Ethnic Cleansing - Definition, Meaning and Examples

Ethnic Cleansing - Definition, Meaning and Examples

“Ethnic cleansing” has been defined as the attempt to get rid of (through deportation, displacement or even mass killing) members of an unwanted ethnic group in order to establish an ethnically homogenous geographic area. Though “cleansing” campaigns for ethnic or religious reasons have existed throughout history, the rise of extreme nationalist movements during the 20th century led to an unprecedented level of ethnically motivated brutality, including the Turkish massacre of Armenians during World War I; the Nazis’ annihilation of some 6 million European Jews in the Holocaust; and the forced displacement and mass killings carried out in the former Yugoslavia and the African country of Rwanda during the 1990s.


The phrase “ethnic cleansing” came into wide usage in the 1990s, to describe the treatment suffered by particular ethnic groups during conflicts that erupted after the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

After the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence in March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces waged a systematic campaign—including forced deportation, murder, torture and rape—to expel Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) and Croatian civilians from territory in eastern Bosnia. This violence culminated in the massacre of as many as 8,000 Bosniak men and boys at the town of Srebrenica in July 1995.

In his 1993 article “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” published in the magazine Foreign Affairs, Andrew Bell-Fialkoff writes that the aim of the Serbian campaign was “the expulsion of an ‘undesirable’ population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic or ideological considerations, or a combination of those.”

Using this definition, Bell-Fialkoff and many observers of history consider the aggressive displacement of Native Americans by European settlers in North America in the 18th and 19th centuries to be ethnic cleansing. By contrast, the removal of thousands of Africans from their native lands for the purpose of slavery would not be classified as ethnic cleansing, as the intent of these actions was not to expel a particular group.


According to Bell-Fialkoff and others, the Assyrian Empire practiced ethnic cleansing when it forced millions of people in conquered lands to resettle between the ninth and seventh centuries B.C. Groups such as the Babylonians, Greeks and Romans continued this practice, though not always on such a large scale and often to procure slave labor.

During the Middle Ages, religion rather than ethnicity was a main source of persecution; episodes of religious cleansing tended to target Jews, often the largest minority in European countries. In Spain, which had a large population of Jews and of Muslims, Jews were expelled in 1492 and Muslims in 1502; those who remained were forced to convert to Christianity, though all Muslim converts (called Moriscos) were expelled in the early 17th century.

In North America, most Native Americans in North America were forced to resettle in territory allotted to them by the mid-19th century; when the Homestead Act of 1862 opened up most of the remaining lands to white settlers, those tribes who resisted—such as the Sioux, Comanche and Arapaho—were brutally crushed.

Despite these examples, some scholars argue that ethnic cleansing in its strictest sense is a 20th-century phenomenon. In contrast to forced resettlement movements of the past, 20th-century ethnic cleansing efforts have been driven by the rise of nationalist movements with racist theories fed by the desire to “purify” the nation by expelling (and in many cases destroying) groups considered “alien.”

This was the case in the 1990s, both in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, where members of the majority Hutu ethnic group massacred hundreds of thousands of people, mostly minority Tutsis, from April to July 1994.

The most prominent example of extremist nationalism-fueled ethnic cleansing was Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime in Germany and its campaign against Jews in German-controlled territory from 1933 to 1945. This movement began with cleansing by deportation and ended in the horrific “final solution”—the destruction of some 6 million Jews (along with some 250,000 Gypsies and roughly the same number of homosexuals) in concentration camps and mass killing centers.

The term ethnic cleansing has also been used to refer to the treatment of Chechens who fled Grozny and other areas of Chechnya after Russia began military operations against separatists there during the 1990s, as well as the killing or forcible removal from their homes of refugees from East Timor by Indonesian militants after a vote for independence in 1999.

Most recently, it has been applied to the events that occurred beginning in 2003 in the Darfur region of Sudan, where brutal clashes between rebel groups and Sudanese military forces left hundreds of thousands dead and more than 2 million displaced (many of whom, like the rebels, are members of the Fur, Zaghawa and Masaalit ethnic groups).


Events in Darfur have intensified a longstanding debate about the difference—if any—that exists between ethnic cleansing (which is a descriptive, not a legal term) and genocide, which was designated an international crime by the United Nations in 1948.

Some equate the two, while others argue that while the main goal of genocide is to physically destroy entire racial, ethnic or religious groups, the aim of ethnic cleansing is to establish ethnic homogeneity, which does not necessarily mean mass killings, but can be achieved by other methods.

During the 1990s, the term “ethnic cleansing” was applied to the ongoing atrocities being committed in Bosnia and Rwanda; its acceptance as a description by the United States and other U.N. Security Council members allowed them to avoid calling these acts “genocide,” which would have required intervention under international law.

Since then, the two international tribunals established by the U.N. during the 1990s (one for the former Yugoslavia and another for Rwanda) and the International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 1998, have all debated fiercely the exact legal definition for ethnic cleansing.

The ICC has linked ethnic cleansing more specifically to genocide, “crimes against humanity” and “war crimes,” stating that ethnic cleansing could constitute all three of those other offenses (all of which are under the court’s jurisdiction). In this way, despite controversy over its exact definition, ethnic cleansing is now clearly covered under international law, though efforts to prevent and punish acts of ethnic cleansing (such as those in Darfur) are still in development.

After more than 20 years in operation, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic guilty of genocide and other crimes against humanity for his role in perpetrating the atrocities of the Balkan wars. Dubbed the “Butcher of Bosnia,” Mladic was sentenced to life in prison, in the last major prosecution of individuals involved with the Bosnian Genocide.

Ethnic conflict

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Ethnic conflict, a form of conflict in which the objectives of at least one party are defined in ethnic terms, and the conflict, its antecedents, and possible solutions are perceived along ethnic lines. The conflict is usually not about ethnic differences themselves but over political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial matters.

Ethnic conflict is one of the major threats to international peace and security. Conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Darfur, as well as in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, are among the best-known and deadliest examples from the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The destabilization of provinces, states, and, in some cases, even whole regions is a common consequence of ethnic violence. Ethnic conflicts are often accompanied by gross human rights violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, and by economic decline, state failure, environmental problems, and refugee flows. Violent ethnic conflict leads to tremendous human suffering.

The Expulsion Of The Germans: The Largest Forced Migration In History

In December 1944 Winston Churchill announced to a startled House of Commons that the Allies had decided to carry out the largest forced population transfer -- or what is nowadays referred to as "ethnic cleansing" -- in human history.

Millions of civilians living in the eastern German provinces that were to be turned over to Poland after the war were to be driven out and deposited among the ruins of the former Reich, to fend for themselves as best they could. The Prime Minister did not mince words. What was planned, he forthrightly declared, was "the total expulsion of the Germans. For expulsion is the method which, so far as we have been able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting."

The Prime Minister's revelation alarmed some commentators, who recalled that only eighteen months previously his government had pledged: "Let it be quite clearly understood and proclaimed all over the world that we British will never seek to take vengeance by wholesale mass reprisals against the general body of the German people."

In the United States, senators demanded to know when the Atlantic Charter, a statement of Anglo-American war aims that affirmed the two countries' opposition to "territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned" had been repealed. George Orwell, denouncing Churchill's proposal as an "enormous crime," took comfort in the reflection that so extreme a policy "cannot actually be carried through, though it might be started, with confusion, suffering and the sowing of irreconcilable hatreds as the result."

Orwell greatly underestimated both the determination and the ambition of the Allied leaders' plans. What neither he nor anybody else knew was that in addition to the displacement of the 7-8 million Germans of the East, Churchill, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin had already agreed to a similar "orderly and humane" deportation of the more than 3 million German-speakers -- the "Sudeten Germans" -- from their homelands in Czechoslovakia. They would soon add the half-million ethnic Germans of Hungary to the list.

Although the governments of Yugoslavia and Romania were never given permission by the Big Three to deport their German minorities, both would take advantage of the situation to drive them out also.

By mid-1945, not merely the largest forced migration but probably the largest single movement of population in human history was under way, an operation that continued for the next five years. Between 12 and 14 million civilians, the overwhelming majority of them women, children and the elderly, were driven out of their homes or, if they had already fled the advancing Red Army in the last days of the war, forcibly prevented from returning to them.

From the beginning, this mass displacement was accomplished largely by state-sponsored violence and terror. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, hundreds of thousands of detainees were herded into camps -- often, like Auschwitz I or Theresienstadt, former Nazi concentration camps kept in operation for years after the war and put to a new purpose.

The regime for prisoners in many of these facilities was brutal, as Red Cross officials recorded, with beatings, rapes of female inmates, gruelling forced labour and starvation diets of 500-800 calories the order of the day. In violation of rarely-applied rules exempting the young from detention, children routinely were incarcerated, either alongside their parents or in designated children's camps. As the British Embassy in Belgrade reported in 1946, conditions for Germans "seem well down to Dachau standards."

Though the death rates in the camps were often frighteningly high -- 2,227 inmates of the Mysłowice facility in southern Poland alone perished in the last ten months of 1945 -- most of the mortality associated with the expulsions occurred outside them.

Forced marches in which inhabitants of entire villages were cleared at fifteen minutes' notice and driven at rifle-point to the nearest border, accounted for many losses. So did train transports that sometimes took weeks to reach their destination, with up to 80 expellees crammed into each cattle car without adequate (or, occasionally, any) food, water or heating.

The deaths continued on arrival in Germany itself. Declared ineligible by the Allied authorities to receive any form of international relief and lacking accommodation in a country devastated by bombing, expellees in many cases spent their first months or years living rough in fields, goods wagons or railway platforms.

Malnutrition, hypothermia and disease took their toll, especially among the very old and very young. Although more research is needed to establish the total number of deaths, conservative estimates suggest that some 500,000 people lost their lives as a result of the operation.

Not only was the treatment of the expellees in defiance of the principles for which the Second World War had professedly been fought, it created numerous and persistent legal complications. At the Nuremberg trials, for example, the Allies were trying the surviving Nazi leaders on charges of carrying out "deportation and other inhumane acts" against civilian populations at the same moment as, less than a hundred miles away, they were engaging in large-scale forced removals of their own.

Similar problems arose with the UN's 1948 Genocide Convention, the first draft of which outlawed the "forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group." This provision was deleted from the final version at the insistence of the U.S. delegate, who pointed out that it "might be interpreted as embracing forced transfers of minority groups such as have already been carried out by members of the United Nations."

To the present day, expelling states continue to go to great lengths to exclude the deportations and their continuing effects from the reach of international law. In October 2009, for example, the current President of the Czech Republic, Václav Klaus, refused to sign the European Union's Lisbon Treaty unless his country was granted an "exemption" ensuring that surviving expellees could not use the Treaty to seek redress for their maltreatment in the European courts. Facing the collapse of the accord in the event of Czech non-ratification, the EU reluctantly acquiesced.

To this day, the postwar expulsions -- the scale and lethality of which vastly exceed the ethnic cleansing that accompanied the break-up in the 1990s of the former Yugoslavia -- remain little known outside Germany itself. (Even there, a 2002 survey found that Germans under thirty had a more accurate knowledge of Ethiopia than of the areas of Europe from which their grandparents were deported.)

The textbooks on modern German and modern European history I use regularly in my college classroom either omit mention of the expulsions altogether, or relegate them to a couple of uninformative, and frequently inaccurate, lines depicting them as the inevitable consequence of Germany's wartime atrocities. In popular discourse, on the rare occasions that the expulsions are mentioned at all it is common to dismiss them with the observation that the expellees were "got what they deserved," or that the interest of the expelling states in unburdening themselves of a potentially disloyal minority population should take precedence over the deportees' right to remain in the lands of their birth.

Superficially persuasive as these arguments may appear, they do not stand up to scrutiny. The expellees were deported not after individual trial and conviction for acts of wartime collaboration -- something of which the children could not have been guilty in any event -- but because their indiscriminate removal served the interests of the Great Powers and the expelling states alike.

Provisions to exempt proven "anti-fascists" from detention or transfer were routinely ignored by the very governments that adopted them Oskar Schindler, the most famous "anti-fascist" of all who had been born in the Czech town of Svitavy, was deprived by the Prague authorities of nationality and property like the rest.

