28 December 1944

28 December 1944

28 December 1944

December 1944

1234567
891011121314
15161718192021
22232425262728
293031
>January

War at Sea

German submarine U-735 sunk at Horten

Pacific

The US Airfield on Mindoro becomes fully operational

Greece

Churchill agrees to recommend the creation of a regency government to the Greek king



Adolf Hitler’s Speech to His Generals at Ziegenberg Headquarters – December 28, 1944

I have asked you to come here before an operation on the successful conclusion of which further blows in the west will depend.

First, I want briefly to place this particular operation in its true significance. I want to relate it to the over all situation that confronts us, and to the problems which we face and which must be solved. Whether they develop in a happy or an unhappy fashion, solved they shall be, ending either in our favour or in our destruction.

The German situation can be characterised in a few sentences. As in the Great War, so in this war the question is not whether Germany will be graciously permitted by her enemies, in the event of their victory, some kind of existence, but whether Germany has the will to remain in existence or whether it will be destroyed. Unlike earlier wars of the seventeenth or eighteenth century, this war will decide neither a question of political organisation nor a question of the adherence of a Folk or a tribe or a former federal State to the German Reich. What, in the last analysis, will be decided is the survival of the very essence of our German Folk, not survival of the German Reich, but survival of the very essence of the German Folk. A victory of our enemies must bolshevise Europe. What bolshevisation means for Germany everybody must and will realise. In contrast with earlier times, it is not now a question of a change in the form of our government. Changes in the form of government have taken place in the lives of Folks on innumerable occasions. They come and go. Here the survival of the very essence is involved. Essences are either preserved or they are removed. Preservation is our goal. The destruction of the essence under certain circumstances destroys the Race forever.

Struggles such as are going on now have the character of clashes of world views, and they frequently last a very long time. Therefore they are not comparable to the struggles of the time of Frederick The Great. Then the issue was whether, within the framework of the gradually crumbling and disintegrating Empire, a new great German power would emerge, and whether this power would, so to speak, achieve recognition as a great European Power. Today Germany no longer needs to prove herself a great European Power — her importance as such is clear to everyone. The German Reich is now fighting an ideological war for its very existence. The winning of this war will, once and for all, stabilise this great Power, which quantitatively and qualitatively is already in existence. The loss of this war will destroy the German Folk and break it up. Parts of Germany will be evacuated.

A few weeks ago you heard Churchill say in the English Parliament that the whole of East Prussia and parts of Pomerania and Silesia would be given to Poland, who in turn would give something else to Russia. Seven or ten or eleven million Germans would have to be transferred. Churchill hopes in any case to eliminate by air attack six or seven millions, so that the population transfer would offer no great difficulties. This is today the sober statement of a leading statesman in a public body. In earlier times you would have regarded this as a propaganda argument, as a propaganda lie. Here it is said quite officially, though it by no means corresponds to what will actually happen, because, in the case of a German collapse, England would be unable to offer serious resistance to bolshevism anywhere.

That is pure theory. In these days, when Mr. Churchill leaves Athens in humiliating failure, and is unable to oppose bolshevism even on a small scale, he wants to give the impression that he is able to halt the advance of bolshevism at any frontier in Europe. That is ridiculous fantasy. America cannot do it. England cannot do it. The only country whose fate will be decided in this war is Germany. She will be saved or, in the event of the loss of the war, she will perish.

I hasten to add, gentlemen, that from these statements of mine you are not to draw the conclusion that I even remotely envisage the loss of this war. In my life I have never learned to know the word capitulation, and I am a self made man. For me the situation in which we are today is nothing new. I have been in very different and much worse situations. I mention this only because I want you to understand why I pursue my aim with such fanaticism, and why nothing can wear me down. As much as I may be tormented with worries, and even physically shaken by them, nothing will make the slightest change in my decision to fight on until at last the scales tip to our side.

The objection that, with respect to such issues, we must think in sober military terms, can best be refuted by taking a quick look at the great events of history. In the time after the Battle Of Cannae, everyone would, by sober military calculations, have been forced to the conclusion that Rome was lost. But, though abandoned by all her friends, betrayed by all her allies, the last Army at her disposal lost, and the enemy at the gates, Rome was saved by the steadfastness of the Senate — not the Roman Folk, but the Senate, which means, their leadership. We have a similar example in our own German history, not of the same worldwide significance, but tremendously important for the whole course of German history, for the later foundation of the German Reich was determined by this hero, was made possible by his historical achievement. I refer to the Seven Years War. As early as the third year countless military and political officials were convinced that the war could never be won. According to human calculations it should have been lost: 3,700,000 Prussians were pitched against about 52,000,000 Europeans. In spite of that, however, this war was won. Even in struggles of a worldwide nature, the spirit is one of the decisive factors. It enables men to discover new ways out, and to mobilise new potentials. Above all, in such situations it is decisive to know that the enemy is made up of men of flesh and blood, of men who have nerves, and of men who do not fight for their very existence in the same sense that we do. That means that the enemy does not know, as we do, that this is a fight for existence. If the English should now lose this war, this would not be decisive for them, in view of the losses they have already suffered. America would lose neither its political form nor its racial essence. But Germany fights for her very existence. That the German Folk are aware of this you all realise. You need to look only at today’s German youth, and to compare them with the youth of the Great War. You need to look only at the German cities and to compare their attitude with that of the German Folk in the year 1918. Today the entire German Folk remain unshaken, and will remain unshaken. In 1918 the German Folk capitulated without necessity. Now they realise the dangers of the situation, and are aware of the problem with which we are confronted. That is what I wanted to say as a brief introduction before I discuss the purely military issues.

