armed conflicts with guerrillas in the African territories, requiring about 40% of Portugal's annual budget to be devoted to military spending, drained the country's resources. By early 1974 dissatisfaction with the seemingly endless wars in Africa, together with political suppression and economic difficulties, resulted in growing unrest within Portugal.

                On Apr. 25 an organized group of officers toppled the government in the Captains' Revolution, encountering a minimum of resistance from loyal forces and enthusiastic acceptance from the people. The officers who initiated the revolution constituted the Armed Forces Movement (MFA). Gen. António de Spínola, who did not play an active role in the coup but had publicly criticized the Caetano government, was appointed head of the ruling military junta. The secret police force was abolished all political prisoners were released full civil liberties, including freedom of the press and of all political parties, were restored and overtures were made to the guerrilla groups in the African territories for a peaceful settlement of the conflicts. In September, Spínola was forced to resign and the government became dominated by leftists.

                In 1975, Angola, Mozambique, São Tomé and Principe, and Cape Verde were granted independence. East Timor was forcibly taken over by Indonesia and did not achieve independence until 2002. January to November of 1975 was the period of greatest leftist ascendancy domestically—most banks and industries were nationalized, a massive agrarian reform was begun in the Alentejo, and the MFA-dominated government tried to ignore the elections of Apr., 1975, which strongly favored moderate parties, and instead relied on Communist support. Leftist predominance vanished after a failed coup attempt by radical military units in November, but many features of the revolutionary period of 1974–75 were incorporated into the constitution of 1976.

                From 1977 to 1980 several moderate, Socialist-dominated governments tried unsuccessfully to stabilize the country politically and economically. In 1980–82, a center-right coalition experienced a similar fate, although it did succeed in instituting a process of constitutional revision, which reduced presidential power, the right of the military to intervene in politics, and the anticapitalist biases of the 1976 constitution. From 1983 to 1985 a coalition government under Socialist leader Mário Soares began to make some headway against the chaos and poverty into which Salazar's long dictatorship, the African wars, and the 1974–75 leftist revolution had thrown Portugal.

                In 1986, the centrist Social Democratic party under Aníbal Cavaco Silva won an undisputed majority in parliament, Soares was elected to the presidency, and Portugal was admitted to the European Community (now the European Union). Constitutional revision was furthered in 1989. Political stability and economic reforms created a favorable business climate, especially for renewed foreign investment, and there was strong economic growth. The Socialists returned to power as a minority government after the 1995 parliamentary elections António Guterres became prime minister.

                Barred from running for a third term, Soares retired as president in 1996 he was succeeded by another Socialist, Jorge Fernando Branco de Sampaio. Portugal became part of the European Union's single currency plan in 1999 in October, Guterres and the Socialists were returned to power, again as a minority government. Under a 1987 agreement, Portugal's last overseas territory, Macau, reverted to Chinese sovereignty at the end of 1999. Sampaio was reelected in Jan., 2001. Social Democratic victories in the Dec., 2001, local elections led Guterres to resign as prime minister and party leader in 2001. Early parliamentary elections in Mar., 2002, resulted in a defeat for the Socialists, and Social Democrat José Manuel Durão Barroso became prime minister, heading a coalition with the smaller Popular party. Barroso resigned in July, 2004, in anticipation of his being named president of the European Commission, and Social Democrat Pedro Miguel de Santana Lopes was appointed prime minister.

                Parliamentary elections in Feb., 2005, resulted in a victory for the Socialists, who won more than half the seats, and José Sócrates Carvalho Pinto de Sousa became prime minister. In 2006 former prime minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva was elected president, becoming the first center-right candidate to win the office since the 1974 revolution he won a second term in 2011. The Socialists won the parliamentary elections in Sept., 2009, but failed to secure a majority of the seats. Sócrates subsequently formed a minority government.

                High budget deficits in the wake of the global recession of 2008–9 forced the government to adopt an austerity budget in 2010. When additional austerity measures failed to win passage in Mar., 2011, Sócrates resigned, and in April, as cost of financing Portugal's debt increased, he asked for financial aid from the European Union in exchange for austerity measures that were enacted in May. Parliamentary elections in June led to a win for the Social Democrats and the Popular party they formed a coalition government with Social Democrat Pedro Passos Coelho as prime minister. In Nov., 2011, the new government enacted austerity measures more severe than those put forward by the Socialists.

                Dismal economic conditions, increasing unemployment, and decreasing government revenues in 2012 led to the need for greater austerities, and a proposal for a significant increase in employee social security contributions (coupled with a reduction in employer contributions) led to protests and government backtracking in Sept., 2012. A number of austerity measures were also overturned by the constitutional court. In mid-2013 tensions within the governing coalition over austerity measures led to a brief crisis but little ultimate change. By 2014, however, unemployment had fallen from a high of 17.7% in early 2013, and the economy had begun to grow slowly, benefiting from increased exports. In May, 2014, Portugal exited from EU bailout program.