The proposition, moreover, that it is legitimate in some circumstances to declare in respect of entire populations that considerations of human rights are simply not to apply is an exceedingly dangerous one. Once the principle that certain specially disfavoured groups may be treated in this way is admitted, it is hard to see why it should not be applied to others. Scholars including Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, John Mearsheimer and Michael Mann have already pointed to the expulsion of the Germans as an encouraging precedent for the organization of similar forced migrations in the former Yugoslavia, the Middle East and elsewhere.

The history of the postwar expulsions, though, shows that there is no such thing as an "orderly and humane" transfer of populations: violence, cruelty and injustice are intrinsic to the process. As the former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who fled Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia as a small child, has correctly noted: "Collective punishments, such as forced expulsions, are usually rationalized on the grounds of security but almost always fall most heavily on the defenseless and weak."

It is important to bear in mind that no valid comparison may be drawn between the expulsion of the Germans and the far greater atrocities for which Nazi Germany was responsible. Suggestions to the contrary -- including those made by expellees themselves -- are both offensive and historically illiterate.

Nonetheless, as the historian B.B. Sullivan has observed in another context, "greater evil does not absolve lesser evil." The postwar expulsions were by any measure one of the most significant occurrences of the mass violation of human rights in recent history. Their demographic, economic, cultural and political effects continue to cast a long and baleful shadow across the European continent. Yet their importance remains unacknowledged, and many vital aspects of their history have not been adequately studied.

Nearly seventy years after the end of the Second World War, as the last surviving expellees are passing from the scene, the time has come for this tragic and destructive episode to receive the attention it deserves, so that the lessons it teaches may not be lost and the unnecessary suffering it engendered may not be repeated.

ON LANGUAGE Ethnic Cleansing

The word adopted by the Nazi Reinhard (The Hangman) Heydrich to describe the planned extermination of Jews was Endlosung , which was translated into the English phrase "final solution." The language soon endows the bureaucratic euphemism with a sinister overtone that has a greater impact than the phrase it replaces: final solution induced more shudders than the straightforward "mass murder," just as liquidation is more sinister than "killing" and the icily bureaucratic termination with extreme prejudice , even if fictional, carries a more chilling connotation than "assassination."

This generation's entry in the mass-murder category is ethnic cleansing . Because it has become a major coinage, now used without quotation marks or handled without the tongs of so-called , the phrase's etymology deserves close examination.

Begin with the word ethnic . This came from the Scots, meaning "heathen, pagan," who got it from the Greek ethnos , which the Barnhart Dictionary of Etymology defines as "a people, nation, Gentiles, a translation of Hebrew goyim , plural of goy ."

Now to its modern application as ethnic group . Julian Sorell Huxley and Alfred Cort Haddon, in their 1935 book, "We Europeans," coined that phrase with authority: "Nowhere does a human group now exist which corresponds closely to a systematic sub-species in animals. . . . For existing populations, the noncommittal term ethnic group should be used." The authors referred later to a "special type of ethnic grouping of which the Jews form the best-known example."

Ethnics as a noun referring to members of a group, but along racial lines, was first used by the sociologists W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt in 1941 a 1945 study by Warner and Leo Srole applied the noun to groups like the Irish and the Jews. By the time David Riesman used ethnicity in 1953, the meaning was "identification with a national and cultural group," especially among second-generation Americans. The power of ethnicity -- both racial and national, covering "the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City" -- was explored in "Beyond the Melting Pot," a 1963 book by Daniel P. Moynihan and Nathan Glazer.

Ethnic as an adjective received its baptism of fire in politics when Jimmy Carter referred to ethnic purity in his winning 1976 campaign: his usage was probably intended to refer to the pride of groups within a neighborhood, but got him in hot water with those who saw in ethnic purity a veiled reference to support of housing segregation.

Now to ethnic cleansing . (It takes etymologists a while to get there, but getting there is half the fun. I will skip the roots of cleansing , except to note that this gerund developed from the pre-1200 verb cleansen , derived from the Old English root of clean .)

In 1988, well before the Soviet Union came apart, clashes broke out between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the autonomous enclave of Azerbaijan known as Nagorno-Karabakh. According to Sol Steinmetz, executive editor of Random House dictionaries, who cites Serbo-Croatian sources, the attempt by one group to drive out the other was called by Soviet officials etnicheskoye chish cheniye , "ethnic cleansing."

On July 9, 1991, a Serbian building supervisor named Zarko Cubrilo told Tim Judah, a Times of London reporter: "Many of us have been sacked because they want an ethnically clean Croatia." On July 31 of that year, as Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats began the conflict that led to the breakup of Yugoslavia, we had the first English use of the phrase in its gerund form: Croatia's Supreme Council was quoted by Donald Forbes, a Reuters reporter in Belgrade, as charging, "The aim of this expulsion is obviously the ethnic cleansing of the critical areas . . . to be annexed to Serbia."

A year later, journalists in the battle zone picked up the phrase: John F. Burns, in The New York Times on July 26, 1992, described the movement for a "Greater Serbia," observing that "the precondition for its creation lies in the purging -- ' ethnic cleansing ' in the perpetrators' lexicon -- of wide areas of Bosnia of all but like-minded Serbs."

That's the first take at a big phrase that is likely to be with us for a while. If the practice is not stopped, the term will continue in active use if the world forces the forcible separation and killing to end, the phrase ethnic cleansing will evoke a shudder a generation hence much as final solution does today -- as a phrase frozen in history, a terrible manifestation of ethnocentrism gone wild. SHMUSH

"ELEGANT LADY ENTERS and carefully lays dress bag on baggage rack," writes Jacob M. Abel of Washington, dramatically setting up the use of a verb unremarked by lexicographers. "Enter older lady, small, much jewelry and heavy suitcase, struggling to get suitcase up onto rack. It rests on dress bag of first lady, who bolts out of her seat to move the suitcase, explaining to the air, 'I don't want my gown shmushed !' "

Mr. Abel notes that the German verb schmeissen is sometimes used to mean "flatten, demolish," and that's a good long-shot possibility of the origin. The closest English verb is smash , probably a blend of smack and mash , according to Merriam-Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, but it does not begin with the sh sound, which is so essential to shmush .

Sol Steinmetz of Random House thinks shmush is a variant not of smash , as I had guessed, but of the Scottish dialectal smush , meaning "to crush." Sure enough, here it is in Wright's English Dialect Dictionary: "smush," its first sense "to mash to crush to reduce to powder." The citation shows how dairy maids, squeezing the curd through their fingers, are said to be " smushin' the crud " (which may also direct us to an origin of crud ).

But what about that beginning sh ? "The initial sh- variant," says Sol, in his special argot, "is probably due to assimilation to the final -sh ." Say wha'? "For example, spaceship is often pronounced, by assimilation, as spash ship or spa ship ." The sh sound is picked up and used earlier in the word. (Drunken astronauts take it even further, with shpaceship .)

No, shmush -- "to crush, to press down," as in "I can tell the dog slept on the couch because every one of the cushions is all shmushed " -- is not a Yiddishism. It is an old Scotticism, and its frequency of use should make it a candidate for inclusion in modern dictionaries. Pronunciation: to rhyme with bush , not brush . (And get that mutt off the couch.)

Ethnic Cleansing - Definition, Meaning and Examples - HISTORY

Back in September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu posted a video that accused the Palestinians of wanting to commit “ethnic cleansing” by ridding the West Bank of Jews. Netanyahu’s Twitter and Facebook feed introduced the video with the phrase “No Jews,” a phrase that, to many, raises the specter of Nazis and Nuremberg laws, of Judenfrei and the Holocaust. And then he began: “I am sure many of you have heard the claim that Jewish communities in Judea Samaria, the West Bank, are an obstacle to peace. I’ve always been perplexed by this notion. No one would seriously claim that the nearly 2 million Arabs living inside Israel — that they’re an obstacle to peace. That’s because they aren’t. On the contrary,” he continued, “Israel’s diversity shows its openness and readiness for peace,” Netanyahu says. “Yet the Palestinian leadership actually demands a Palestinian state with one precondition: no Jews. . . . There’s a phrase for that: It’s called ethnic cleansing. . . .” He added that any demand that Jews leave their West Bank settlements is “outrageous” and: “It’s even more outrageous that the world doesn’t find this outrageous. Some otherwise enlightened countries even promote this outrage. . . Would you accept ethnic cleansing in your state? A territory without Jews, without Hispanics, without blacks? Since when is bigotry a foundation for peace?” The Prime Minister concluded: “Ethnic cleansing for peace is absurd. It’s about time somebody said it. I just did.”

The video’s purpose seems to have had a lot to do with coalition maintenance in the face of a then-recent speech by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry at the end of a failed effort to kickstart the fabled but feeble Israeli-Palestinian peace process. If so, it stands as a classic example of the multiple audience problem, for plenty of parties overheard a message intended for Netanyahu’s pro-settler rightwing colleagues in the cabinet. One of those audiences was the U.S. government. Obama Administration State Department spokeswoman Elizabeth Trudeau criticized Netanyahu’s assertions: “We obviously strongly disagree with the characterization that those who oppose settlement activity or view it as an obstacle to peace are somehow calling for ethnic cleansing of Jews from the West Bank. We believe that using that type of terminology is inappropriate and unhelpful.”

There were other critiques, too. Several critics pointed out that Netanyahu appeared to be referring to a 2013 statement by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. “In a final resolution,” Abbas told Egyptian journalists, “we would not see the presence of a single Israeli—civilian or soldier—on our lands.” Note that Abbas, speaking about how a Palestinian state would look, said “Israeli,” not “Jew.” “Palestinian leaders have made clear that Jews can be citizens of a future Palestinian state,” according to a blog post on the Foundation for Middle East Peace written by Matt Duss. “But that they will not accept the presence of enclaves of Israeli settlers peppered throughout that state (as, of course, no state would).” Duss quoted Hanan Ashrawi, a top (Christian) Palestinian leader, who told Israeli journalists in 2014: “Any person, be he Jewish, Christian or Buddhist, will have the right to apply for Palestinian citizenship. Our basic law prohibits discrimination based on race or ethnicity.”

None of these criticisms daunted those for whom the pronouncements of the Israeli leadership are infallible. So, months later (March 28 of this year to be specific), when the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s president invited a PLO spokesman to present a program to its membership, a self-avowed member of the Zionist Organization of America accused him publicly of being a “coward” for allowing the speaker to spew hatred about the “ethnic cleansing” of Jews. At least “coward” does not go so far as the favorite verbal spewing of ZOA members in such cases: “self-hating Jew,” which is no more than an exaggeration characteristic of our political world that happens when Jews have political disagreements with one another.

What exactly is going on? For one thing, we are witness to contending polemics—nothing new there. The word “polemic” comes from the Greek root meaning “war,” so a polemic is a waging of conflict with words. Israelis and Arabs of various descriptions have been doing it for a long time, and so have American Jews with each other.

If polemic is going on, it is a sure thing that exaggeration is going on, too—and exaggeration, as the poet Eliza Cook once wrote, “misleads the credulous and offends the perceptive.” Thus it is obvious that Palestinians today cannot “ethnically cleanse” Jews from the West Bank. Israeli settlements are all in the 60 percent of the West Bank called Area C, which is under the control of the Israeli army. So Netanyahu set out in his video to transform a supposed intention into an imminent threat, an exaggeration in practice if there ever was one. This doesn’t mean that many, probably most, Palestinians today would not cleanse all of Palestine of Jews, not just Jewish Israelis, if they could. But they can’t and they know it.

As for a ZOA member calling someone who strives to fairly present multiple views of an issue a coward, that is a scoundrel’s exaggeration. It is not much different, only less playful, from a fanatical baseball partisan insisting that the umpire is blind in every call that doesn’t go his way, but miraculously regains fine vision for any close call that does go his way.

Similarly, many Palestinians in recent years have accused Israel of ethnically cleansing parts of Palestine of Arabs, and of wanting in its dark heart of hearts to cleanse all of Palestine of Arabs. It is true that in 1948-49 some specific strategic parts of Palestine were ethnically cleansed by Jews—Ramle, Lod, for example—and it is true that the word “cleanse” was used at the time, according to historian Benny Morris. In a 2004 interview in Ha’aretz, Morris rues the fact that Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion did not cleanse more or even all Arabs from Palestine, a somewhat surprising view for someone who set out on his research intending to be a critic of the Zionist enterprise. And it is true as well that as recently as 35 years ago there were many on the Right in Israel who subscribed to the “Jordan is Palestine” falsity and spoke of “transferring” the Arab population west of the Jordan River to the east of the river, at a time when the phrase “ethnic cleansing” had not yet been coined for popular usage.