What is the military situation? Whoever studies the great worldwide historical struggles which are known to us will very frequently find situations of a similar character, perhaps even situations much worse than the one with which we are confronted today. For we should not forget that even today we are defending a territory — German territory and Allied territory — which is essentially larger than Germany has ever been, and that we have at our disposal a Defence Force which even today unquestionably is the strongest on the Earth. If anyone wants to get the over all situation into correct perspective, he should visualise the following: he should take by itself one of the world powers which are opposing us, Russia, England, or America. There can be no doubt that singly we could dispose of each of these States with ease. That not only is proof of the strength of the German Folk, but also of the strength of the German Defence Force which, of course, in the final analysis, grows out of the strength of the German Folk, which cannot be imagined to exist in a vacuum.

In a military sense it is decisive that in the west we are moving from a sterile defensive to the offensive. The offensive alone will enable us to give once more to this war in the west a successful turn. To the extent to which the enemy succeeds in mobilising resources, defensive warfare would get us into a hopeless position within a calculable period of time. The offensive would not cost such sacrifice in blood as people generally assume — at least, less in the future than at present. The view that under all circumstances an offensive would be more costly in blood than a defensive is wrong. We ourselves have had that experience. The battles that were most bloody and costly were in all cases our defensive battles. If we take into account the losses of the enemy and our own losses, and if we include the numbers of war prisoners, offensive battles have always been favorable to us. The same is true of the present offensive. If I imagine the total number of the Divisions the enemy has thrown in here, and if I calculate his entire losses in prisoners alone — losses in prisoners are the same thing as losses in killed, the men are eliminated — and if I add his losses in blood to his losses in material, then if I compare them with our losses, there can be no doubt that even the brief offensive we have just undertaken has resulted in an immediate easing of the situation on the entire Front. Although, unfortunately, the offensive has not resulted in the decisive success which might have been expected, yet a tremendous easing of the situation has occurred. The enemy has had to abandon all his plans for attack. He has been obliged to regroup all his forces. He has had to throw in again units that were fatigued. His operational plans have been completely upset. He is enormously criticised at home. It is a bad psychological moment for him. Already he has had to admit that there is no chance of the war being decided before August, perhaps not before the end of next year. That means a transformation of the entire situation such as nobody would have believed possible a fortnight ago. That is the net result of a battle in which a great part of our Divisions has not even been committed. A considerable part of our Panzer Divisions still follows in the rear, or has been in combat for only a few days. I am convinced that the defensive would in the long run be unbearable for us. For the losses in blood of an enemy offensive will steadily decrease commitments of material will increase. The enemy will not continue these monotonous assaults with men, for the criticism at home will on the one hand be decisive, and on the other, of course, the gradually improving flow of ammunitions and war material will have its decisive effect. To the same extent to which he repairs the harbours and solves his transportation problem, he can accelerate the moving up of supplies as long as the stockpiles suffice. He will become accustomed to the tactics that were actually employed at Aachen, namely, concentrated artillery fire on a position, destruction of single pill boxes by fire from tanks, and then occupation of a completely pulverised area by relatively weak infantry forces. In the long run his losses in manpower will be fewer than ours. During this time he will demolish our rail system — slowly but surely — and will make transportation gradually impossible for us. We do not force him to use his bomber squadrons over the battle front, but open to them the German homeland and in turn that will react upon the front because of decreases in delivery of ammunition, of petrol, of weapons, of tools, of motorcars, and so on, and that will have unfavourable effects upon the troops. In other words, the result of a continuation of the present, or former, tactics which were forced upon us by circumstances, because we were unable to attack earlier, might result in extremely heavy losses in blood, while the losses of the enemy would probably decrease considerably.

Consequently, if possible, we shall abandon these tactics the moment we believe that we have forces enough for offensive action. That is possible. The result of the present first act of our offensive in the west has already been that the Americans have, all told, been forced to move up something like 50 percent of the forces from their other Fronts, that their other offensive formations, located north and south of our breakthrough point, have been greatly weakened, that the first English Divisions are arriving, that the enemy is already moving up a great part of his tank forces. I believe that eight or nine tank Divisions, of a total of fifteen, have been in action. That means that he has had to concentrate his forces there. In the Sector in which we are now starting to attack, lines have become extraordinarily thin. He has pulled out Division after Division, and now we must hurry in order to be able to annihilate a still larger number of Divisions — perhaps the enemy has left there only three or perhaps four — if we have luck it may be five, but hardly six.

I want to emphasise right away that the aims of all these offensives, which will be delivered blow by blow — already I am preparing a third blow — is, first, the elimination of all American units south of the penetration point by annihilating them piece by piece, Division by Division. Then we shall see how we can establish a direct connection between this operation and the penetration point. The task of our forces at the penetration point is to tie down as many enemy forces as possible. The penetration point is at a spot vital for them. The crossing of the Meuse River would be immensely dangerous for both the Americans and the English. An advance toward Antwerp would be catastrophic for them. The advance did not succeed, but we did succeed in one thing, namely, in forcing them to concentrate all essential and available forces in order to localise the danger. This is our first positive gain. Now our task is to destroy the forces south of the penetration point, first by means of a number of single blows.

Thus the task set for this new offensive does not go beyond what is possible, and can be achieved with our available forces. We are committing eight Divisions. With the exception of one Division which comes from Finland, seven are of course worn out from fighting, although parts of a few are rested but the enemy who opposes us — if we have luck, with five Divisions, possibly only with four, possibly only with three — is not fresh, either. He too is worn out, with the exception of one Division which is stationed directly along the Rhine River, and of which we shall have to see how it will prove itself, and with the exception of the 12th American Tank Division, of which it is not certain whether it will be committed at all, and which in any case is a new unit which has not yet been in combat. But the rest of the units on the enemy side are also worn out. We shall find a situation which we could not wish to be better.