                The Oct., 2015, parliamentary elections were won by the governing coalition, but it lost its majority and subsequently lost a confidence vote. In November, the Socialists formed a minority government with the support of leftist parties, and António Costa became prime minister. His government subsequently reversed a number of austerity measures while also reducing other spending to reduce budget deficits. By 2018 its policies had helped revive the economy, though the overall government debt remained high, and wages remained low despite a significant drop in unemployment. Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, the Social Democratic candidate, won the Jan., 2016, presidential election. The worst drought in more than 20 years contributed to deadly wildfires in June and Oct., 2017. Costa and the Socialists won a plurality in the Oct., 2019, parliamentary elections, and again formed a minority government.

                The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed. Copyright © 2012, Columbia University Press. All rights reserved.

                See more Encyclopedia articles on: Spanish and Portuguese Political Geography

                The country of Portugal emerged in the tenth century during the Christian reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula: first as a region under the control of the Counts of Portugal and then, in the mid-twelfth century, as a kingdom under King Afonso I. The throne then went through a turbulent time, with several rebellions. During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries overseas exploration and conquest in Africa, South America and India won the nation a rich empire.

                In 1580 a succession crisis led to a successful invasion by the King of Spain and Spanish rule, beginning an era known to opponents as the Spanish Captivity, but a successful rebellion in 1640 led to independence once more. Portugal fought alongside Britain in the Napoleonic Wars, whose political fallout led to a son of the King of Portugal becoming Emperor of Brazil a decline in imperial power followed. The nineteenth century saw civil war, before a Republic was declared in 1910. However, in 1926 a military coup led to generals ruling until 1933, when a Professor called Salazar took over, ruling in an authoritarian manner. His retirement through illness was followed a few years later by a further coup, the declaration of the Third Republic and independence for African colonies.


                For a long time, Portugal was isolated within Europe, due both to its location on the western fringe of the continent and to policies that focused more on exploiting resource-rich colonies than on cooperation with neighbouring nations. In the long term, this had dramatic consequences as – much like neighbouring Spain – Portugal failed to restructure its economy when the flow of South American treasure began to ebb in the mid-18th century.

                The Marquis de Pombal, then “First Minister”, attempted to respond to this development: he founded Europe’s first “business school”, curtailed the influence of land owners, nobility and the Church and, in 1758, established the royal silk manufactory. Private glass and iron-working operations followed. But in the agricultural sector, modernisation was inconceivable: with agriculture dominated in the south by arch-conservative large land owners and in the north by innumerable subsistence farmers, agricultural productivity remained low. No profits were generated, and as a consequence, a significant domestic market did not become established and investment capital was lacking. The country was thus hit all the harder by the declaration of independence in 1822 of Brazil – Portugal’s most important colony.

                As Portugal was also almost entirely lacking in natural resources, only a few scattered islands of industry developed at the end of the 19th century based on the use of domestic natural resources.Textile production was the most successful, in particular the manufacture of woollens in Covilha. The tungsten mines near Fundão were another example, as were the expanding tobacco and cork processing, and paper, ceramics and glass manufacturing. In the mid 19th century, construction of a railway network commenced: the first trains connected Lisbon and Porto in 1864, with a link to Spain following in 1866. As the new industries settled primarily in the capital and in the Porto region, no new jobs were created in rural areas. The population grew dramatically, and tens of thousands were forced to emigrate.

                Agriculture remained the backbone of the Portuguese economy until well into the 20th century. Improved cultivation methods and gradual mechanisation boosted production and an export trade in wine, fruit and cork developed, although grain imports were still necessary. The qualified workers and capital required for industrialisation were lacking. The fact that Portuguese foreign trade was dominated by Britain for a long time proved to be a further obstacle: much as the Portuguese economy had exploited the colonies as markets and raw-material suppliers, Great Britain exported technically advanced industrial goods to Portugal and in return procured agricultural products.

                The isolationist policy of the dictatorial Salazar regime from 1932 to 1968 stifled progress for a long time, as the former economics professor once again focused on colonial exploitation. However, he succeeded in balancing the notoriously lopsided national finances and stabilising the currency. Additionally, labour costs were low, which made Portugal attractive to foreign investors. When the dictator finally loosened the reins over the course of the 1960s, the long-delayed industrialisation began. The steel corporation Siderurgia Nacional expanded Lisnave built new shipyards in Lisbon and Setenave in nearby Setúbal paper factories, petrochemical companies and electrical equipment manufacturers emerged. The economy remained dominated by a small elite of a handful of families intermarried with the large landowners, but finally the process of structural change was completed.