In retrospect all of this looks to have been one kind of exaggeration or another on the part of Palestinian polemicists, for virtually no one in Israel today, even on the fairly far Right, speaks of transfer. This does not mean that lots of Jewish Israelis wouldn’t ethnically cleanse Arabs from west of the Jordan River if in some fantasy world they could, but as is the case on the Palestinian side, they can’t and they know it.

What is also going on, of course, is the elastic use of language as a means of polemical exaggeration—in this case of the phrase “ethnic cleansing.” That is how exaggerations proceed from the brain to the train of events that form politics eventually into history. What can one say of political language, you ask? You’re asking the right person, since I’ve written a book on the subject. But I’ll spare you a recitation, since I can sum the matter up well enough through the vehicle of a few well-known quotations from masters much greater than I.

  • First, Eric Arthur Blair (a.k.a. George Orwell): “Political language—and with variations this is true of all political parties from Conservatives to Anarchists—is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind.”
  • Second, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (a.k.a. Lewis Carroll): “’When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’”

Adding the two thoughts together, we arrive at a conclusion, which, in this case goes like this: Ethnic cleansing means whatever a speaker or writer wants it to mean and is allowed to get away with meaning, and if that speaker or writer is a politician you can bet the rent that some kind of intentional misrepresentation is behind it all.

That is not very comforting, perhaps. We want words and phrases, especially emotive and loaded ones like “ethnic cleansing,” to have but one meaning that more or less stands still for a long enough time that we can use it objectively to communicate precisely. But as long as there are politicians and polemicists on the make, we are not likely to have our way, especially at a moment when “false news” thrives because so many people cannot think because they do not read deeply. They just watch television and other screens launching mediated images at them non-stop (unless they choose to stop it), rather like the Chauncey Gardiner character in Being There—except this time it isn’t very funny.

There are multitudinous examples of such vocabulary creep. Take the word terrorism, for example. What does it mean? It used to have an agreed meaning. It meant the use of random deadly violence against civilians for the purpose of evoking terror, the better to goad some targeted adversary into a counterproductive reaction or to gain media exposure for a cause, or both. It was once possible to face down the patent relativistic nonsense that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” That has now become very difficult since most Americans, without thinking about it (and that is the key) have come to call events like the October 1983 bombing of a Marine barracks near the Beirut International Airport or the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbor examples of terrorism. Since when is attacking uniformed military personnel on foreign soil or in foreign waters consistent with the definition of terrorism noted above? It clearly isn’t, but that distinction has melted away, especially since 9/11, into nothingness. To most Americans, terrorism is simply an all-purpose name for evil coming from alien sources. As best as my experience can discern, there is nothing that can be done about this.

The same goes for the word genocide. Before a bunch of mischievous “progressive” lawyers got hold of the term, this post-World War II locution meant the effort to exterminate a whole people, whether defined in ethno-linguistic or sectarian terms. And it followed, as everyone knew back at a certain time, that genuine efforts at genocide focused on murdering women and children, since these are the keys to the perpetuation of a targeted population.

This is no longer how the term is used. Most younger people, my undergraduate students being a case in point, use genocide as a synonym for mass murder. This is likely because of a constant degradation in the usage of the term over the years from its original meaning in trying to come to terms with the Nazi Holocaust.

The first degradation came from the effort to accuse Turks of genocide against Armenians. This is a close case. Some Armenians marched at the head of a Russian army in a war—World War I—aimed at destroying the Ottoman Empire, hardly comparable to the situation of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. Some Turkish leaders clearly supported and even enjoyed an unrestrained and utterly sadistic campaign to murder innocent Armenians. But the purpose of the murders was to drive Armenians off of what was at the time imagined would become postwar Turkish lands, not to exterminate all Armenians. Turks did the same thing to Greeks at what was then called Smyrna (now Izmir) in the wake of World War I—but again, the purpose was to rid them from particular places, not to murder all Greeks.

The second degradation arguably applies to Pol Pot in Cambodia. This mass murder was at the time widely described as genocide. That was, however, a curious use of the term, because in this case one ethno-linguistic group was not targeting a different ethno-linguistic group (as later in Rwanda and in Darfur). Instead an ethno-linguistic group was targeting itself—making it into a kind of suigenocide. The distinction here was not ethnicity but class. To be sure, the Khmer Rouge did intend to exterminate all members of certain classes, and would probably have succeeded to an even greater extent than it did had not Vietnam’s invasion stopped the murderous madness.

The third degradation, which will bring us neatly back to the matter of “ethnic cleansing,” took place in the Balkans in the 1990s during the Wars of Yugoslav Succession. When Yugoslavia disintegrated, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs all sought to grab lands as they could, and to drive the losers away into their own enclaves. At the start of the mayhem, the Serbs were the stronger party, especially with regard to the Bosniaks, and so the former became cleansers and the latter mainly got cleansed. The Slovenes managed to get away from all this without a lot of muss and fuss, mainly because they already lived in a more or less homogeneous corner of the country. But the sorting process in the rest of what had been Yugoslavia was protracted and vicious. The press and other Western observers started calling the efforts genocide, particularly after the wanton murder of 5,000 men and boys in Srebrenica under the feckless eyes of UN “peacekeepers.” But this was not genocide this was old-fashioned mass murder in the service of an old-fashioned land grab. If the more powerful Serbs had wanted to commit genocide, they would have concentrated on murdering women and children instead of men and boys of military or potential military age. This was, yes, “ethnic cleansing.”

So we had a useful word for a while in terrorism, and now we don’t. We had a useful word for a while in genocide, and now we don’t. And we had a useful phrase for a while in “ethnic cleansing,” and now we seem to be in a process, like the others, of losing so much precision that the phrase is becoming—as some Israelis and Palestinians alike are proving—another of what Robert Nisbet once called a “half brick.” A half brick, he said, is not nearly so useful as a whole brick for building anything solid, but it does have the virtue that it can be thrown about twice as far.

Did “ethnic cleansing” ever have a precise meaning, whether in international law or in common sense consensual usage? Not really, as it turns out. Though its origin, as noted, lies in the Balkan wars of the 1990s, other terms in other languages preceded it, some going all the way back to classical antiquity. Many of these terms came into being after World War I and into World War II in Eastern and Central Europe as the great ethno-linguistic mosaic of the area become more consolidated in both violent and non-violent ways. There have been non-violent episodes of ethnic cleansing, usually called population exchanges or something else under such circumstances. That describes the movement of ethnic Germans out of Czechoslovakia, for example, after World War II, and it describes the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey during the period after the Treaty of Lausanne. The diversity of the precursor terms and the situations they described made coming up with a precise meaning for “ethnic cleansing” difficult.

But clearly, one group of people driving another group of people off its lands by force was one of the most popular pastimes of premodern (and not just premodern) humanity. It goes back to hunter-gatherer times and likely even before that. There is simply no question in the light of biological, anthropological, and other evidence that Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s regrettably influential depiction of the noble savage supposedly living in peace and harmony until civilization corrupted his innocent soul is just so much wishful nonsense.

It is quite likely, therefore, that every spoken language had a term for this sort of thing, save those of groups isolated preternaturally by some geophysical feature (island or mountain redoubt, for two obvious examples). The reality of the security dilemma, as we moderns call it, was no doubt the default assumption of most human communities, who did not need George Herbert Spencer to misinterpret Charles Darwin to tell them that the world could be a dangerous place or that, as Hegel put it, history was “a butcher’s block.”

What has changed is the sense of the inevitability of it all. It used to be that most people were resigned to the reality of ethnic cleansing or whatever they called it, and even of genocide as a by-product if not an intention. They lived in a world in which the cyclical metaphor dominated, and in which unworldly forms of fatalism of one sort of another thrived. But, starting small some five thousand years ago, a few people dared to believe that things could be different, they could be better, that people were free and able to change their situation over time, not in some afterlife in some other world, but within the bounds of history in this world.

That thought, beginning in religious culture and moving in uneven fits and starts over many centuries, finally got traction in the Renaissance and real purchase on the minds of men in the Enlightenment’s Age of Reason. Indeed, that faith in moral progress is one of the key defining characteristics of modernity itself: It is the Whig or Chartist idea, to speak of its British context, in which moral and material progress walk hand-in-hand into a better future for all humanity. And it is an idea, above all, that is part and parcel of the very idea of America, a nation born as no other in the optimistic nurturing cradle of modernity itself.

That idea puts stock in the conviction that the abstract articulation of norms can and does impinge upon reality. It is in that context that ethnic cleansing has migrated from an ancient idea under many names as something deemed a facet of reality to a label for a stigmatized behavior deemed morally reprehensible, simply out of bounds for civilized people. In that sense it lives in the catchall aura of liberal progressivism that at least since 1945 has gone under the generic label or banner of human rights: people now have a human right not to be forcibly cleansed from their lands. It is the hopeful history of human rights, and its underlying philosophy of secular humanism, since around 1945 that informs those who believe, as President Obama beautifully put it, that “the arc of history is bending toward justice.”

But is it really? Not everyone agrees. Not so many years ago John Gray began pillorying humanism, the idea of progress, and the whole boatload of utopian, meliorist through that went with it. It is still not entirely clear if Gray and those who think as he does are the cause or the consequence of the erosion of the basic predicates of modernity in the West: the belief in individual agency the assertion of the secularist divide between religion to the one side and politics and the arts to the other and above all the idea of progress. But it seems beyond doubt that those predicates are under stress in the West, and that this explains the widely noted loss of self-confidence, verve, and hence confident foreign policy orientation afflicting most Western polities. At least some other parts of the world are just starting to develop an affinity for these characteristics of modernity, however, so the picture gets fuzzier as the globe in our mind’s eye gets larger.

It is that wider context that in turns gives fuller meaning to the games that various people seem determined to play with the inherited moral vocabulary that we have to hand. It seems to me that “ethnic cleansing” (and genocide and terrorism) as a term of moral obloquy will live or perish upon the power and constancy of those who insist upon it. Higher norms of moral behavior, whether in communities, nations, or the planet as a whole, do not have a life of their own separate from the vicissitudes of human transactions. As John Gray insists, they are not baked into some necessary teleology of the future. In a sense, then, they are “artificial” or derivative of our collective will as a civilization, here in the sense that Herbert Simon used the term in The Sciences of the Artificial (1969). If that will or that civilization flags, then before very long those norms will collapse.

This is why politicians and polemicists shortsightedly playing fast and loose with the meaning of terms that are the symbolic repositories of our norms is ultimately so dangerous. What they do deranges the utility of these symbols not just as means of intersubjectivity, but as an array of expectations about the kind of world we want to bequeath to our children and grandchildren. Those expectations are powerful, for if we will a better world, we perhaps can have one. As W.I. Thomas famously put the autogenic theorem back in 1928: “If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” And if they destroy the intelligibility of critical definitions, that will have real consequences, too.

Adam Garfinkle is the Founding Editor of The American Interest and formerly a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Ethnic Cleansing is Sanctioned by the God of the Old Testament

While Israel is engaged in a program of ethnic cleansing in Gaza, and Ann Coulter and other conservatives, including House Republicans, embrace the idea of a similar program here, through deportation if not outright slaughter, we would do well here to recall that this is not the first time Israel has engaged in these activities.

There is, for example, the Hasmonean Jewish treatment of Pagan minorities within their borders in the late second century BCE: ethnic cleansing, expulsion (1 Macc 13.47) which often goes unremarked in the historical record: forced conversion, etc., events which must have been well-remembered in Tacitus’ day (these conquests were also noted by Strabo, Geography 16.2.37).

The Bible, of course, condones ethnic cleansing. It is an activity ordered by God himself on numerous occasions. Remember, the “Promised Land,” when the Jews arrived out of the desert (according to the Bible’s account) was owned by somebody else when they arrived. The Jewish response was ethnic cleansing: killing, ejecting, and forcibly converting the Canaanites in order to create a Jewish state. Today’s modern Canaanites, the Palestinians, are now in the way and are discovering first-hand that Israel is still for Jews only.

Ancient Israel was, after this early ethnic cleansing, itself under the dominion of foreign powers and suffered greatly, but no more so than others suffered under Israel when it had the upper hand. Once the Hasmonean dynasty got into a position of power about a century-and-a-half before the birth of Jesus, it was the turn of the Gentiles to suffer once more. Why? Because of ancient promises that come allegedly from Israel’s god, that Israel, no matter who else might live there, belongs to the Jews.