If this operation succeeds, it will lead to the destruction of a part of that group of Divisions which confronts us south of the breakthrough point. The next operation will then follow immediately. It will be connected with a further push. I hope that in this way we shall first smash these American units in the south. Then we shall continue the attack, and shall try to connect it with the real long term operation itself.

Thus this second attack has an entirely clear objective — the destruction of the enemy forces. No questions of prestige are involved. It is not a question of gaining space. The exclusive aim is to destroy and eliminate the enemy forces wherever we find them. It is not even the task of this operation to liberate all Alsace. That would be wonderful. It would have an immense effect on the German Folk, a decisive effect on the world, immense psychological importance, a very depressing effect on the French Folk. But that is not what matters. As I said before, what matters is the destruction of the manpower of the enemy.

However, even in this operation, it will be necessary to pay attention to speed. That means, in my opinion, that we should take what can be taken quickly, like lightning, without being deflected from our proper target. Sometimes you can not catch up in weeks with what you failed to do, or missed doing, in three or four hours. A reconnaissance unit, or a small motorised unit, or an Assault Gun Brigade, or a Panzer Battalion is sometimes able to cover in three or four hours 20 to 40 decisive kilometres which afterwards could not be gained in six weeks of battle.

Unfortunately that is what we experienced in our first operation. This stood under a number of lucky, as well as unlucky, stars. A lucky omen, we succeeded for the first time in keeping an operation secret — I may say for the first time since the fall of 1939, since we entered the war. A few bad things happened even here. One Officer carrying a written order went up to the Front and was snapped. Whether the enemy found the order and made use of this intelligence, or whether they did not believe it, cannot be established now. At any rate the order reached the enemy. However, thank heaven! it had no effect. At least no reports have come in from any quarter that the enemy was put on guard. That was a lucky omen.

The best omen of all was the development of the weather, which had been forecast by a young weather prophet who actually proved to have been right. This weather development gave us the possibility of camouflaging, though this had seemed hardly possible, the final assembly of the troops during the last two or three days, so that the enemy gained no insight. The same weather prophet, who again forecast the present weather with absolute certainty, has again proved to be right. Then there was the complete failure of the enemy air reconnaissance, partly because of the weather, but partly also because of a certain existing conceitedness. Those people did not think it necessary to look around. They did not believe it at all likely that we could again take the initiative. Perhaps they were even influenced by the conviction that I am already dead, or that, at any rate, I suffer from cancer and cannot any longer live, and drink, so that they consider this danger also eliminated. They have lived exclusively in the thought of their own offensive.

A third factor has also to be added, namely the conviction that we could not possess the necessary forces. Gentlemen, here I want to tell you something immediately. Certainly our forces are not unlimited. It was an extremely bold venture to mobilise the forces for this offensive and for the coming blows, a venture which, of course, involved very grave risks. Hence if you read today that things are not going well in the south of the Eastern Front, in Hungary, you must know that as a matter of course we cannot be equally strong everywhere. We have lost so many allies. Unfortunately, because of the treachery of our dear allies, we are forced to retire gradually to a narrower ring of barriers. Yet despite all this it has been possible on the whole to hold the Eastern Front. We shall stop the enemy advance in the south, too. We shall close it off. Nevertheless it has been possible to organise numerous new Divisions and to arm them, to reactivate old Divisions and to rearm them, to reactivate Panzer Divisions, to accumulate petrol, and above all to get the German Airforce into shape so that, weather permitting, it can be committed to a number of daylight flights, and can come forward with new models which are able to make daylight attacks in the enemy’s rear, and against which he has at present nothing to oppose. In other words, we have been able to reassemble enough in the way of artillery, mortars, tanks, and Infantry Divisions to restore the balance of forces in the west. That in itself is a miracle. It demanded continuous pushing, and months of work and plugging, even with regard to the smallest detail. I am by no means satisfied yet. Every day shows that there is something which is not yet ready, which has not yet arrived. Just today I received the sad news that the needed 21 centimetre mortars, which I have kept after like the devil, probably still will not come. I still hope they will. It is a continuous struggle for weapons and men, for supplies and fuel, and god knows what. Of course this cannot go on forever. This offensive really must lead to a success.

If we succeed in cleaning up, at least half way, the situation in the west — and that must be our unalterable goal — then we should be able to rectify the situation with respect to iron ore, because we need not only the Saar Basin but most of all we need the high quality iron ore mined in Lorraine. This is a prerequisite. The more critical our situation in the rest of Europe, the more important is this iron ore region. We cannot continue this war for any length of time, we cannot continue to exist as a Nation, without having bases of certain raw material at our disposal. That also is crucial. I hope this objective also will be reached in the course of these operations.

The enemy did not think that possible. He was firmly convinced that we were at the end of our rope. That was a further, third, reason why initially we succeeded in our offensive. Then difficulties arose. First of all, the terribly bad roads. Then the repairing of bridges took longer than anticipated. Here for the first time it became clear what it means to lose ten hours. To a Panzer Division, ten lost hours can mean, under certain circumstances, the loss of an entire operation. If you do not succeed in getting through in ten hours, you may not be able, under certain circumstances, to make that up in eight days. Speed, therefore, here means everything. That is one point.

The second was: because of the delays caused by bad roads, because of the destruction of certain bridges which could not be quickly repaired, we did not begin our offensive with the mobility that would have been desirable, but were heavily burdened with equipment and most of all with vehicles. Exactly why all these vehicles were taken along I do not know. It has even been claimed that the vehicles were taken along in order that everyone could carry with him what he could grab. I do not know about that, but it is certain that we were encumbered with vehicles. In that respect we must learn from the Russians.