                When the dictatorship was overthrown in the Carnation Revolution of 1974, the pent-up desire for social change broke loose. In the agricultural south, numerous large landowners were expropriated, their roles taken over by cooperatives. The government in Lisbon gradually nationalised the key industries and the banks. But the socialist experiment did not last long. Drops in agricultural production gave the old elite a weapon for reversing most of the land expropriations. As the government had increased the wages and at the same time massively expanded its administration to carry out the new tasks of the state, a large hole once again emerged in the state’s finances. An austerity policy with wage cuts was instituted in 1976, and the subsequent years saw a re-privatisation of most industrial operations. In 1986, Portugal finally met the requirements for accession to the European Community, marking a long-overdue end to the era of isolation.

                Portugal: 40 Years of Democracy and Integration in the European Union

                This paper reviews Portugal´s recent decades. It portrays a country full of hopes for the future in 1974, after the democratic revolution that closed a long lasting imperial course, mirrored for centuries in the world vision of its political elites. A country with very poor macroeconomic and social-development indicators, where most of the population had limited contact with the rest of the world, except those spread in the African colonies and in some European countries. It shows how the country integrated internationally in the decades that followed.

                Phase I: 1974-1979: revolution and the first infant steps of democracy

                Portugal has changed beyond recognition in the last four decades of democracy. Portugal’s April 25th, 1974 revolution was followed by a parliamentary democracy, based on a new constitution, following 48 years of dictatorship. It ended 13 years of colonial war, which demanded the presence of a total 800 thousand military in three main war theatres (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), with an army deployment that, at its peak in 1973, reached nearly 150 thousand men in arms. The war resulted in the death of 8.831 men of the Portuguese Armed Forces and in more than 100 thousand wounded and sick. (1) It is estimated that more than 100 thousand combatants and civilians died as a consequence of the colonial war. (2) The war, on average, consumed one third of the annual government budget expenditure and represented more than 40% of budget expenditures during the 1960s. (3)
                In the 1950s and the 1960s, Portugal, departing from extremely harsh economic conditions, experienced one of the highest rates of economic growth worldwide, which, however, still left it, by 1974, as one of the poorest countries in Europe. On April 25th, 1974, the country, led by its mid-officers-corps, tired of a war without a political solution in sight, tired of the lack of political and economic freedom, tired of large scale emigration of its youth, embraced the idea of democracy through a captains-corps military revolution, which was largely peaceful despite heavy movements of troops. (4)
                The political and economic instability in the first years following the revolution was high. A country based on a colonial empire had to reorganise itself as a small European peripheral economy. It welcomed and integrated more than half a million Portuguese from the former colonies (6%-7% of continental Portugal’s population), (5) an enormous success when we compare with the sombre integration process of the French ‘Pieds-Noirs’, after the Algerian Independence (1962). Portugal created a National Health Service in 1979, offering for the first time, free access to health to the wide population. It vastly expanded its public and free education system, resulting in an exponential increase in the number of enrolled students. It introduced a public social security system for all citizens, including those that had not paid any contributions, guaranteeing a minimum income for its eldest. (6) Portugal raised child care allowances, and expanded benefits so that the unemployed could also claim child care allowances. It introduced a minimum wage (May 1974), which has never been as high in real terms since then. Portugal also created a national unemployment insurance in 1975 and nationalised the Bank of Portugal, the commercial banking system and leading industrial conglomerates.
                In part as a result of: the political and economic instability the increase in public spending and in disposable income and the long impact waves of the oil shock of 1973, which made some Portuguese industries obsolete, the country quickly experienced small recurring balance of payments crises right from 1974 onwards. The trade deficit jumped from -5,9% of GDP to -12,9% of GDP between 1973 and 1974. Between 1973 and 1974, Portugal’s net borrowing requirements deteriorated by 7.9 percentage points from -1.9% of GDP to 6% of GDP.
                According to Paul Krugman (7) and Diário Económico (8), between 1975 and 1977, the then governor of the Bank of Portugal, José Silva Lopes called on various teams of MIT professors and graduate students, which included Rudiger Dornbusch, Robert Solow, Lance Taylor, Richard S. Eckaus, Cary Brown, Andrew Abel, Jeffrey Frankel, Miguel Beleza, Paul Krugman, Ray Hill, David Germany, Jeremy Bulow and Ken Rogoff for advice. In 1975 Dornbusch, Taylor and Eckaus helped to create national accounts statistics. In 1976 Abel, Frankel, Beleza, Krugman and Hill, led by Rudiger Dornbusch, helped devise a novel solution to deal with the large trade deficits: a crawling peg for the Escudo which consisted in a planned and constant devaluation rate of the escudo vis-à-vis other currencies, whereby the Bank of Portugal committed to guaranteeing the forward exchange rates.
                The trade deficit initially fell marginally but remained at over 10% of GDP, in all but one year, in the period going from 1974 to 1983. The country net borrowing requirements remained high despite the first IMF bailout in 1977. Following, the second oil shock in 1979 and the abandonment of the crawling peg policy in 1980 (“strong escudo” policy), the balance of payments crisis aggravated, with the country registering a trade deficit of 17.3% of GDP in 1982, leading to a second IMF bailout in 1983.