And yes, this is relevant. History, because it informs the present, it always relevant:

As Lee I. Levins of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem writes of the Hasmoneans,

[A] much more expansive understanding of Eretz Israel became a new reality under the Hasmoneans, with enormous ideological and social implications.

The Hasmoneans saw themselves as successors to Israel’s biblical leaders, particularly the judges and kings of the First Temple era. This self-perception is made very clear in I Maccabees, a book written under their auspices and in the style of which is reminiscent of the biblical books of Judges and Kings.

The more things change, the more they stay the same, as the saying goes.

As we know, wishes aren’t reality and no more than is Netanyahu’s Israel was the rule of the Maccabees/Hasmoneans (165-63BCE) a return to the fabled Golden Age of Solomon and David. Yet it marked a resurgence of sorts in the fortunes of Israel. The reigns of John Hyrcanus (reigned 134-104) and his son Alexander Jannaeus (Yannai), who reigned 103-76 BCE, was a period of dramatic expansion for the Maccabean kingdom and it was in this period that both Galilee and Idumea (ancient Edom) were added to Judaea.

Hasmonean Conquests – or Gentile loss of land

Their conquests, noted by Strabo (Geography 16.2.37), are seen as glorious from the Jewish perspective, but resulted in great hardship for the non-Jewish populations of these areas and many cities were abandoned or destroyed, their Pagan populations fleeing, and many others were conquered. Hyrcanus forced the Gentile populations to convert to Judaism, and claims made by some that this represents the “only forcible mass conversion in the history of Judaism” [1] ignores the forced conversions of polytheistic Jews and Gentiles by Hezekiah and Josiah and down through the post-exilic period.

In both the second and first centuries BCE the Hasmonean rulers “forcibly circumcised Gentile peoples after subduing them in battle.” [2] The joy of the cities of the Decapolis at their liberation by Pompey speaks volumes.

No doubt well aware of the above appeal (and the divine mandate at Deut 7.1-6), Mattathias, leader of the Maccabean revolt against the Seleucids, is said to have gone “around destroying the illicit altars and forcibly circumcising all the uncircumcised babies they found within the boundaries of Israel” (1 Macc 2.46).

The Hasmonean rulers followed this injunction in their conquests, practicing forcible conversion in both Galilee (Ant. 13.318) and Idumea (Ant. 13.257-258) as Josephus tells us and burning cities, for example Pella (Ant. 13.397) that refused to convert, and there is no reason to suppose that if the rebels of 66 would have gotten the upper hand against the Romans that they would not have done likewise, as their record and their rhetoric indicates.

Our literary sources bear this out: 1 Maccabees is implacably hostile to Gentiles, putting them on a par with the ancient Canaanites. 2 Maccabees amends this view to one which, to paraphrase General Sherman, would amount to “The only good Gentiles I’ve seen are converted.” We’ve seen rhetoric like this come out of Israel today, with the enemy now not Canaanites or Gentiles but Palestinians.

This was all part of a process that has been called by one scholar, “Judaization,” [3] and by another “internal colonization” [4] which are both happy terms for what was, in essence, a holy war, or to use a modern term, ethnic cleansing, as the capture of Akra by Simon in 141 BCE demonstrates. The account of the city’s capture in 1 Maccabees 14:49-52, and that of Gezer (14:43-48) leaves us in no doubt as to the motivation of the Hasmonean Reconquista. [5] The religious purity demanded by God requires not just rejection but ejection.

That this was not a happy situation for Pagans living either within Israel’s borders or in neighboring areas scarce needs be said. The best the Pagan population could hope for was expulsion (such as at Acre, Gezer, Joppa, and other cities whose entire Pagan populations were expelled) at the worst, death or forced conversion.[6] Indeed, the Greek version of Esther 8.17 in the Septuagint admits that “many of the pagans were circumcised and became Jews out of fear of the Jews.”

1 Macc 13.47 celebrates an event in which Simon (d. 135) expelled the inhabitants of Gezer and repopulated it with “men who observed the Law.” This was apparently part of Simon’s general policy of removing idolaters from Israel (1 Macc 14.36) and archaeology seems to confirm it.[7]

Those who were not expelled sometimes fled: Tel Anafa, some 10-12 km north of Lake Huleh, was abandoned by 75 BCE”perhaps due to the flight of its pagan population after the incorporation of the area into the Hasmonean kingdom.”[8] Richard Horsley makes much of the Roman destruction of Carthage in 146 BCE and the fate of Corinth in the same year, as actions that “bore ominously on the fate of other peoples that they were to conquer in the future”[9] but takes no notice of Hasmonean Jewish imperialism and what can only be called ethnic cleansing of Pagan population centers.

French scholar Maurice Sartre suggests that the abandonment of “Gezer, Bethzur, Shechem, Bethshan, Lachish, possibly Bethel, Dothan, Shiloh, Tell Zakariyeh, and less important sites…not to mention cities whose destruction is well known, such as Samaria, Marisa, Adora, and Beersheba” was due to “imperialist Hasmonaean policy.”[10] The campaigns of Antiochus VII Sidetes in the 130s, culminating in a negotiated settlement in 132 BCE, temporarily put an end to Hasmonean ethnic cleansing (Ant. 13:245-248), but the death of the Seleucid king in 129 while on campaign against the Parthians saw its resumption under John Hyrcanus.

The beacon of a Greater Israel ever beckoned, and with it, the conversion of the “Nations” – the Pagan world.[11] As we are seeing with our own horrified eyes, that beacon of a Greater Israel beckons still.

The Jewish historian Josephus alludes to the forced circumcision of Gentiles during the Jewish revolt of 66 while he was in charge of Galilee’s defenses (Life, 113) and it is possible that Bar Kokhba in the revolt of 132 may also have practiced forced circumcision.[12]

The Jews of the Second Temple period were quite capable then of following the injunctions of these various biblical texts, which John J. Collins characterizes as “programmatic ideological statements”:

We can no longer accept them as simply presenting what happened. Whether we see these texts as reflecting expansionistic policies of King Josiah or as mere fantasies of powerless Judeans after the exile, they project a model of the ways in which Israel should relate to its neighbors. In this perspective, ownership of the land of Israelis conferred by divine grant, not by ancestral occupancy or by negotiation, and violence against rival claimants of that land is not only legitimate but mandatory, especially if these people worship gods other than YHWH, the God of Israel.[13]

This was also the Israel that the Fourth Philosophy and the Essenes hearkened back to, an Israel ruled by God and unpolluted by Gentiles (Pagans), back to the days of the Maccabees and beyond, just as the Maccabees had hearkened back to the zeal of Phinehas (Num 25.10-15): Mattathias “burned with zeal for the law, just as Phinehas did against Zimri, the son of Salu” (1 Macc 1.26). Horsley can argue that all the violence and all the terror was done by the Romans to the Jews, but as John J. Collins and others have shown, these biblical texts have served to “legitimize violent action.” It was also ancient texts which legitimized the expulsion of Gentiles from Judea and their forced circumcision.[14]

For some radical Jews and our own Religious Right, we can see that it legitimizes the expulsion of Palestinians today.

As we are seeing in America today, letting ancient religion dictate domestic policy, let alone global politics, is a recipe for disaster. The state of Israel is today repeating crimes of which it has often been victim, and as we have seen here, not for the first time. There was no court of global opinion in the second century BCE and kingdoms and empires could get away with barbarous behavior. This is a lesson applicable not only to Israel, but America under Bush and Russia under Putin.

In our supposedly enlightened present, there is far less excuse, and Israel will have a difficult time presenting itself as a victim if it continues on its current course. The Religious Right will be happy to believe them, as always, that the only deaths have been Jewish, because the Palestinians, after all, are not really people, but we know better. Don’t we?

[1] For example, in Stephen M. Wylen, The Jews in the Time of Jesus (NY: Paulist Press, 1996), 64.
[2] Steven Weitzman, “Forced Circumcision and the Shifting Role of Gentiles in Hasmonean Ideology,” HTR 92 (1999), 37.
[3] A. Kasher, Jews and Hellenistic Cities in Eretz-Israel. Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum 21. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 105.
[4] Shimon Applebaum, Judaea in Hellenistic and Roman Times: Historical and Archaeological Essays (Leiden: Brill, 1989), 44.
[5] We are informed by 1 Maccabees that Simon “cleansed the houses in which idols were” and “cast out of it all uncleanness” before settling it with those who observed the Law.
[6] While ethnic cleansing may at times constitute genocide, it can also be distinct from genocide. The United Nations defines ethnic cleansing as activities designed to render an area “ethnically homogeneous”. It cannot be denied that this was the intent of the Hasmonean policies in question. See Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to security council resolution 780 (1992), Annex IV The policy of ethnic cleansing.28 December 1994.
[7] Steven Weitzman, “Forced Circumcision and the Shifting Role of Gentiles in Hasmonean Ideology,” HTR 92 (1999), 43.
[8] Mark Alan Chancey Adam Lowry Porter, “The Archaeology of Roman Palestine,” Near Eastern Archaeology 64 (2001), 82. See also Andrea M. Berlin, “Archaeological Sources for the History of Palestine: Between Large Forces:Palestine in the Hellenistic Period,” The Biblical Archaeologist 60 (1997), 2-51.
[9] Richard Horsley, Jesus and Empire (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003), 17-18.
[10] Maurice Sartre, The Middle East Under Rome (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 16.
[11] But the victories of these Jewish kings did not restore the glory of David and Solomon, immersed as they were in Hellenistic culture and what emerged was itself a Hellenistic state in the mold of those that had come before. Ironically then, the Hasmonean revolution, as Elias Bickerman observed, “eradicated one kind of Hellenism only to facilitate the growth of another kind.” See Elias Bickerman, From Ezra to the Last of the Maccabees. Foundations of Post-Biblical Judaism (New York: Schocken Books, 1962), 178.
[12] Weitzman, “Forced Circumcision,” 43 and n 25. Weitzman suggests the possibility that Roman laws against circumcision might be an outcome of forced circumcisions by Bar Kochba.
[13] John J. Collins, “The Zeal of Phinehas: The Bible and the Legitimation of Violence,” JBL 122 (2003), 11.
[14] Steven Weitzman, “Forced Circumcision,” 43-44 and n 24. Both Genesis 34 and 2 Sam 18.25-7 are examples of anti-Gentile violence the Maccabees, and later, the Hasmoneans, may have hearkened back to, and 2 Bar 66.5 celebrates Josiah as a king who “left no one uncircumcised.”