One primary fact was demonstrated at once. In this attack, Infantry Divisions generally advanced quite as fast as Panzer Divisions, and indeed sometimes faster, although these Infantry Divisions were advancing on foot. That reminds me of the year 1940 when, for instance, a Division like the First Mountain Division, about which I had seriously worried whether it could catch up at all, suddenly whizzed along like a weasel. All of a sudden it reached the Aisne River, nearly as quickly as our Panzer units. Quite a number of Infantry Divisions have given very good accounts of themselves, some of them young Divisions, though they were really impeded in their own progress by the road jam caused by the Panzer units. They would have advanced faster if the roads had not been clogged by the Panzer units. One thing is clear, namely, that Panzer units which are fully motorised — I always hear it said that they are 75 to 80 percent, or 65 per cent motorised that is usually too much because then everything is on the road, and there are eight or ten men to a truck whereas formerly there were thirty — I say, Panzer units can cover 100 kilometres per day, even 150, given free terrain. But I cannot remember that there has been one offensive when even for two or three days we have covered more than 50 or 60 kilometres. Generally at the end the pace has hardly exceeded that of the infantry units. The Panzer units made only short hops. They quickly took possession of something, but the advance units of the Infantry Division then had to close up. As soon as a Panzer Division cannot roll, excessive motorisation becomes a burden. The vehicles cannot get off the roads, and if, because of the danger from the air, they have to move at intervals, the final result is that some of the forces will not be in their places. Either the artillery, or the infantry, or the Grenadiers will not get to the Front. Actually, the battle out front has been fought out by quite small spearheads. That happened in the fighting of the Army Group Model, also of the Life Guard In the last analysis, only the spearheads did the fighting. Only the spearheads of the 12th SS Panzer Division were in the battle, but a gigantic network of roads toward the rear was completely clogged and blocked. You could not get ahead, and you could not get back. Finally not even the fuel was brought up. The vehicles hardly moved. They actually let the motors idle. They let them keep running during the night in order to prevent damage from freezing, and so on. The men kept warm that way, too. An immense amount of petrol is needed. Everywhere the roads were bad. You had to drive in first gear.

We can really learn from the Russians. When today I get a report about a Russian road which leads to a front section where there are 36 infantry divisions and Panzer units, so many armoured regiments, and so and so many other units, and when this report says that last night 1,000 vehicles were on the road, tonight 800, and then 1,200, and then 300 vehicles, this report causes an alarm that runs through the whole Eastern Front, for it is understood to mean that an attack is imminent. Our Panzer Divisions have 2,500, 3,000, 4,000, 4,500 trucks, and then they report that they are mobile only 60, 75, or 80 percent. Quite by chance I found out about two Mountain Divisions, of which one had 1,800, the other 1,400 trucks. Those are Mountain Divisions. Of course, they will get plucked if they have not plucked themselves already. This development would not be so bad if we could afford all that, and if we could operate in large open terrain. But at a time when you are hemmed in and crammed onto a few roads, this motorisation can even be a misfortune. That is one of the reasons why the right wing first got entirely stuck — bad roads, obstacles because of bridges which could not be repaired in a short time, then thirdly the difficulty of coping with the masses of vehicles, then again the difficulty of the fuel supply, which, unlike in earlier offensives, could not be brought up by the German Airforce, and then finally of course the threatened clearing of the weather. We have to realise that the German Airforce did a pretty good job. It has thrown itself into the offensive, and has done everything that it could do considering the number of aeroplanes which can be committed, and the kind of aeroplanes at our disposal. Nevertheless, in good weather it is impossible for us to give such protection in the air that no enemy aeroplanes can get in. In the case of such crammed roads, the roads then become mass graves for vehicles of all kinds. Nevertheless, we had immense luck, for when the good weather came, the disentanglement was in general already getting under way.

As I said before, those were the unlucky moments among the lucky ones. Nevertheless, for a moment, the situation seemed to justify the hope that we could hold out. At the beginning I did not at all believe that the enemy would thin out his fronts to such an extent. Now that the thinning out has taken place, it is time to draw the consequences at other parts of the Front, and they must be drawn quickly. Here I must take up a very decisive consideration, namely the objections that can be raised to a continuation of this operation. The first objection is the old one, the forces are not yet strong enough. Here I can only say that you have to take advantage of a unique situation, even at the risk of being not yet quite strong enough. We have committed very strong units. If circumstances had been somewhat more favourable, weaker units certainly would have achieved a greater success than the strong units in default of lucky circumstances. Thus yardsticks of strength are relative. The enemy, too, is not up to his full strength. He too has weaknesses.

Another argument always put forward is that a greater period of rest should be allowed. Gentlemen, speed is everything today. If we permit the enemy to regain his wits, then, in my opinion, we shall have lost half the chance we possessed. The year 1918 should be a warning to us. In 1918 the intervals between the various attacks were much too long. Reasons have been given why, but there can be no doubt that if the second offensive at Chemin des Dames had followed the first one sooner, the outcome would have been very different. Connection with the wing of the first great assault group would have certainly been established via Compiègne, and a decisive turn might have occurred. Perhaps we might have reached the sea. Rest periods, therefore, are not always desirable.

Gentlemen, there is something else I want to emphasise. I have been in this business for eleven years, and during these eleven years, I have never heard anybody report that everything was completely ready. On the contrary, during these eleven years a report usually arrived saying that the Navy requested urgently a delay for such and such a length of time because this and that should still be done, and would be ready at such and such a date. Then, when the Navy was ready, the Army had its say: It would be a great pity if we should do that now, because the Army is just about to introduce this and that thing, and would like to wait for it. When the Army was ready, then the German Airforce came forward and said: It is quite impossible to do that. Until the new model is introduced, it is impossible to attack or to expose oneself to such a danger. When finally the German Airforce was ready, the Navy came back and declared: The present submarine has not proved itself. A new type must be introduced, and a new type cannot be ready before the year so and so. We have never been ready. That has been true for every offensive. The most tragic example perhaps was the fall of 1939. I wanted to attack in the west immediately, but I was told that we were not ready. Afterwards I was asked: Why did we not attack? You had only to give the order. I then had to admit that a mistake had been made. We should have declared simply: We attack in the west on 15th November at the latest. That is final, no objection permitted. Then we would have started action. I am convinced that we should have beaten France to a pulp that winter, and would have been completely free in the west.