                Phase II: 1980-1998 - joining the European Union (EU)

                Portugal formally applied to join the EU on March 28 1977. It signed the pre-adhesion treaty on December 3 1980. On January 1, 1986, Portugal and Spain formally joined the European Union. Portugal’s policy makers eagerly endorsed the European integration process. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, they embraced the Economic and Monetary Union (the launch of the single currency) project. It became an economic policy priority to be in the group of early euro adopters.
                Very few argued against joining the euro. In fact, most economists and most policy makers had quite naïve views about the difficulties of the euro project. Thus, the country, and other member countries, ratified the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty in 1992, and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997), in the process ceding away various economic and jurisdictional policy instruments.
                Thus, Portugal: abolished capital controls in July 1990 reduced its banking system minimum reserve requirements from 17% in 1997 to 2% by January 1 1999 altered its constitution twice to accommodate the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Amsterdam.
                This widespread belief, without sound political or economic grounds, in the virtues of adopting the single currency was somewhat understandable. In fact, despite the damage caused by the European Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the early 1990s and the growing impact of the of economic integration in specific sectors of the Portuguese economy, the fact is that the first 6 years of integration in the EU were highly favourable for Portugal. Between 1986 and 1992, real per capita incomes increased enormously, moving from 50% to 65% of the average of 15 OECD developed economies. (9)
                At the political level, a number of arguments were put forward: that the Economic and Monetary Union would ensure that there would be peace among the Europeans that it would accelerate economic development that it would lead to higher levels of social justice that it would result in increased powers for the European Parliament and ultimately that it would lead to an European citizenship.
                For Portugal, the Maastricht Treaty would have three alleged advantages: “first it is an insurance for democracy, since the European political class is far more democratic than the Portuguese one (…) second, it is a source of economic development (…) third, it is a factor of world relevance”. (10)
                The widespread enthusiasm with an embellished and idealised vision of the European Union likely explains why the naysayers had little representation in the media and on public opinion, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, why their views, even when presented publicly, were not able to gain the hearts and minds of the general public.
                The refusal to submit the Treaty ratification process to a public referendum also explains the lack of effective national debate about the subject, confirming Adriano Moreira’s thesis that one of the larger sins of the European integration process is the “stealth fashion” by which it was brought about. (11)