Map of Palestinian land loss from Jewish Voice for Peace
This article contains material from a previous post

The United Nations defines ethnic cleansing this way: [1] [2]

  • It is done on purpose, as part of a plan
  • It is done by one ethnic or religious group
  • That group uses violence and terror to force other ethnic or religious groups to leave certain areas
  • The goal is to make sure that only the perpetrators' ethnic or religious group lives in those areas

A report by United Nations experts said that ethnic cleansing has been done in many different ways, including: [2]

Experts say that ethnic cleansing is different than genocide. In a genocide, a group tries to kill every member of a certain group, so that group no longer exists on the earth. In an ethnic cleansing, the perpetrators are trying to get rid of other groups in specific areas. [2] [3]

There is no official legal definition of ethnic cleansing. [4] However, both the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) [a] define deporting a population from its home as a crime against humanity. [6] [7] Other crimes that happen during ethnic cleansing are treated as separate crimes that may fit under the definitions of genocide or crimes against humanity. [8] For example, murdering, raping, and persecuting large groups of people are all crimes against humanity under the International Criminal Court's laws. [9]

Jews in ancient and medieval history Edit

During ancient and medieval history, Jewish people were victims of ethnic cleansing in many countries. For example, around 1290 AD, King Edward I of England ordered all of the Jews in the country to leave. Hundreds of elderly Jews were executed. [10] Next, France and some German states did the same. Finally, in 1492, Spain ordered its Jews to convert to Catholicism or leave the country. [11] Any Jew who stayed in the country would be executed without a trial. [11] Between 40,000 and 100,000 Jews were forced to leave Spain. [12]

Ten years later, in 1502, Spain also forced its Muslims to leave the country. [13]

Ethnic cleansing of Jews in Europe from 1100 – 1600

Drawing of French Jews being burned to death (1410)

Spain's original law requiring Jews to convert to Catholicism or leave Spain

Jews who refused to convert or leave Spain were called heretics and could be burned to death on a stake

Early modern history: Ireland Edit

In 1652, Oliver Cromwell and the English military took over Ireland. Historians Brendan O'Leary and John McGarry write: "Oliver Cromwell offered Irish Catholics a choice between genocide and forced mass population transfer." [14] Cromwell wanted all of the Irish Catholics to leave eastern Ireland and move to the northwest. [15] [16]

With Cromwell in charge, the English military forced many Irish Catholics to leave eastern Ireland, and killed many of the people who refused to leave. They did this by:

  • Threatening to execute Irish people who fought back against the English [17]
  • Taking away about 40% of the land owned by Irish Catholics, and giving it to English Protestants[18] Irish Catholics [18][19] Irish crops with the goal of starving the Irish Catholics [19]

Historian John Morrill says that England's actions were "the greatest episode of ethnic cleansing ever attempted in Western Europe." [18] About 600,000 Irish people died – 43% of the Irish population. [19] Because of this, historians do not agree on whether this was an ethnic cleansing [15] [16] [20] or a genocide. [21] [22] [23]

Oliver Cromwell led the program to ethnically 'cleanse' eastern Ireland of Irish Catholics

Map showing Irish-controlled areas in green before Cromwell invaded

In 1653, Cromwell ruled that all Irish Catholics had to move to the green areas on this map

English soldiers massacre Irish Catholic civilians

The 19th century: Native Americans removal Edit

In the 19th century, the United States government committed an ethnic cleansing against Native American tribes. [24] [25] [26] [27] At this time, the United States was growing. Many people in the country wanted to take over what is now the Southern United States. However, this land had always belonged to Native American tribes, like the Cherokee Nation. [28]

In the early 1800s, the United States government started a program of removing these tribes from the South. The government wanted these tribes to move west, outside the United States. [28] Under Andrew Jackson, the United States military took land away from Creek and Seminole Indians.

Some tribes signed treaties and agreed to move. However, other tribes refused to leave the land that had always been theirs. [28] In 1829, Andrew Jackson became President. The next year, he signed the Indian Removal Act. [29] Jackson used this law to force tribes that were still in the South to leave the United States. [30]

The Cherokee Nation refused to leave their homes. In 1838, President Martin van Buren ordered the military to force them to leave. [31] p. 41 Soldiers forced about 15,000 Cherokees and 2,000 of their slaves to leave their land. [32] At first, the Cherokees were all forced into internment camps, where 353 Cherokee died from diseases during one summer. [31] [33] pp. 41–42 After that, the Cherokee were forced to walk from the South to what is now Oklahoma and Arkansas. Most historians say that about 4,000 people died on the way. [34] [35] This was one out of every four people in the Cherokee population. [36] Because so many people died, this forced migration is now called the Trail of Tears.

Map showing the U.S. states (in red) and Indian territory before Indian Removal started

Drawing called "Hunting Indians in Florida with Bloodhounds" (1848)

Map showing the forced migration of Indian tribes

Part of the internment camp the Cherokee were forced into

Map of the routes the Cherokee had to travel on the Trail of Tears

The 20th century: Poles during The Holocaust Edit

In 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland. This started World War II. After taking over part of Poland, Nazi Germany committed an ethnic cleansing against the Polish people. They did this in many ways: [37]

  • The Nazis deported at least 1.5 million Polish people out of Poland. They did this for two reasons:
    • So Germans could move into Poland and have it for themselves and
    • So Polish people could be used as forced labor in areas that Germany controlled

    Public execution of innocent Polish civilians (1939)

    Polish Jews who were deported from a ghetto to a death camp (1942)

    A Polish child who died after 3 months in Auschwitz (1942)

    Nazi Einsatzgruppen massacre Polish civilians (1942)

    The 21st century: Darfur Edit

    Starting in 2003, the government of Sudan has been accused of committing an ethnic cleansing against black ethnic groups in Darfur. [38] [39] The Sudanese military, police, and a militia called the Janjaweed have done this by: [40] [41] [42]

    • Attacking and massacringcivilians and burning down villages
    • Forcing people to leave Darfur, then giving their villages to Arab people
    • Raping and sexually assaulting thousands of women and girls

    As of 2007, about 450,000 black Darfurians had been killed, and about 800 villages had been destroyed. [41] As of April 2008, about 2.5 million people – one-third of Darfur's population – were living in refugee camps. [42] These people had been forced to leave their homes, either by soldiers, or because their villages had been destroyed. [41]


    Political and strategic explanations have often taken center stage in elucidating ethnic cleansing. Included in this category are security and power perspectives. Essentially, as a political act of power, ethnic cleansing incorporates multiple motives of a military and strategic nature, as well as political acquisition and consolidation, economic aggrandizement, land settlement, cultural domination, racial discrimination, greed, and jealousy. In the Ottoman Empire, which was ethnically diverse, Armenians and Greek communities located in frontier or strategically significant regions were removed. Stalin’s uprooting of the Chechen-Ingush peoples in the Caucasus during World War II was similarly motivated. Among the most prominent of the ingredients that enter into the calculus for territorial cleansing, apart from military-strategic interests, is the creation of a culturally homogenous state.

    State creation that seeks congruence between territorial claims and cultural uniformity has already been discussed under the rubric of nationalism. Population transfers became part of the process of establishing more homogenous states with cruel expulsions and uprooting being part of the process, especially after the collapse of the Ottoman, Hapsburg, and Russian empires after World War I and with the defeat of the Axis powers after World War II. With the growth of industrial technology in the well-organized centralized states, ethnic cleansing became more complete and bordered on genocide. The twentieth century witnessed the worst cases of large-scale ethnic cleansing culminating in the 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed leaving some 25 million ethnic Russians living outside of their homeland. Many of these Russians, though they had resided in these other countries of the Soviet Union for many years—even generations—were subject to overt and covert pressures by the liberated states such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and forced to leave. Likewise, when the Yugoslav state disintegrated there was a massive displacement of peoples. In the twenty-first century, ethnic cleansing continued in Darfur, Sudan, as well as in Iraq, where Sunnis and Shias expelled each other from their regions and neighborhoods.


    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

    Article 7
    Crimes Against Humanity

    1. For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack:
      1. Murder
      2. Extermination
      3. Enslavement
      4. Deportation or forcible transfer of population
      5. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law
      6. Torture
      7. Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity
      8. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
      9. Enforced disappearance of persons
      10. The crime of apartheid
      11. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
      1. ‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack

      Elements of the crime

      According to Article 7 (1) of the Rome Statute, crimes against humanity do not need to be linked to an armed conflict and can also occur in peacetime, similar to the crime of genocide. That same Article provides a definition of the crime that contains the following main elements:

      1. A physical element, which includes the commission of “any of the following acts”:
        1. Murder
        2. Extermination
        3. Enslavement
        4. Deportation or forcible transfer of population
        5. Imprisonment
        6. Torture
        7. Grave forms of sexual violence
        8. Persecution
        9. Enforced disappearance of persons
        10. The crime of apartheid
        11. Other inhumane acts.

        The contextual element determines that crimes against humanity involve either large-scale violence in relation to the number of victims or its extension over a broad geographic area (widespread), or a methodical type of violence (systematic). This excludes random, accidental or isolated acts of violence. In addition, Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute determines that crimes against humanity must be committed in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit an attack. The plan or policy does not need to be explicitly stipulated or formally adopted and can, therefore, be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.

        In contrast with genocide, crimes against humanity do not need to target a specific group. Instead, the victim of the attack can be any civilian population, regardless of its affiliation or identity. Another important distinction is that in the case of crimes against humanity, it is not necessary to prove that there is an overall specific intent. It suffices for there to be a simple intent to commit any of the acts listed, with the exception of the act of persecution, which requires additional discriminatory intent. The perpetrator must also act with knowledge of the attack against the civilian population and that his/her action is part of that attack.

        [1] For example, William Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities – Justice, Politics, and Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals, Oxford University Press, 2012 – p. 51-53.

        [2] For example, M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999, p.62


        Bosnia and Herzegovina was ruled by the Ottoman Empire from 1463 until 1878. During this period, large parts of its population, mostly Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), converted to Islam, giving its society its multiethnic character. [14] Bosnia and Herzegovina's ethnic groups—the Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats—lived peacefully together from 1878 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, before which intermittent tensions between the three groups were mostly the result of economic issues, [15] though Serbia had had territorial pretensions towards Bosnia and Herzegovina at least since 1878. [16] According to some historians, certain Serb and Croat nationalists, who practiced Orthodox and Catholic Christianity, respectively, never accepted Bosniaks as a nationality [14] and tried to assimilate them into their own cultures. [17] World War II lead to interethnic clashes, though the three groups were evenly split between various factions and did not rally universally along the ethnic lines. [15] After World War II, Bosnia and Herzegovina became part of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. [18]

        After the death of its leader Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia experienced a dysfunctional political system and economic calamity in the 1980s. [19] As communism was losing its potency, new nationalist leaders Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and Franjo Tuđman in Croatia came to power. [20] Slovenia and Croatia called for reforms and a looser confederation of the state in Yugoslavia but this call was opposed by the country's government in Belgrade. [21] On 25 June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. A short armed conflict followed in Slovenia and the Croatian War of Independence escalated. [22] Macedonia also declared independence, which Yugoslavia granted without conflict. [23] The RAM Plan began to be implemented, laying the foundations for new borders of a "Third Yugoslavia" in an effort to establish a country where "all Serbs with their territories would live together in the same state". [24]

        The Izetbegović-Gligorov Plan offered a restructuring of Yugoslavia based on the principle 2+2+2, with Serbia and Montenegro as the core of an asymmetric federation, with Bosnia and Macedonia in a loose federation, and with Croatia and Slovenia in an even looser confederation. The plan was not accepted by either side. [25] In late 1991, the Serbs began establishing autonomous regions in Bosnia. [26] When the Party of Democratic Action's (SDA) representatives in the Parliament of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina announced their plan for a referendum on independence from Yugoslavia on 14 October 1991, leading Bosnian Serb politician Radovan Karadžić, made a speech at the parliamentary session and publicly threatened war and the extinction of the Bosniaks as a people. [27] On 9 January 1992, the Bosnian Serb Assembly proclaimed the "Republic of Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina", which would include territory with a Serb majority and "additional territories, not precisely identified but to include areas where the Serbs had been in a majority" before World War II. [28]

        On 29 February and 1 March 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina held an independence referendum, after which it declared independence from Yugoslavia. [29] Most Bosnian Serbs wanted to remain in the same state with Serbia. [30] During the 16th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 12 May 1992, Karadžić, who was by then the leader of the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska proto-state, presented his "six strategic goals", which included the "separation from the other two national communities and the separation of states", and the "creation of a corridor in the Drina Valley thus eliminating the Drina [River] as a border between Serbian states". [31] Republika Srpska General Ratko Mladić identified "Muslims and Croat hordes" as the enemy and suggested to the Assembly it must decide whether to throw them out by political means or through force. [32]

        The Bosnian War quickly escalated. Serb forces were composed of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS), the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and Serbian and Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces. [33] Their aim was to form either a rump Yugoslavia [34] or a Greater Serbia. [35] The Serb authorities in Belgrade wanted to annex new territories for Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia that would eventually be added to Serbia and Montenegro. [36]

        At the start of the war, Bosniak forces that were organized in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH), and Croat forces that were organized in the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), initially cooperated against the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the Army of Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb Army or VRS). [37] The Croatian Defence Council (HVO) was the official army of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia (HR HB), a separate "political, cultural, economic and territorial entity" within Bosnia proclaimed by Mate Boban on 18 November 1991. [38] The HVO said it had no secessionary goal and vowed to respect the central government in Sarajevo. [39] The HR HB was financed and armed by Croatia. [38] International officials and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded that the aim of the establishment of HR HB was to form a Greater Croatia from parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, [40] [41] in effect partitioning Bosnia and Herzegovina between an expanded Serbia and Croatia. [42]

        Ethnic cleansing is a purposeful policy of "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove from a given area persons from another ethnic group". [43]