You are never entirely ready. That is plain. In our situation it is not even possible. The big problem is that when in theory you are ready, the things that were ready are no longer at your disposal, but have been used somewhere else. Today we are not in a position to put Divisions on ice. Everyone is watched with the eyes of Argus. If there is quiet, or no large scale battle in the east for two weeks, then the Commander of the Army Group in the west comes and says: There are unused Panzer units in the east, why do we not get them? If there is quiet momentarily in the west, then the same Commander, if in the east, would declare immediately: There is complete quiet in the west we should get at least 4 to 6 Panzer Divisions over here to the east. As soon as I have a Division free anywhere, other sections are already eyeing it. For myself I am really glad the Divisions are in existence at all. Now I am following the example of some clever Army or Army Group Commanders. They never pull out any Divisions, but leave them all in, even if the Divisional Sectors at their Front get very narrow and then they declare: I have no Divisions free to dispose of, they are all committed. Then it is up to me to unfreeze a Division otherwise I would never get one.

Therefore, I have to state that we do not have unlimited time at our disposal. Events march on. If I do not act quickly at one point, then somewhere else a situation may arise by which I am forced to send something away. Time is of value only if you make use of it.

Then a further worry is the problem of ammunition. I am convinced that we can afford the ammunition needed for this offensive, because experience shows that an offensive eats up less ammunition than a defensive. Furthermore, the following consideration should be emphasised. It is generally believed that we are unable to equal our enemies’ supply of ammunition. According to the reports of our troops, our reserve of ammunition in the west was half of that of the Allies. In the east our expenditure of ammunition is nearly 100 percent greater than that of the Russians. Although you may sometimes hear it said that the Russians send over gigantic quantities of ammunition, the fact is that the German expenditure of ammunition is exactly 100 percent higher than the Russian, and I do not count the ammunition we leave behind on retreats. That beats everything. So far as ammunition is concerned, we can afford this offensive. The real problem is transportation.

The fuel actually needed for this operation is available. That we shall get it there, there is no doubt. The general transportation situation is more difficult. Improvement in the transportation situation will depend on the extent to which each Commander of a unit, each Troop Leader, examines conscientiously what he needs to take along and what is not absolutely essential. Everything that is taken along, and is not absolutely necessary, is not only a burden for the troops but a burden for the supply forces, a burden for the entire fuel situation, and that means a burden for the coming operation. I consider it important to ask oneself rigorously again and again: Is there anything that I do not absolutely need? The character and the honour of a Panzer Division — whether an Army or an SS Division makes no difference — is not demeaned if its Battalions march for once on foot. If they cannot close up because of a road jam, then they are compelled to march on foot anyway. They have to get up to the front under all circumstances. If this operation were headed for the Sahara or for Central Asia, I would say that I understood that you do not want to part with your vehicles, but this operation, which in any case will not extend for more than 50 to 60 kilometres, can be carried out on foot. The infantry has to do that anyway, and has never known otherwise. The infantry accepts this as its god appointed fate and its honourable duty, but Panzer units regard it as a kind of disgrace if suddenly some must for a while march on foot.

I believe this to be a decisive factor for the success of this operation. On the whole the plan of the operation is clear. I am in full agreement with the measures that have been taken. I particularly hope that we shall succeed in moving the right wing forward rapidly in order to open the way to Saverne and then to push into the plains of the Rhine River and liquidate the American Divisions. The destruction of these American Divisions must be our goal. I further hope that by then the fuel situation will permit a regrouping for a fresh assault and a further blow, as a result of which I confidently expect that additional American Divisions will be destroyed by the growing forces on our side. For the number of our forces will by then have increased somewhat. I can support this next attack with several additional Divisions, one of them a very good one from Finland. Unless the enterprise is cursed with bad luck from the beginning, it should, in my opinion, succeed.

I do not need to explain to you a second time how much depends upon it. It will largely determine the success of the first operation. By carrying out the two operations, A and B, and by succeeding in them, the threat to our left flank will disappear automatically. We shall then immediately fight the third battle and smash the Americans completely. I am firmly convinced that we can then turn toward the left.

Our firm aim must be to clean up the situation in the west by offensive action. We must be fanatical in this aim. Perhaps there are some who will secretly object, saying, All right, but will it succeed? Gentlemen, the same objection was raised in the year 1939. I was told in writing and vocally that the thing could not be done, that it was impossible. Even in the winter of 1940 I was told, That cannot be done. Why do we not stay within the West Wall? We have built the West Wall, why do we not let the enemy run against it, and then perhaps attack him as a follow-up? But let him come first we can perhaps advance afterwards. We hold these wonderful positions, why should we run unnecessary risks? What would have happened to us if we had not attacked them? You have exactly the same situation today. Our relative strength is not less today than it was in 1939 or 1940. On the contrary, if, in two blows, we succeed in destroying both American groups, the balance will have shifted clearly and absolutely in our favour. After all, I rely on the German soldier being aware of what he is fighting for.

Only one thing is not in our favour this time, and that is the air situation. But that is why we are now forced, despite all hazards, to take advantage of the bad winter weather. The air situation forces us to action. I cannot wait till we have more favourable weather. I would prefer to delay matters somehow until spring. Perhaps I could then organise another 10, 15, or 20 Divisions, and we could then attack in spring. But, first of all, the enemy also will bring over 15 or 20 new Divisions. Secondly, I do not know whether in the spring I shall be any more master of the air than I am now, but if I am then no more master of the air than now, the weather will give a decisive advantage to the enemy, whereas now there are at least several weeks during which carpet bombing of troop concentrations cannot take place. That means a lot.