                Phase III: 1999-2011 - adopting the euro

                On January 1, 1999 Portugal adopted the euro. The main problem of the euro area is that its member countries do not form a classic monetary union, based on federalism, which finds in the US its most mature type. A functioning monetary union has self-adjustment mechanisms that, while demanding responsible economic and financial behaviour from the member states, ensure that member states in crisis automatically receive fiscal transfers from other member states, in the form, for example, of unemployment insurance and reduced tax bill, greatly reducing the chance that these states will be forced into bankruptcy.
                In the United States, there is a proper federal government, with a very high own budget, which allows it to share with the federated states some of the social expenditures, which tend to increase during crises. Moreover, in contrast with the single inflation mandate of the ECB, the Federal Reserve has a dual inflation and full employment mandate.
                In the US there is a single common purpose. In contrast, in the EU, there is no entity with a strategic vision of the mission and future of the Union as a whole. On the contrary, the responses are found in a disruptive logic of ‘zero sum games’, in which the strongest (creditor countries with current account surpluses) seek to advance and protect their national interests, without care for the losses caused to the weaker, indebted countries, with current account deficits and with a lesser role in the EU decision making process.
                Unfortunately, the Economic and Monetary Union not only does not have any of the mechanisms that made the US federation a success story, but instead, the letter of the law (the European Treaty) forbids such mechanisms. The result, obviously, was that the European Council was forced to violate the letter of the law in order to be able to respond to the euro crisis. (12)
                At the present, by insisting on keeping the main body of the rules that have shown themselves highly destructive of the well-being and wealth of people and countries, the European Council and other EU governing institutions are simply showing an incomprehensible level of stubbornness, bordering on recklessness, since such an approach risks bringing about the collapse of the entire European project with it.
                While Portugal experienced rapid economic growth in the years that preceded the launch of the euro (between 1995 and 2000), the country’s macroeconomic performance since the introduction of the euro was a disillusionment. The performance was poor for most macroeconomic metrics (economic growth, domestic demand, gross investment, employment, unemployment rate, productivity growth, wage growth, etc).
                In fact, for example, real domestic demand, total employment, gross investment are all lower than in the first year the country adopted the euro.
                Nonetheless, the country registered strong progress in a number of social-economic indicators, such as educational attainment, production structure, and the structure of exports.
                From 2001 onwards, with the country in risk of violating or de facto in violation of the stability and growth pact (budget deficit no larger than 3% of GDP), successive governments undertook various austerity measures and one-off non-recurring measures to lower the budget deficit, but these efforts were not successful.
                Notwithstanding the successive austerity measures, the country economic performance aggravated during the rest of the decade. Undisturbed by the austerity measures the country’s net external debt grew at a rapid pace, so that by 2013, Portugal’s international investment position reached -118.9% of GDP (it had been close to balanced in 1996). This followed consecutive years in the late 90s when the trade deficit was close to or above 10% of GDP.
                However, led by the Governor of the Bank of Portugal who, in 2000, announced that under the euro the country would not have to worry about current account deficits, and by leading economists that argued that, with the euro, balance of payments statistics would become a mere curiosity of the past, the authorities and policy makers paid no attention to the growing external imbalances.
                As a consequence, at the end of 2009, about three fourths of the Portuguese government direct debt was held by non-residents abroad, i.e., the Portuguese government was highly dependent on external funding. (14) Moreover, the Portuguese banking system was strongly indebted abroad, and dependent on external funding. And the Bank of Portugal showed growing dependency on large Eurosystem TARGET2 loans, from abroad.
                Thus, as the financial crisis stroke in 2007-2008, and the banking systems of creditor countries (Germany, Holland, etc) cut back on lending to Portugal and other periphery countries perceived as more risky, the Portuguese government and the Portuguese banking system rapidly faced a funding crisis, whereby they were unable to raise new funds to repay old debt that matured: the euro crisis arrived in Portugal a few months after it landed in Greece and in Ireland.
                Between 2010 and 2011, the main rating agencies lowered Portugal’s government debt rating from investment grade to non-investment grade (“junk”). (15) In April 2011, under the prodding of the ECB, (16) the Portuguese banking system announced that it would not participate in further Portuguese government bond auctions. In June 2011, a large Portuguese bond series was due. The government did not have the funds to repay that debt at maturity, which would have precipitated a default event. To avoid default, the minister of finance Fernando Teixeira dos Santos on April 6th 2011, notwithstanding the opposition of the prime-minister José Sócrates, gave an interview announcing that Portugal would request a bailout. An initial agreement was reached on May 3, 2011 and the memorandum of understanding for the bailout was signed on May 17th, 2011.