        A report by the UN Commission of Experts dated 27 May 1994 defined ethnic cleansing as an act of "rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area", and found that ethnic cleansing has been carried out through "murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, confinement of civilian populations in ghetto areas, forcible removal, displacement and deportation of civilian populations, deliberate military attacks or threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction of property". [44] Such forms of persecution of a group were defined as crimes against humanity and they can also fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention. [45]

        The terms "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide" are not synonymous but academic discourse considers both to exist within a spectrum of assaults on nations or religio-ethnic groups. Ethnic cleansing is similar to the forced deportation or population transfer of a group to change the ethnic composition of a territory whereas genocide is aimed at the destruction of a group. [46] To draw a distinction between the terms, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a verdict in the Bosnian Genocide Case:

        It [i.e. ethnic cleansing] can only be a form of genocide within the meaning of the [Genocide] Convention, if it corresponds to or falls within one of the categories of acts prohibited by Article II of the Convention. Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area "ethnically homogeneous", nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is "to destroy, in whole or in part" a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of the displacement. This is not to say that acts described as 'ethnic cleansing' may never constitute genocide, if they are such as to be characterized as, for example, 'deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part', contrary to Article II, paragraph (c), of the Convention, provided such action is carried out with the necessary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with a view to the destruction of the group, as distinct from its removal from the region. — ICJ. [47]

        The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations published a staff report on the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia in August 1992. [48] On 17 November the same year, United Nations special rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki issued a report titled "Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia" to the United Nations (UN). In the report, the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina was singled out and described as a political objective of Serb nationalists who wanted to ensure control of territories with a Serb majority as well as "adjacent territories assimilated to them". Paramilitaries played a major role in ethnic cleansing, according to the report. [49]

        On 18 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly issued resolution 47/147, in which it rejected the "acquisition of territory by force" and condemned "in the strongest possible terms the abhorrent practice of 'ethnic cleansing' ", and recognised "the Serbian leadership in territories under their control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Yugoslav Army and the political leadership of the Republic of Serbia bear primary responsibility for this reprehensible practice". [50]

        On 1 January 1993, Helsinki Watch released a report on the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. It found ethnic cleansing was "the most egregious violations in both Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina" because it envisaged "summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, deportation and forcible displacement of hundreds of thousands of people on the basis of their religion or nationality". [51]

        United Nations Security Council Resolution 780 authorised the establishment of a Commission of Experts to record the crimes in the former Yugoslavia, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 27 May 1994, these reports, which described the policy of ethnic cleansing, were concluded. [52] The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on war crimes in the Balkans on 9 August 1995. [53]

        On 15 November 1999, the UN released its "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica [A/54/549]", which details the fall of Srebrenica in July 1995 and found it was part of the larger Serb ethnic cleansing plan to depopulate Bosnian territories they wanted to annex so Serbs could repopulate them. [54]

        The methods used during the Bosnian ethnic cleansing campaigns include "killing of civilians, rape, torture, destruction of civilian, public, and cultural property, looting and pillaging, and the forcible relocation of civilian populations". [13] The forcible displacement of civilian populations was a consequence of the conflict and its objective through the ethnic cleansing campaign. [55] The Serb campaign included selective murder of civic, religious and intellectual representatives of Bosniaks and Croats the sending of adult males into concentration camps and the rape of women. The Serb campaign also included the destruction and burning of Croat and Bosniak historical, religious and cultural sites. [56]

        Serb forces Edit

        Between 700,000 and a 1,000,000 Bosniaks were expelled from their homes from the Bosnian territory held by the Serb forces. [57] Another source estimates that at least 750,000 Bosniaks and a smaller number of Croats were expulsed from these areas. [58] Methods used to achieve this included coercion and terror in order to pressure Bosniaks, Croats and others into leaving Serb-claimed areas. [59]

        Numerous discriminatory measures were introduced against Bosniaks on VRS-held territory. [60] In the town of Prijedor, starting from 30 April 1992, non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs and banned from entering the court building, and were replaced by Serbs. Bosniak intellectuals and others were deported to the Omarska camp. [61] Bosniak and Croat homes were searched for weapons and were sometimes looted. [62] Serb forces accompanied non-Serbs wearing white armbands to buses that transported them to camps at Omarska, Trnopolje and Keraterm camp. Movement was restricted through a curfew and checkpoints. Radio broadcasts appealed to Serbs to "lynch" Bosniaks and Croats. [63] Torture and mistreatment in these detention centres were established as to leave inmates with no other choice then to accept the offer of their release under the condition they sign a document that compelled them to leave the area. [64]

        In Banja Luka, Bosniaks and Croats were evicted from their homes, and incoming displaced Serbs took their accommodation. Forced labour imposed by the authorities hastened the flight of non-Serbs. Those leaving Banja Luka had to sign documents of abandonment of their properties without compensation. [65] Paramiltaries frequently broke into the homes of non-Serbs at night to rob and assault the occupants. In some instances, paramilitaries would shoot at the houses. The local Serb police did not prevent these sustained assaults. [7] In Zvornik, Bosniaks were given official stamps on identity cards for a change of domicile to leave the area, they were forced to transfer their properties to an agency for the exchange of houses. Starting from May–June 1992, Bosniaks were taken by bus to Tuzla and Subotica in Serbia. Some residents were ordered to leave at gunpoint. Similar forced removals occurred in Foča, Vlasenica, Brčko, Bosanski Šamac, and other Bosnian towns. [65] In the villages around Vlasenica, the Serb Special Police Platoon was ordered by Miroslav Kraljević that the territory has to be "100 % clean" and that no Bosniak should remain. [66] UNHCR representatives were reluctant to help Bosniaks leave war-affected areas, fearing they would become unwilling accomplices to the ethnic cleansing. [67] Foča was renamed Srbinje (The Place of the Serbs). One Bosniak woman, who was raped, said her rapist told her his aim was to baptise and convert all of them to Serbs. [68]

        In Kozluk in June 1992, Bosniaks were rounded up and placed in trucks and trains to remove them from the area. [69] In Bijeljina, non-Serbs were also evicted from their homes and dismissed from their jobs. [70] Arrested non-Serbs were sent to the Batković camp, [71] where they performed forced labor on the front lines. [72] Serb paramilitary singled out Bosniaks and used violence against them. In the Višegrad massacres of 1992, hundreds of Bosniaks were rounded up on a bridge, shot and thrown into the river or locked in houses and burnt alive Bosniak women were raped and a Bosniak man was tied to a car and dragged around the town. [73]

        The VRS placed Bosniak enclaves under siege. [74] After the VRS takeover of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995, Bosniak men were massacred while 23,000 people were bused out of the area by 13 July. [75]

        Croat forces Edit

        In early 1992, as VRS forces were advancing towards Odžak and Bosanska Posavina, Croat forces routed Serb civilians living in the area and transported them to Croatia. They also expelled Serbs from Herzegovina and burned their houses in May 1992. [76] In 1993, the Bosnian Croat authorities used ethnic cleansing in conjunction with the attack on Mostar, where Bosniaks were placed in Croat-run detention camps. Croat forces evicted Bosniaks from the western part of Mostar and from other towns and villages, including Stolac and Čapljina. [77] To assume power in communities in Central Bosnia and Western Herzegovina that were coveted by the HR BH, its president Mate Boban ordered the Croatian Defence Council (HVO) to start persecuting Bosniaks living in these territories. Croat forces used "artillery, eviction, violence, rape, robbery and extortion" to expel or kill the Bosniak population, some of whom were detained in the Heliodrom and Dretelj camps. The Ahmići and Stupni Do massacres had the aim of removing Bosniaks from these areas. [78]

        Croat soldiers blew up Bosniak businesses and shops in some towns. They arrested thousands of Bosniak civilians and tried to remove them from Herzegovina by deporting them to third countries. [79] HR HB forces purged Serbs and Bosniaks from government offices and the police. The Bosniaks of HR HB-designated areas were increasingly harassed. [80] In Vitez and Zenica in April 1993, Croat soldiers warned Bosniaks they would be killed in three hours unless they left their homes. [81] Similar events occurred in Prozor, where Bosniaks left after Croat forces took over the city, looting and burning Bosniak shops. [82]

        Bosniak forces Edit

        According to the UN Security Council's "Final Report (1994)", Bosniaks engaged in "grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law" but they did not engage in "systematic ethnic cleansing". [10] Bosnian prosecutors charged former members of the Bosnian Army with crimes against humanity against Serbs, with the aim of expelling them from Konjic and surrounding villages in May 1992. [83] [84] During the 1993 siege of Goražde, Bosniak forces expelled some Serbs from the town and placed others under house arrest. [85] Similar incidents occurred in March 1993 when Bosniak authorities initiated a campaign to expel Croats from Konjic. [77] During the siege of Sarajevo, Bosniak paramilitary leader Mušan Topalović and his forces abducted and killed mostly Serbs living in and around the Sarajevo suburb Bistrik before Bosnian police killed Topalović in October 1993. [86] After the war, Croats left Vareš voluntarily, fearing Bosniak revenge. The departure of Croats from Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica had different motives, which were not always the direct consequence of pressure by Bosniaks. [59]

        According to the 1991 census, Bosnia and Herzegovina had a population of 4,364,574, of whom 43.7% were Bosniaks, 31.4% were Serbs, 17.3% were Croats and 5.5% were Yugoslavs. [87] In 1981, around 16% of the population were of mixed ancestry. [88] Serbs comprised 31% of Bosnia and Herzegovina's populace but Karadžić claimed 70% of the country's territory. [89] The organizers of the ethnic cleansing campaign wanted to replace Bosnia's multiethnic society with a society based on Serb nationalist supremacy, [90] which was seen as a form of Serbianisation of these areas. [91] Indian academic Radha Kumar described such territorial separation of groups based on their nationality as "ethnic apartheid". [92]

        It is estimated between 1.0 [2] and 1.3 million [3] people were uprooted and that tens of thousands were killed during the ethnic cleansing. [1] Serb forces perpetrated most of the ethnic cleansing campaigns and the majority of the victims were Bosniaks. [93] [94] In September 1994, UNHCR representatives estimated around 80,000 non-Serbs out of 837,000 who initially lived on the Serb-controlled territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war remained there an estimated removal of 90% of the Bosniak and Croat inhabitants of Serb-coveted territory, almost all of whom were deliberately forced out of their homes. [95] By the end of the war in late 1995, the Bosnian Serb forces had expelled or killed 95% of all non-Serbs living in the territory they annexed. [96]

        Before the war, the Bosnian territory held by the Army of the Republika Srpska was comprised out of 47% Serbs, 33% Bosniaks and 13% Croats. After the war, according to a research by Bosnian demographer Murat Prašo, in 1995 Serbs comprised 89%, while Bosniaks made 3% and Croats 1% of the remaining population. [97] In the Bosnian territory held by the HVO and the Croatian Army, before the war, Croats comprised 49% of the population this percentage rose to 96% in 1996. By the same year, the percentage of Bosniaks fell from 22% to 2.5% and the percentage of Serbs fell from 25% to 0.3%. Before the war, Bosniaks comprised 57% of the populace of territory controlled by the Bosnian government at the end of the war, they comprised 74%. [97]

        Croatian historian Saša Mrduljaš analysed the demographic changes based on the territorial control following the Dayton Agreement. According to his research, in Republika Srpska, the number of Bosniaks changed from 473,000 in 1991 to 100,000 in 2011, the number of Croats from 151,000 to 15,000, and the number of Serbs changed from 886,000 to 1,220,000. [99] In the territory controlled by the ARBiH, the number of Serbs changed from 400,000 to 50,000, the number of Croats changed from 243,000 to 110,000, and the number of Bosniaks changed from 1,323,000 to 1,550,000. [100] In the HVO-held area, the number of Serbs changed from 80,000 to 20,000, the number of Bosniaks changed from 107,000 to 70,000, and the number of Croats changed 367,000 in 1991 to 370,000 in 2011. [100]

        Initial estimates placed the number of refugees and internally displaced people during the Bosnian War at 2.7 million, [11] though later publications by the UN cite 2.2 million people who fled or were forced from their homes. [104] It was the largest exodus in Europe since World War II. [67] A million people were internally displaced and 1.2 million people left the country [105] 685,000 fled to western Europe—330,000 of whom went to Germany—and 446,500 went to other former Yugoslav republics. [106] The Bosnian War ended when the Dayton Agreement was signed on 14 December 1995 it stipulated Bosnia and Herzegovina was to stay a united country shared by Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska, and granted the right of return for victims of ethnic cleansing. [107]