How important it is to get an early decision you will realise from the following. The enemy has full knowledge of the flying bombs. He has already reconstructed them entirely. We know that. He has put them into production. Unquestionably, exactly as we are causing continuous disturbances to the English industrial regions through these flying bombs, so the enemy will be able almost to demolish the Ruhr Basin by the mass shooting of flying bombs. There is no protection against them. We cannot even fend them off with fighter aeroplanes. I do not want to talk about the rockets. There is no remedy against them at all. Everything, therefore, speaks in favour of cleaning up this situation before the enemy begins to use superweapons of this kind.

The German Folk have breathed more freely during recent days. We must prevent this relief from being followed by lethargy — lethargy is the wrong word, I mean resignation. They have breathed again. The mere idea that we are on the offensive has had a cheering effect on the German Folk, and when this offensive is continued, when we have our first really great successes — and we shall have them, for our situation is not different from that of the Russians from 1941 to 1942, when, despite their most unfavourable situation, they manoeuvred us slowly back by single offensive blows along the extended front on which we had passed over to the defensive — if the German Folk see such a development taking place here, you can be sure that they will make any sacrifices which are humanly possible. We shall obtain whatever we ask of them. Nothing will deter the Nation — whether I order a new textile collection, or some other collection, or whether I call for men. The youth will come forward enthusiastically. The German Folk as a whole will react in a thoroughly positive manner. I must say the Nation behaves as decently as could possibly be expected. There are no better people than our Germans. Individual bad incidents are just the exception that confirms the rule.

Finally, I wish to appeal to you to support this operation with all your fire, with all your zest, and with all your energy. This also is a decisive operation. Its success will automatically result in the success of the next operation. The success of the second operation will automatically bring about the collapse of the threat on the left to our offensive. We shall actually have knocked away one half of the enemy’s Western Front. Then we shall see what happens. I do not believe that in the long run he will be able to resist 45 German Divisions which will then be ready. We shall yet master fate.

Since the date could be fixed for New Year’s Eve, I wish to say that I am grateful to all those who have done the gigantic work of preparation for this operation, and who have also taken upon themselves the great risk of being responsible for it. I consider it a particularly good omen that this was possible. In German history New Year’s Eve has always been of good military omen. The enemy will consider New Year’s Eve an unpleasant disturbance, because he does not celebrate Christmas but New Year’s Eve. We cannot introduce the New Year in any better way than by such a blow. When on New Year’s day the news spreads in Germany that the German offensive has been resumed at a new spot, and that it is meeting with success, the German Folk will conclude that the old year was miserable at the end, but that the new year has had a good beginning. That will be a good omen for the future.

Gentlemen, I want to wish each of you, individually, good luck. Gentlemen, there is one thing more. A prerequisite for the success of this operation is secrecy. Anyone who does not need to know about it should not know about it. Whoever does need to know about it should hear only what he needs to know. Whoever does need to know about it should not hear about it earlier than he needs to know. That is imperative. And nobody should be ordered up to the Front who knows something about it and might be caught. That also is imperative.

Field marshal Von Rundstedt – closing words:

My Führer, in the name of all the assembled Commanders I wish to give you the firm assurance on the part of leadership and troops that everything, absolutely everything, will be done to make this offensive a success. We ourselves know where in our first offensive we have made mistakes. We shall learn from them.


The Fairfield Recorder (Fairfield, Tex.), Vol. 69, No. 14, Ed. 1 Thursday, December 28, 1944

Weekly newspaper from Fairfield, Texas that includes local, state, and national news along with advertising.

Physical Description

four pages : ill. page 22 x 15 in. Digitized from 35 mm. microfilm.

Creation Information

Context

This newspaper is part of the collection entitled: Freestone County Area Newspaper Collection and was provided by the Fairfield Library to The Portal to Texas History, a digital repository hosted by the UNT Libraries. It has been viewed 16 times. More information about this issue can be viewed below.

People and organizations associated with either the creation of this newspaper or its content.

Editor

Publisher

Audiences

Check out our Resources for Educators Site! We've identified this newspaper as a primary source within our collections. Researchers, educators, and students may find this issue useful in their work.

Provided By

Fairfield Library

The Fairfield Library first opened its doors August 2, 1954, in a small brick house on the Courthouse square with just 224 books. By 1977, the growing library gained accreditation in the Texas Library System and subsequently became a place where families could spend time together reading and enjoying the abundant resources.


The Alvin Sun (Alvin, Tex.), Vol. 55, No. 22, Ed. 1 Thursday, December 28, 1944

Weekly newspaper from Alvin, Texas that includes local, state, and national news along with advertising.

Physical Description

eight pages : ill. page 20 x 13 in. Digitized from 16 mm. microfilm.

Creation Information

Context

This newspaper is part of the collection entitled: Brazoria County Area Newspapers and was provided by the Alvin Community College to The Portal to Texas History, a digital repository hosted by the UNT Libraries. More information about this issue can be viewed below.

People and organizations associated with either the creation of this newspaper or its content.

Editor

Publisher

Audiences

Check out our Resources for Educators Site! We've identified this newspaper as a primary source within our collections. Researchers, educators, and students may find this issue useful in their work.

Provided By

Alvin Community College

Situated in Alvin, Texas, Alvin Community College (ACC) was established in 1948 as Alvin Junior College. ACC is a public community college that provides educational opportunities in workforce training, academics, technical fields, adult basic education, and personal development.

Contact Us

Descriptive information to help identify this newspaper. Follow the links below to find similar items on the Portal.

Titles

  • Main Title: The Alvin Sun (Alvin, Tex.), Vol. 55, No. 22, Ed. 1 Thursday, December 28, 1944
  • Serial Title:The Alvin Sun

Description

Weekly newspaper from Alvin, Texas that includes local, state, and national news along with advertising.