                Phase IV: 2011-2014 – the troika bailout and the adjustment programme

                The consensus perception of reality often matters more than facts – and this is of course the reason why propaganda, and not only in dictatorial regimes, is so important. The consensus view of the euro crisis was that this was a crisis that had its origins in ‘misbehaviour’ of the peripheral countries’ governments. Meaning this was a fiscal crisis caused by lax fiscal discipline: the governments of the peripheral countries “had been living beyond their means for too long”. This consensus view was shared not only by the governing institutions of the EU (17) but also by wide segments of the population of the affected countries, including Portugal.
                In fact, in Portugal, the memoranda of understanding between the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), on the one side, and the government of Portugal, on the other, was widely hailed in the press and by many academic economists. One often repeated slogan was that the memorandum meant that finally, under the close supervision of a troika of IMF, European Commission (EC), and European Central Bank (ECB) officials, Portugal would finally be able to ‘get rid’ of some old bad habits.
                Many Portuguese believed that the country had ‘lived beyond its means’ and that the cause of the crisis was poor national (and poor government) policies. Many Portuguese believed that the country required some austerity to overcome the funding crisis, and actually embraced and accepted the first austerity measures with resignation to their ‘fado’. (18) Many welcomed the troika of IMF, EC, and ECB technocrats because they believed the foreign technocrats would be far more competent stewards of Portugal’s economy and government, than the Portuguese politicians of the previous three and a half decades.
                Therefore, it is no surprise that the design of the bailout and accompanying ‘conditionality’, (19) was essentially based on the view that Portugal faced eminently a fiscal crisis.
                However, in reality, the euro crisis is an external debt and balance of payments crisis. Up until 2005, according to the Eurostat, Portugal’s sovereign debt in percentage of GDP (67.7%), was lower than Germany’s (68.6%) (20), and this following 5 years of subpar economic growth. At the end of 2009, Portugal’s net external debt and the net external debt of Spain, Greece and Ireland were very high (between 80% and 100% of GDP), roughly twice the size of Argentina’s gross external debt in 2001, when it declared a moratorium on debt, triggering a default event. (21)
                Thus, the adjustment programme suffered from a fundamental problem: the misdiagnosis of the nature of the crisis.
                A second problem is the widespread belief, by the powers that are running both EU and euro area destinies since at least the early 1990s, in the almost mythic powers and virtues of austerity. These unwarranted beliefs were allowed to be ingrained in key pieces of the Maastricht Treaty. (22)
                When the crisis stroke, the response was immediate: more austerity, and “austerity is the only option to respond to the euro crisis”. (23)
                Thus, austerity policy measures were numerous and blunt. They focused on raising fiscal revenues and reducing fiscal expenditure. They did not explicitly target improvements to the balance of payments (the cause of the crisis).
                Improvements in the external accounts were seen as a by-product of the adjustment programme, though the size of the external adjustment envisioned for Portugal (of more than 13 percentage points of GDP) was much larger than the size of the fiscal adjustment.
                Disastrous, regression and impoverishment are perhaps the keywords that best characterize the effects of the adjustment programme on the Portuguese economy and on the Portuguese social fabric and people.
                First, the adjustment programme has resulted in unprecedented job destruction. In 2012 alone, the first full year of the programme implementation, 227 thousand jobs in the private sector were destroyed, 106% more than in 2011, representing 5,8% of total private sector employment. In the 4 years between the end of 2008 and 2012, 550 thousand private sector jobs were lost. The unemployment rate rose rapidly, particularly among youth. (24) In fact 35.7% of 16-24 year-olds were unemployed in Portugal at the end of 2013. Despite the increase in unemployment, access to unemployment insurance was restricted so that by April 2013 only 44% of the unemployed could claim unemployment benefits. (25)
                Second, the adjustment programme resulted in a massive increase in emigration of young singles and couples, often with a higher education degree. The best qualified generation in Portuguese history, more than 200 thousand Portuguese emigrated between 2010 and 2013, with an estimated 120 thousand emigrating in 2013 alone. This rate of emigration is similar with that registered in the worse period of the dictatorship in the 1960s. This is very problematic for the demographic sustainability of a country whose pre-crisis birth-rate was already among the lowest in western Europe.
                Third, the adjustment is so harsh that Portugal registered in 2013 the first balance of trade surplus in 70 years (the 8th trade surplus in 238 years of History). This is a stark indicator of the level of stress that the Portuguese economy is being subjected to, and is clearly unsustainable.
                The social and human consequences of the adjustment programme are known: an increase in suicide rates, poverty, hunger, including among children. Widespread segments of the population, including employed families (for example, in Portuguese public security forces), are facing hunger and hardship due to financial difficulties. These austerity policies were implemented in a country with high levels of poverty and income inequality. According to Journal i, (27) in 2010, prior to the bailout, but already after the first package of austerity measures were implemented, 2.3 million families (48% of total) had gross annual incomes of less than 10 thousand euro. Following the austerity measures implemented by imposition of the troika adjustment programme, families’ incomes dropped significantly. By 2012, 3 million families (66% of total) had gross annual incomes of less than 10 thousand euro.

                Phase V: 2014 - … – the post-troika

                The roadmap laid out by the EU governing institutions, the IMF, and the Portuguese government is clear. The country should, for the next few decades, “stay the austerity course”: (28)

                The French invasion of Spain, February-May 1808

                The Peninsular War was one of Napoleon&rsquos greatest blunders, leading to seven years of warfare and ending with an invasion of France, but it began with a an almost effortless occupation of Madrid, Old Castile and the fortresses on the Pyrenees, followed by a cynical but well managed abduction of the Spanish royal family. Spain was officially allied with France at the time of the French invasion, but for some time Napoleon had been dissatisfied with the performance of his ally, especially after the Spanish fleet was destroyed at Trafalgar, and was known to have said that a Bourbon Spain was too week as an ally but potentially a dangerous enemy. Napoleon&rsquos suspicions had been raised during the Jena campaign of 1806, when the Spanish government had issued a proclamation calling on the people to unite against an unnamed enemy, widely assumed to be France. In the aftermath of Napoleon&rsquos victory at Jena the proclamation had been withdrawn, but the damage was done.

                Spain in 1808 was ruled by Charles IV, the last surviving Bourbon king in Europe. He was widely considered to be an imbecile who was entirely dominated by his wife Maria Luisa and her favourite, Don Manuel Godoy. Charles had denied any role during the reign of his father Charles III, and had come to the throne at the age of 40. At first power was held by the queen, but within a few years Godoy had risen from the ranks (he was a private in the royal bodyguard, and a minor nobleman) to the status of prime minister. After negotiating the peace of Basle, which ended the Franco-Spanish War of 1793-1795, he had been awarded with the title of Prince of the Peace. Godoy was corrupt and ambitious but ineffective, although he was also moderately progressive, a supporter of vaccination and an opponent of the Inquisition. Lurking behind the scenes was Ferdinand, Prince of the Asturias, the heir to the throne. Just like his father he had been excluded from all government business for most of his life, but as his parents aged, Ferdinand began to attract a group of supporters. Unfortunately he would turn out to be ignorant, cowardly, and on his return to power in 1814 despotic and tyrannical.