        Number of refugees or internally displaced in 1992–1995
        Country Bosniaks Croats Serbs
        Bosnia and Herzegovina 1,270,000
        (63% of the group) [108]
        (67% of the group) [108]
        (39% of the group) [108]

        The homogenization of the population continued after the war finished. [109] When the Serb-held areas of Sarajevo were transferred to the FBiH in March 1996, [109] many Serbs left Sarajevo in the ensuing months. [110] Between 60,000 [111] and 90,000 [112] Serbs left Sarajevo's suburbs. This was interpreted as a result of Dayton's division of Bosnia along ethnic lines. [112] The Bosnian Serbs' politicians pressured Serbs into leaving Sarajevo while the mixed statements of the Bosnian government caused a lack of confidence among Serb inhabitants. [112] Bosnian Serb extremists burned apartments and expelled Serbs who wanted to stay in these suburbs before the handover to the Bosnian government. In Ilidža, medicine, machines and utility equipment disappeared. Serb politician Momčilo Krajišnik publicly called for Serbs to leave Sarajevo, which prompted a UN press officer to call the Serb authorities "the masters of manipulation". [111] This episode is often cited as "difficult to distinguish between coercion and voluntarism". [113]

        The demographic changes caused by the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina were the most dramatic that country had experienced in a century the 2013 population census registered 3,531,159 inhabitants—a more-than-19% decline within a single generation. [114]

        Islamic Edit

        Destruction of Islamic religious buildings in Bosnia (1992–1995) [115]
        Destroyed by Serbs Destroyed by Croats Damaged by Serbs Damaged by Croats Total destroyed during the war Total damaged during the war Total Total no. before the war Percentage of pre-war damaged or destroyed
        congregational mosque 249 58 540 80 307 620 927 1,149 81%
        small neighbourhood mosque 21 20 175 43 41 218 259 557 47%
        Quran schools 14 4 55 14 18 69 87 954 9%
        Dervish lodges 4 1 3 1 5 4 9 15 60%
        Mausolea, shrines 6 1 34 3 7 37 44 90 49%
        Buildings of religious endowments 125 24 345 60 149 405 554 1,425 39%
        Total 419 108 1,152 201 527 1,353 1,880 4,190 45%

        Orthodox Edit

        Destruction of Orthodox religious buildings in Bosnia (1992–1995) [116]
        Destroyed churches Damaged churches Destroyed parish homes Damaged parish homes
        Banja Luka Eparchy 2 3 No data No data
        Bihačko-Petrovac Diocese 26 68 No data No data
        Dabrobosanska Eparchy 23 13 No data No data
        Zahumsko-hercegovačka 36 28 No data No data
        Zvornik-tuzlanska 38 60 No data No data
        Total 125 172 67 64

        Catholic Edit

        In 1998, Bosnian bishops reported 269 Catholic churches had been destroyed in the Bosnian War. [117]

        Total number of destroyed Catholic religious objects in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992–1995) [118]
        Destroyed by Muslims Destroyed by Serbs Damaged by Muslims Damaged by Serbs Total destroyed during the war Total damaged during the war Total
        churches 8 117 67 120 125 187 312
        chapels 19 44 75 89 63 164 227
        clergy houses 9 56 40 121 65 161 226
        monasteries 0 8 7 15 8 22 30
        cemeteries 8 0 61 95 8 156 164
        Total 44 225 250 481 269 731 1000

        Around 500,000 of the 1,295,000 housing units in Bosnia were either damaged or destroyed 50% were damaged and 6% destroyed in FBiH while 24% were damaged and 5% destroyed in RS. [119] Some of the destruction was incidental damage from combat but most of the extensive destruction and plunder was part of a deliberate plan of ethnic cleansing that was aimed at preventing expelled people from returning to their homes. [120] Half of the schools and a third of the hospitals in the country were also damaged or destroyed. [121]

        Several people were tried and convicted by the UN-backed International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in connection with persecution on racial, religious or ethnic grounds, [b] forced displacement and deportation as a crime against humanity during the Bosnian War. The Srebrenica massacre, which was also included as part of the ethnic cleansing campaign, [123] [54] was found to constitute a crime of genocide. [124]

        In its verdict against Karadžić, the ICTY found there was a joint criminal enterprise that aimed to forcibly resettle non-Serbs from large parts of Bosnia, and that it existed from October 1991:

        . the Chamber finds that together with the Accused, Krajišnik, Koljević, and Plavšić shared the intent to effect the common plan to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory, and through their positions in the Bosnian Serb leadership and involvement throughout the Municipalities, they contributed to the execution of the common plan from October 1991 until at least 30 November 1995. [137]

        In the judgement against Bosnian Croat leader Dario Kordić, the ICTY found there was a plan to remove Bosniaks from Croat-claimed territory:

        . the Trial Chamber draws the inference from this evidence (and the evidence of other HVO attacks in April 1993) that there was by this time a common design or plan conceived and executed by the Bosnian Croat leadership to ethnically cleanse the Lašva Valley of Muslims. Dario Kordić, as the local political leader, was part of this design or plan, his principal role being that of planner and instigator of it. [138]

        1. ^ abc Identifier Yugoslav(s) has been used both as an ethnic or supra-ethnic/national label and as a demonym for citizens and inhabitants of the former Yugoslavia. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav Wars, the vast majority of those who once identified themselves as "Yugoslavs" abandoned the label in favor of traditional ethnic ones or national identities of the successor nations. In some instances, especially in multi-ethnic historical entities, some people chose to use sub-national and regional identifications like Istria–Istrians, Vojvodina–Vojvođans. [102][103]
        2. ^ The ICTY defined persecution as a discriminatory policy aimed against a particular group by targeting them through "killings, physical and psychological abuse, rape, establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living conditions, forcible transfer or deportation, terrorising and abuse, forced labour at front lines and the use of human shields, plunder of property, wanton destruction of private property, including cultural monuments and sacred sites, and imposition and maintenance of restrictive and discriminatory measures". [122]
        1. ^ abSeybolt 2007, p. 177.
        2. ^ abTotten 2017, p. 21.
        3. ^ abPhillips 2005, p. 5.
        4. ^Crowe 2013, p. 343.
        5. ^Haddad 2011, p. 109.
        6. ^ A. D. Horne (22 August 1992). "Long Ordeal for Displaced Bosnian Muslims". The Washington Post . Retrieved 7 May 2020 .
        7. ^ ab
        8. "War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina: U.N. Cease-Fire Won't Help Banja Luka". Human Rights Watch. June 1994 . Retrieved 25 July 2019 .
        9. ^
        10. "War and humanitarian action: Iraq and the Balkans" (PDF) . UNHCR. 2000. p. 218 . Retrieved 25 July 2019 .
        11. ^Bell-Fialkoff 1993, p. 110.
        12. ^ abANNEX IV: Policy of Ethnic Cleansing - Part Two: Ethnic Cleansing in BiH - I: Introduction, 27 May 1994, pp. 36–37
        13. ^ ab
        14. Erlanger, Steven (10 June 1996). "The Dayton Accords: A Status Report". New York Times.
        15. ^
        16. Wren, Christopher S. (24 November 1995). "Resettling Refugees: U.N. Facing New Burden". New York Times.
        17. ^ abANNEX IV: Policy of Ethnic Cleansing: Ethnic Cleansing in BiH - I: Introduction, 27 May 1994, p. 33
        18. ^ abKeil 2016, pp. 55–56.
        19. ^ abFarkas 2003, p. 71.
        20. ^Fischer 2019, p. 49.
        21. ^Balić 1997, p. 137.
        22. ^McEvoy 2015, p. 11.
        23. ^Burg 1986, p. 170.
        24. ^Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. – Judgement, 16 November 1998, p. 41
        25. ^Baker 2015, p. 44.
        26. ^CIA 2002, pp. 58, 91.
        27. ^Džankic 2016, p. 64.
        28. ^Lukic & Lynch 1996, p. 204.
        29. ^Katz 2014, p. 191.
        30. ^Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 56.
        31. ^Morrison 2016, p. 80.
        32. ^Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 1114
        33. ^Nizich 1992, p. 18.
        34. ^Stojarova 2019, p. 174.
        35. ^Nettelfield 2010, p. 68.
        36. ^Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 1093
        37. ^Call 2007, p. 233.
        38. ^Crnobrnja 1996, p. 228.
        39. ^Kelly 2002, p. 301.
        40. ^Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. – Judgement, 16 November 1998, p. 46
        41. ^Shrader 2003, p. 66.
        42. ^ abBartrop & Jacobs 2014, p. 223.
        43. ^Ramet 2010, p. 264.
        44. ^
        45. Schmidt, William E. (17 May 1993). "Conflict in the Balkans Croatia Is Facing Pressure to Stop Fighting by Bosnia Croats". New York Times . Retrieved 8 July 2020 .
        46. ^Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez – Judgement, 26 February 2001, p. 39
        47. ^Ali & Lifschultz 1994, p. 367.
        48. ^ANNEX IV: Policy of Ethnic Cleansing: Summary and Conclusions I. Introduction, 27 May 1994
        49. ^
        50. "Annex - Final Report Of The Commission Of Experts Established Pursuant To Security Council Resolution 780" (PDF) . UN Security Council. 27 May 1994. p. 33 . Retrieved 7 July 2020 .
        51. ^Bartrop 2019, pp. 26–27.
        52. ^Schabas 2000, p. 199.
        53. ^International Court of Justice 2007, pp. 83–84.
        54. ^
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        63. "War Crimes in the Balkans—Joint Hearing" (PDF) . United States Senate. Washington, D.C. 9 August 1995 . Retrieved 2 June 2020 .
        64. ^ abReport A/54/549, 15 November 1999, p. 106
        65. ^Young 2001, p. 782.
        66. ^Lawson 2006, p. 23.
        67. ^Burg & Shoup 1999, p. 171.
        68. ^Thompson 2014, p. 465.
        69. ^ abBurg & Shoup 2015, p. 172.
        70. ^Clark 2014, p. 123.
        71. ^Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, pp. 651–652
        72. ^Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 654
        73. ^Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, pp. 656–657
        74. ^Amnesty International 1992, p. 72.
        75. ^ abInternational Court of Justice 2007, pp. 141–142.
        76. ^Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 458
        77. ^ ab
        78. Maass, Peter (25 July 1992). "Muslims Forced to Leave Bosnia". Washington Post . Retrieved 8 May 2020 .
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        80. Tozer, Louis (2016). "The Significance of the Role of Religion in the Bosnian Conflict of the 1990s: The Town of Foča as a Case Study". University College London. pp. 83–84.
        81. ^Amnesty International 1992, p. 75.
        82. ^Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 240
        83. ^Nizich 1992, p. 211.
        84. ^Prosecutor v. Karadžić – Judgement, 24 March 2016, p. 253
        85. ^Fabijančić 2010, p. 88.
        86. ^de Graaff & Wiebes 2014, p. 186.
        87. ^Bartrop & Jacobs 2014, p. 186.
        88. ^Burg & Shoup 2015, p. 229.
        89. ^ abBurg & Shoup 1999, p. 180.
        90. ^Bartrop 2016, p. 25.
        91. ^
        92. Pomfret, John (18 May 1993). "Croats Seek 'Intolerable' Deportation of Muslims". Washington Post . Retrieved 7 May 2020 .
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        95. Burns, John F. (21 April 1993). "Vicious 'Ethnic Cleansing' Infects Croat-Muslim Villages in Bosnia". New York Times . Retrieved 8 May 2020 .
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        97. Burns, John F. (30 October 1992). "In a 'Cleansed' Bosnian Town, Croats, Not Serbs, Aim Guns". New York Times . Retrieved 8 May 2020 .
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        99. Grebo, Lamija (4 December 2017). "Bosnia Arrests 13 Suspected of Crimes in Konjic". BalkanInsight.
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        101. Muslimovic, Admir (8 May 2019). "Bosnia Tries Ex-Fighters for Crimes Against Humanity in Konjic". BalkanInsight.
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        103. "World Report 1995 - Bosnia-Hercegovina". Human Rights Watch. 1995 . Retrieved 24 May 2020 .
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        105. Hedges, Chris (12 November 1997). "Postscript to Sarajevo's Anguish: Muslim Killings of Serbs Detailed". New York Times.
        106. ^Rogel 1998, p. 29.
        107. ^Takeyh & Gvosdev 2004, p. 84.
        108. ^Nizich 1992, p. 32.
        109. ^Donia & Fine 1994, p. 1.
        110. ^Rieff 1996, p. 96.
        111. ^Kumar 1999, p. 100.
        112. ^Wheeler 2002, p. 149.
        113. ^Tuathail & O'Loughlin 2009, p. 1045

        The majority of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina was perpetrated by armed formations affiliated with the wartime goals of the SDS and VRS.