Physical Description

eight pages : ill. page 20 x 13 in. Digitized from 16 mm. microfilm.

Notes

Subjects

Library of Congress Subject Headings

University of North Texas Libraries Browse Structure

Language

Item Type

Identifier

Unique identifying numbers for this issue in the Portal or other systems.

  • Library of Congress Control Number: sn84006908
  • OCLC: 11098054 | External Link
  • Archival Resource Key: ark:/67531/metapth1252091

Publication Information

  • Volume: 55
  • Issue: 22
  • Edition: 1

Collections

This issue is part of the following collections of related materials.

Brazoria County Area Newspapers

Situated in the Gulf Coast region of Texas, Brazoria County has seen publication of some of the earliest newspapers published in Texas. One of the earliest titles in this collection, the Texas Gazette and Brazoria Commercial Advertiser, began publication in 1832 and documents Texas' history when it was still a part of the United Mexican States, in the state of Coahuila y Tejas.

Tocker Foundation Grant

Collections funded by the Tocker Foundation, which distributes funds principally for the support, encouragement, and assistance to small rural libraries in Texas.

Texas Digital Newspaper Program

The Texas Digital Newspaper Program (TDNP) partners with communities, publishers, and institutions to promote standards-based digitization of Texas newspapers and to make them freely accessible.


World War II Database

Did you enjoy this photograph or find this photograph helpful? If so, please consider supporting us on Patreon. Even $1 per month will go a long way! Thank you.

Share this photograph with your friends:

  • » 1,102 biographies
  • » 334 events
  • » 38,816 timeline entries
  • » 1,144 ships
  • » 339 aircraft models
  • » 191 vehicle models
  • » 354 weapon models
  • » 120 historical documents
  • » 227 facilities
  • » 464 book reviews
  • » 27,604 photos
  • » 359 maps

"No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. You win the war by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country!"

George Patton, 31 May 1944

The World War II Database is founded and managed by C. Peter Chen of Lava Development, LLC. The goal of this site is two fold. First, it is aiming to offer interesting and useful information about WW2. Second, it is to showcase Lava's technical capabilities.


Recy Taylor, Alabama woman raped by six white men, dies at 97

Recy Taylor, an African-American woman from Abbeville, Alabama, whose abduction and rape by six white men in 1944 made national headlines, died Thursday morning, her brother Robert Corbitt told NBC News.

She would have turned 98 on Sunday.

Corbitt said she passed peacefully in a nursing home in Abbeville.

“[She was] a brave woman and a fighter who tried her best to get it known all over the world,” he said during a phone interview from Alabama.

Taylor recently made headlines again as the film “The Rape of Recy Taylor” made its North America debut at the New York Film Festival this fall.

The film chronicles Taylor, who was 24 at the time, walking home from a church service on a September summer evening in 1944, when she was kidnapped, gang raped, and left blindfolded on the side of a road by six white men. According to reports, the men were armed and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the attack. The young, married mother did tell authorities, however, in the height of the Jim Crow Era.

Nancy Buirski, director of the film, said Taylor passed away peacefully knowing that her story has been told.

“It is Recy Taylor and rare other black women like her who spoke up first when danger was greatest,” Buirski told NBC News in an email. “It is these strong women’s voices of the 40’s and early 50’s and their efforts to take back their bodies that led to the Montgomery Bus Boycott and other movements that followed, notably the one we are witnessing today.”

Her case was brought to the NAACP in Alabama and the investigator tasked with leading the case was Rosa Parks — nearly 11 years prior to Parks’ historic refusal to get up her seat on a Montgomery city bus.

Related

News Ending the Sexual Abuse to Prison Pipeline For Black and Brown Girls

“Victim of White Alabama Rapists,” notably led the front page of The Chicago Defender newspaper about a month after the violent attack. The six suspects reportedly were willing to pay $600 to Taylor — a payment for her to “forget” her gang rape. One of the suspects admitted to raping Taylor.

Taylor did not accept the hush money and Parks pushed on with the case in what some today call a “Me Too” moment of the Civil Rights Movement. According to “At the Dark End of the Street,” a book by Danielle McGuire that talks about women raped during the Jim Crow Era, Parks pressed people to write letters to then-Alabama governor Chauncey Sparks, since the men weren’t charged. The letters led to a second investigation but Taylor’s six assailants were never prosecuted.

In 2011, nearly 67 years after the rape, Alabama legislature issued an apology to Taylor "for its failure to prosecute her attackers."

Buirski said Taylor felt no shame but rather entitled to justice for what happened to her that day. She wants her to be remembered for her courage and dignity.

“This lack of shame is a psychology finding its place in today’s #MeToo movement, a movement that is only just beginning to recognize its true origins in the history of black women in Jim Crow south.”

Erica Ayisi is a multimedia and international journalist with experience reporting in West Africa, New York and Massachusetts.


Recy Taylor, black Alabama woman raped by six white men in 1944, dies aged 97

Recy Taylor, a black Alabama woman whose rape by six white men in 1944 drew national attention, died on Thursday. She was 97.

Taylor died in her sleep at a nursing home in Abbeville, her brother Robert Corbitt said. He said Taylor had been in good spirits the previous day and her death was sudden. She would have been 98 on Sunday.

Taylor’s story, along with those of other black women attacked by white men during the civil rights era, is told in At the Dark End of the Street, a book by Danielle McGuire released in 2010. A documentary on her case, The Rape of Recy Taylor, was released this year.

The Rape of Recy Taylor is directed by Nancy Buirski, best known for directing The Loving Story, about Mildred and Richard Loving, the couple who toppled laws against interracial marriage

“This is such an important time in this country’s path to recognize Recy Taylor,” Buirski told the Guardian this month. “With women being singled out on Time magazine’s cover, as part of the #MeToo campaign, I really want to draw attention to the black women who spoke up when their lives were seriously in danger.”