                Ferdinand&rsquos main concern by 1807 was a fear that Godoy was planning to exclude him from the succession, and seize the throne in his own name. Despite all the pleadings of his supporters, Ferdinand took no action against Godoy, but in the autumn of 1807 he decided to write to Napoleon, asking for a French princess to marry, and for Napoleon&rsquos support against Godoy and his father. Godoy soon learnt of this letter, and on 27 October 1807 Ferdinand was arrested and his quarters searched. There Godoy&rsquos men discovered two letters of complaint that Ferdinand had drafted but never sent. This was just enough for Godoy to convince Charles to arrest his son and announce that Ferdinand had been planning to overthrown his father. Whatever plans Godoy had for Ferdinand were derailed by Napoleon, who intervened to make it clear that his involvement in the affair must not be revealed. Ferdinand was forced to write a grovelling letter of apology, and was by 5 November was partially restored. The whole episode became known as the &ldquoAffair of the Escurial&rdquo, and it played a considerable part in speeding up Napoleon&rsquos plans against Spain.

                The first French troops to enter Spain were the 25,000 men of General Junot&rsquos First Corps of Observation of the Gironde, who passed through on their way to Portugal in October-November 1807. Under the terms of the agreement between France and Spain, the French were allowed to send reinforcements to Portugal if the British intervened, but only after giving Charles IV due notice, but Junot had met no opposition at all, and the British were still months away from intervening when on 22 November the Second Corps of Observation of the Gironde began to enter Spain. This force of 30,000 men under General Dupont made no effort to move towards Portugal. Behind them in France three more corps began to take shape &ndash the Corps of Observation of the Ocean under Marshal Moncey, the Corps of Observation of the Pyrenees and the Corps of Observation of the Eastern Pyrenees. On 8 January 1808 Moncey&rsquos men crossed into Spain, and the 55,000 Frenchmen under Dupont and Moncey began to spread out across Old Castile, Biscay and Navarre.

                Up until February it was just possible for the French to claim that these 55,000 troops were travelling through Spain to Portugal under the terms of the Franco-Spanish alliance, but on 10 February 18,000 men of the Corps of Observation of the Eastern Pyrenees, under General Duhesme, began to cross into Catalonia. There was no way that these men were heading for Portugal.

                Only a few days later the French finally revealed their intentions, seizing a series of Spanish border fortresses. Pampeluna was taken by surprise on 16 February, as was Barcelona on 29 February and Figueras on 18 March. Only at San Sebastian did the garrison put up any resistance, but the commander was under orders not to resist any French assault, and the place fell on 5 March.

                The reaction in Madrid to this open aggression was chaotic. Charles IV and his advisor Godoy had responded to the first French moves in November by asking Napoleon if he could find a suitable female relative to marry Prince Ferdinand. Napoleon did not respond until after his return from Italy in January 1808, and in his reply made it clear that he did not think Ferdinand was a suitable match for any of his relatives, hardly a reassuring response. Even after the seizure of the border fortresses, Charles failed to declare war, apparently refusing to believe that Napoleon had betrayed him.

                Although Napoleon had been planning to intervene in Spain for some time, he still did not have his long term plans in place. At first the overall command in Spain was given to Joachim Murat, Napoleon&rsquos brother-in-law, who was appointed &ldquoLieutenant of the Emperor&rdquo in Spain. On 26 February he reached Bayonne, on 10 March crossed into Spain, and on 13 March reached Burgos. On 27 March he offered the throne to his brother Louis, then the King of Holland, but Louis refused. Napoleon then repeated the offer to his brother Joseph, then the King of Naples, and Joseph accepted the offer.

                By that point the Spanish throne had changed hands. When it became clear that the French would soon be at Madrid, Godoy, Charles, Ferdinand and the Spanish court moved to Aranjuez, the first step on a longer journey to the coast and then to Mexico or Argentina. On the night of 17 March, the court was ready to move from Aranjuez, but the mob discovered their plans. At this point Ferdinand was an unknown quantity, and was thus far more popular than his father. When the crowd threatened violence, Charles was forced to turn to his son for help. That night Godoy was removed from his posts, and two days later Charles abdicated in favour of his son.

                Ferdinand VII began his reign with massive public support, much to Napoleon&rsquos surprise. He had believed that Ferdinand had been discredited by the affair of the Escurial, and had based his plans on the expectation that his armies would be deposing the unpopular Godoy. Murat, as the man on the scene, found himself in a difficult position, but luckily for the French Ferdinand still believed that he could win over Napoleon. Instead of taking command of the army, and making himself the figurehead of the resistance, on 24 March, the day after Murat and 20,000 men reached the city, Ferdinand returned to Madrid.