        Books Edit

        • Baker, Catherine (2015). The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. Macmillan International Higher Education. ISBN9781137398994 .
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        • Bartrop, Paul R. (2016). Bosnian Genocide: The Essential Reference Guide: The Essential Reference Guide. ABC-CLIO. ISBN9781440838699 .
        • Bartrop, Paul R. (2019). Modern Genocide: A Documentary and Reference Guide. ABC-CLIO. ISBN9781440862342 .
        • Bieber, Florian (2005). Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance. Springer. ISBN9780230501379 .
        • Bringa, Tone (2005). "Reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina". In Skaar, Elin Gloppen, Siri Suhrke, Astri (eds.). Roads to Reconciliation. Lexington Books. ISBN9780739109045 .
        • Burg, Steven Shoup, Paul (1999). The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention . M.E. Sharpe. p. 171. ISBN9781563243080 .
        • Burg, Steven Shoup, Paul (2015). Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention: Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1990-93. Routledge. ISBN9781317471028 .
        • Call, Charles (2007). Constructing Justice and Security After War. US Institute of Peace Press. ISBN9781929223909 .
        • Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis (2002). Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995, Volume 1. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency. ISBN978-0-16-066472-4 .
        • Clark, Janine Natalya (2014). International Trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the Impact of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Routledge. ISBN9781317974758 .
        • Cousens, Elizabeth M. Cater, Charles K. (2001). Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN9781555879426 .
        • Crnobrnja, Mihailo (1996). Yugoslav Drama, Second Edition. McGill-Queen's Press. ISBN9780773566156 .
        • Crowe, David M. (2013). War Crimes, Genocide, and Justice: A Global History. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN978-0-230-62224-1 .
        • de Graaff, Bob Wiebes, Cees (2014). "Fallen Off the Priority List". In Walton, Timothy R. (ed.). The Role of Intelligence in Ending the War in Bosnia in 1995. Lexington Books. ISBN9781498500593 .
        • Donia, Robert J. Fine, John Van Antwerp (1994). Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed. C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. ISBN9781850652120 .
        • Džankic, Jelena (2016). Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro: Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges. Routledge. ISBN9781317165798 .
        • Eberhardt, Piotr Owsinski, Jan (2015). Ethnic Groups and Population Changes in Twentieth Century Eastern Europe: History, Data and Analysis. Routledge. ISBN9781317470960 .
        • Fabijančić, Tony (2010). Bosnia: In the Footsteps of Gavrilo Princip. University of Alberta. ISBN9780888645197 .
        • Farkas, Evelyn (2003). Fractured States and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, Ethiopia, and Bosnia in the 1990s. Springer. ISBN9781403982438 .
        • Fischer, Ernest W. (2019). "The Yugoslav Civil War". In Haglund, David G. (ed.). Nato's Eastern Dilemmas. Routledge. ISBN9780429710780 .
        • Friedman, Francine (2013). Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink. Routledge. ISBN9781134527540 .
        • Hodge, Carole (2019). The Balkans on Trial: Justice vs. Realpolitik. Routledge. ISBN9781000007121 .
        • Keil, Soeren (2016). Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Routledge. ISBN9781317093428 .
        • Kumar, Radha (1999). Divide and Fall?: Bosnia in the Annals of Partition. Verso. ISBN9781859841839 .
        • Lawson, Kenneth E. (2006). Faith and hope in a war-torn land. Government Printing Office. ISBN9780160872792 .
        • Lukic, Reneo Lynch, Allen (1996). Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN9780198292005 .
        • McEvoy, Joanne O'Leary, Brendan (22 April 2013). Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN978-0-8122-0798-9 .
        • McEvoy, Joanne (2015). Power-Sharing Executives: Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland. University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN9780812246513 .
        • Morrison, Kenneth (2016). Sarajevo's Holiday Inn on the Frontline of Politics and War. Springer. ISBN9781137577184 .
        • Nettelfield, Lara J. (2010). Courting Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521763806 .
        • Nizich, Ivana (1992). War Crimes in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Volume 1. Helsinki Watch. ISBN9781564320834 .
        • Perica, Vjekoslav (2002). Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. Oxford University Press. ISBN9780195174298 .
        • Phillips, R. Cody (2005). Bosnia-Herzegovina. Government Printing Office. ISBN9780160876141 .
        • Ramet, Sabrina P. (2010). "Politics in Croatia since 1990". In Ramet, Sabrina P. (ed.). Central and Southeast European Politics Since 1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 258–285. ISBN978-1-139-48750-4 .
        • Riedlmayer, Andras (2002). "From the Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia's Cultural Heritage". In Shatzmiller, Maya (ed.). Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States. McGill-Queen's Press. ISBN9780773523463 .
        • Rieff, David (1996). Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West. Simon and Schuster. ISBN9780684819037 .
        • Rogel, Carole (1998). The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN9780313299186 .
        • Schabas, William A. (2000). Genocide in International Law: The Crimes of Crimes. Cambridge University Press. ISBN9780521787901 .
        • Schwai, Markus Burazor, Mladen (2020). "Contemporary Design Intervention Inside the Cultural Landscape of Žepče – At What Price?". In Bailey, Greg Defilippis, Francesco Korjenic, Azra Čaušević, Amir (eds.). Cities and Cultural Landscapes: Recognition, Celebration, Preservation and Experience. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. ISBN9781527548206 .
        • Seybolt, Taylor B. (2007). Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure. Oxford University Press. ISBN9780199252435 .
        • Shrader, Charles R. (2003). The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992–1994. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press. ISBN978-1-58544-261-4 .
        • Stojarova, Vera (2019). "Characteristics of the Balkans: 1989–2019 in South East Europe: Dancing in a Vicious Circle?". In Eibl, Otto Gregor, Miloš (eds.). Thirty Years of Political Campaigning in Central and Eastern Europe. Springer Nature. ISBN9783030276935 .
        • Takeyh, Ray Gvosdev, Nikolas K. (2004). The Receding Shadow of the Prophet: The Rise and Fall of Radical Political Islam. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN9780275976286 .
        • Thompson, Wayne C. (2014). Nordic, Central, and Southeastern Europe. Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN9781475812244 .
        • Toal, Gerard Tuathail, Gearóid Ó Dahlman, Carl T. (2011). Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Its Reversal. Oxford University Press. ISBN9780199730360 .
        • Totten, Samuel (2017). Genocide at the Millennium. Routledge. ISBN9781351517836 .
        • Vermeulen, Hans Govers, Cora (1994). "Full text for reading and/or download available at". The Anthropology of Ethnicity: Beyond "Ethnic Groups and Boundaries". Het Spinhuis. ISBN9789073052970 .
        • Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2002). "Human rights and security agenda: beyond non-intervention?". In Rees, G. Wyn (ed.). International Politics in Europe: The New Agenda. Routledge. ISBN9781134890163 .

        Scientific journals Edit

        • Ali, Rabia Lifschultz, Lawrence (1994). "Why Bosnia?". Third World Quarterly. 15 (3): 367–401. doi:10.1080/01436599408420387. JSTOR3993291.
        • Balić, Smail (1997). "The Cultural Achievements of Bosnian Muslims". Islamic Studies. 36 (2): 137–175. JSTOR23076192.
        • Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew (1993). "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing". Foreign Affairs. 72 (3): 110–121. doi:10.2307/20045626. JSTOR20045626. S2CID27821821.
        • Burg, Steven (1986). "Elite conflict in post‐Tito Yugoslavia". Soviet Studies. 38 (2): 170–193. doi:10.1080/09668138608411634.
        • Haddad, Heidi Nichols (2011). "Mobilizing the Will to Prosecute: Crimes of Rape at the Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals". Human Rights Review. 12: 109–132. doi:10.1007/s12142-010-0163-x. S2CID55172255.
        • Katz, Vera (2014). "A Platform on the Future Yugoslav Community (Izetbegovic-Gligorov Plan). A View from the Perspective of Bosnia and Herzegovina". Politeja. 4 (30): 191–210. doi:10.12797/Politeja.11.2014.30.18. JSTOR24919725.
        • Kelly, Michael J. (2002). "Can Sovereigns Be Brought to Justice? The Crime of Genocide's Evolution and the Meaning of the Milosevic Trial". St. John's Law Review. 76 (2): 287–378. SSRN920900 .
        • Kondylis, Florence (2008). "Conflict displacement and labor market outcomes in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina" (PDF) . Journal of Development Economics. 93 (2): 235–248. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.10.004.
        • Mrduljaš, Saša (2011). "Značenje političkih odnosa u Bosni i Hercegovini za Dalmaciju" [Relevance of the political relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to Dalmatia]. New Presence : Review for Intellectual and Spiritual Questions (in Croatian). Institute of Social Sciences Ivo Pilar. 9 (3): 521–544.
        • Ringdal, Gerd Inger Ringdal, Kristen Simkus, Albert (2008). "War Experiences and War-related Distress in Bosnia and Herzegovina Eight Years after War". Croatian Medical Journal. 49 (1): 75–86. doi:10.3325/cmj.2008.1.75. PMC2269254 . PMID18293460.
        • Tuathail, Gearóid Ó. O'Loughlin, John (2009). "After Ethnic Cleansing: Return Outcomes in Bosnia-Herzegovina a Decade Beyond War". Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 99 (5): 1045–1053. doi:10.1080/00045600903260671. S2CID143472185.
        • Young, Kirsten (2001). "UNHCR and ICRC in the former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina" (PDF) . International Review of the Red Cross. 83 (843): 781–806. doi:10.1017/S1560775500119315 (inactive 31 May 2021). S2CID37791908. CS1 maint: DOI inactive as of May 2021 (link)

        Other sources Edit

        • Amnesty International (1992). "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Gross Abuses of Basic Human Rights". New York. OCLC231617610.
        • Bassiouni, M. Cherif (28 December 1994). "Final report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to security council resolution 780 (1992), Annex IV – The policy of ethnic cleansing". United Nations. Archived from the original on 4 May 2012 . Retrieved 11 July 2012 .
        • International Court of Justice (2007). "Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs, Serbia and Montenegro)" (PDF) . The Hague.
        • "Prosecutor vs. Zejnil Delalić – Judgement" (PDF) . The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 16 November 1998.
        • "Prosecutor vs. Radovan Karadžić – Judgement" (PDF) . The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 26 March 2016.
        • "Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez – Judgement" (PDF) . The Hague: International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 26 February 2001.
        • Mazowiecki, Tadeusz (17 November 1992). "Situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia : note / by the Secretary-General". United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
        • "Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica [A/54/549]". United Nations. 15 November 1999.

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        He and his team are investigating how well materials such as charcoal can cleanse stormwater.

        When the daughter announced she saw it walking down the hall, they sent the doll away and cleanse d the home with holy water.

        Soapy suds for cleansing hands and bodies usually contain fragrances.

        Employees in the vehicles do not have hand sanitizer or another method to cleanse hands while away from the station.

        I think it’s to cleanse their image more than anything, to wipe away the judgment and the perception that they are enemies of progress, which is what it seemed like back then.

        Underneath minimalistic names like Detox and Cleanse , enticing descriptions of the fluid medicine bags help narrow the choices.

        The bucket of water-filled prayers she will use three times to “ cleanse away her shame.”

        It is bad enough when credulous but healthy people buy worthless cleanse kits and eat too much kale.

        With every health trend, every celebrity-endorsed “superfood” and faddish juice cleanse comes the inevitable backlash.

        But could something quite sensible lie behind this hokey-sounding separation cleanse ?

        Turn away from sin and order thy hands aright, and cleanse thy heart from all offence.

        Thou blind Pharisee, cleanse first the inside of the cup and of the platter, that the outside thereof may become clean also.

        He stood there knowing that I knew that he had done something wrong and he was trying to cleanse himself of it.

        There is neither soap, water, nor towel, to cleanse yourself when you rise in the morning.

        The first milk of the cow after calving, is slightly purgative, which is essential to cleanse the stomach of the calf.