                Murat handled the situation with some skill. He refused to acknowledge Ferdinand as king, and opened communications with Charles, who was easily persuaded to write a letter to Napoleon complaining that he had been forced to abdicate against his will. This would play an important part in the upcoming betrayal at Bayonne. Napoleon decided to make a personal intervention in Spain. He decided to lure Ferdinand out of Madrid, towards the French border, and if possible to convince him to come to Bayonne. First Ferdinand was told that Napoleon was planning to visit Madrid, and the French even went as far as preparing a palace to receive the Emperor. In fact Napoleon had no intention of coming any further than Burgos. On 10 April Ferdinand left Madrid, arriving on Burgos on 12 April. On 18 April he received a letter from Napoleon, inviting him on to Bayonne. In this letter Napoleon promised to recognise Ferdinand as long as his father&rsquos abdication had been spontaneous. By this time Napoleon had already received the letter from Charles in which he made it clear this was not the case.

                Ferdinand was still hoped that he could trust Napoleon, and so on 19 April left Burgos, arriving at Bayonne on the following day. One hour after meeting Napoleon over dinner, Ferdinand received a letter informing him that Napoleon had decided that the best thing for Spain would be the replacement of the Bourbon dynasty by a French prince. Despite the weakness of his position, Ferdinand refused to abdicate. Napoleon then summoned Charles to Bayonne. On 30 April the royal couple joined their son in French captivity. Even now Ferdinand refused to abdicate.

                Napoleon&rsquos limited patience soon wore thin. News reached Bayonne of the riots that had broken out in Madrid on 2 May, and he responded by telling Ferdinand either that he would be treated as a &ldquotraitor and rebel&rdquo if he did not abdicate (this is Napoleon&rsquos own version of events), or that he had to chose between &ldquoabdication and death&rdquo, a more dramatic version of essentially the same threat. On 6 May Ferdinand finally agreed to officially return the crown to his father. Only then did he discover than on the previous day Charles had abdicated in favour of Napoleon. Ferdinand would spend the next seven years a prisoner at Talleyrand&rsquos estate of Valençay. On 10 May Ferdinand officially gave up all claims to the throne of Spain.

                As news from Bayonne slowly leaked back into Spain, a wave of popular discontent threatened to break out into open resistance. The first outbreak came on 2 May at Madrid (the &ldquoDos Mayo&rdquo), and was soon put down by the French. In the provinces the news from Madrid and the news from Bayonne combined to trigger the first of the major uprisings, when on 24 May the province of the Asturias declared war on Napoleon. Over the next month most of the rest of Spain followed suit, and by the time Joseph was officially declared King of Spain on 15 June the French only held those parts of Spain directly occupied by their garrisons. Joseph&rsquos kingdom consisted of an area around Barcelona, and a wedge that ran along the main road from Bayonne to Vittoria, Burgos and Madrid, reaching as far as Toledo. The Spanish uprising had begun.

                The Spanish Ulcer, A History of the Peninsular War, David Gates. An excellent single volume history of the Peninsular War, which when it was published was the first really good English language history of the entire war since Oman. This is a well balanced work with detailed coverage of those campaigns conducted entirely by Spanish armies, as well as the better known British intervention in Portugal and Spain.

                History of the Peninsular War vol.1: 1807-1809 - From the Treaty of Fontainebleau to the Battle of Corunna, Sir Charles Oman. The first volume of Oman's classic seven volume history of the Peninsular War, this is one of the classic works of military history and provides an invaluable detailed narrative of the fighting in Spain and Portugal. This first volume covers the initial French intervention, the start of the Spanish uprising, the early British involvement in Spain and Portugal and Napoleon's own brief visit to Spain.

                Economy of Portugal

                Major Industries: textiles and footwear wood pulp, paper, and cork metals and metalworking oil refining chemicals fish canning rubber and plastic products ceramics electronics and communications equipment rail transportation equipment aerospace equipment ship construction and refurbishment wine tourism

                Agricultural Products: grain, potatoes, tomatoes, olives, grapes sheep, cattle, goats, swine, poultry, dairy products fish

                Natural Resources: fish, forests (cork), iron ore, copper, zinc, tin, tungsten, silver, gold, uranium, marble, clay, gypsum, salt, arable land, hydropower

                Major Exports: clothing and footwear, machinery, chemicals, cork and paper products, hides

                Major Imports: machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, petroleum, textiles, agricultural products

                National GDP: $248,500,000,000

                ** Source for population (2012 est.) and GDP (2011 est.) is CIA World Factbook.