Taylor was 24 when she was abducted and raped as she walked home from church in Abbeville. Her attackers left her on the side of the road in an isolated area. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) assigned Rosa Parks to investigate the case, and she rallied support for justice for Taylor.

Two all-white, all-male grand juries declined to indict the six white men who admitted to authorities that they assaulted her.

In a 2010 interview, Taylor said she believed the men who attacked her were dead, but she still would like an apology from officials.

“It would mean a whole lot to me,” Taylor said. “The people who done this to me … they can’t do no apologizing. Most of them is gone.”

The Alabama legislature passed a resolution apologizing to her in 2011.

Buirski told the Guardian that “during the civil rights movement, issues like equal accommodations and voting rights became more vital to the general population than issues about ‘sexual stuff’. That was something that people put aside, that people didn’t want to talk about. It was unseemly to talk about, and certainly, to fight about.”

But Buirski said the movement remained rooted in what one academic has called “a bodily claim to own a space”, a debt Buirski said it owed partly to women like Taylor.

“That was her legacy,” Buirski said. “Recy Taylor was so courageous, so brave to have spoken up.”


You can use it for research or reference.

Related links

Under Operation IMPACT, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) carried out airstrikes* on targets in Iraq and Syria from October 30, 2014 to February 15, 2016. Operation IMPACT is the CAF’s role as part of the Global Coalition against Daesh.

CAF fighter aircraft (CF-188 Hornets) flew a total of 1378 sorties**. They made 251 airstrikes—246 in Iraq and 5 in Syria—and spent 606 munitions. The sorties affected:

  • 267 Daesh fighting positions
  • 102 Daesh equipment and vehicles and
  • 30 Daesh Improvised Explosive Device (IED) factories and Daesh storage facilities.

The CAF ceased airstrikes in Iraq and Syria on February 15, 2016. This direction came from the Canadian government.

The following is a list of Operation IMPACT airstrikes.

*An airstrike is an attack from the air. It is intended to damage or destroy a target.

**A sortie is an operational flight by one aircraft. It starts when an aircraft takes off and ends when it lands.


Elisa - My reviews and Ramblings

Queers in History: Laird Cregar (July 28, 1913 – December 9, 1944)

Laird Cregar died at age thirty-one, after a film career that lasted only five years, but his wicked and sinister presence made him famous in such films as Blood and Sand, Wake Up Screaming, The Black Swan, and Hangover Square. He played the Devil in Heaven Can Wait and Jack the Ripper in The Lodger.

Historian Gregory Mank called Cregar &ldquoan anguished homosexual.&rdquo William Mann, in Behind the Screen, wrote that gay rights activist Harry HAY knew Cregar in the 1930s, when the rotund actor was living with a boyfriend, &ldquoThere was no attempt to hide it. He wasn&rsquot troubled by being gay.&rdquo

What did trouble Cregar was his weight, which kept him from obtaining the leading roles he craved. His premature death was the result of a heart attack brought on by a crash diet.

Stern, Keith (2009-09-01). Queers in History: The Comprehensive Encyclopedia of Historical Gays, Lesbians and Bisexuals (Kindle Locations 3897-3904). Perseus Books Group. Kindle Edition.

Hiding in Plain Sight: The Secret Life of Raymond Burr by Michael Seth Starr
Paperback: 280 pages
Publisher: Applause Theatre and Cinema Books (September 1, 2009)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 142347371X
ISBN-13: 978-1423473718
Amazon: Hiding in Plain Sight: The Secret Life of Raymond Burr

Now in paperback, the complete story of the actor's career, including his secret gay life. Raymond Burr (1917-1993) was an enigma. A film noir regular known for his villainous roles in movies like Rear Window, he eventually became one of the most popular stars in television history as the lead actor on two top-rated dramas, Perry Mason and Ironside, which between them ran virtually uninterrupted for 20 years. But Raymond Burr was leading a secret gay life at a time in Hollywood when exposure would have been career suicide. To protect his secret, Burr fabricated a tragic past for himself as a grieving husband and father. He claimed to have been twice widowed - he said his first wife had died in a plane crash, and his second marriage had ended with his wife's early death from cancer. And there was also a dead son - 10-year-old Michael, who lost his battle with leukemia. Neither of the wives nor Michael ever existed. But that didn't stop these lies from being perpetuated again and again, even in Burr's New York Times obituary. Hiding in Plain Sight examines the totality of Raymond Burr's career and his personal life, including his 35 years with partner Robert Benevides. The author interviewed over 30 people who knew or worked with Burr, including Angela Lansbury, Barbara Hale, Robert Wagner, Gale Storm, and more.

Behind the Screen: How Gays and Lesbians Shaped Hollywood, 1910-1969 by William J. Mann
Hardcover: 496 pages
Publisher: Viking Adult 1st edition (October 15, 2001)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0670030171
ISBN-13: 978-0670030170
Amazon: Behind the Screen: How Gays and Lesbians Shaped Hollywood, 1910-1969

William Mann's Behind the Screen is a thoughtful and eye- opening look at the totality of the gay experience in studio-era Hollywood. Much has been written about how gays have been portrayed in the movies but no book&mdash until now&mdash has looked at their influence behind the screen. Whether out of or in the closet, gays and lesbians have from the very beginning played a significant role in shaping Hollywood. Gay actors were among the earliest matinee idols and gay directors have long been among the most popular and commercially successful filmmakers. In fact, gay set and costume designers created the very look of Hollywood.

With this landmark book, Mann fills a void in the Hollywood history archives. Written in the tradition of Neal Gabler's An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood and based on hundreds of hours of interviews with survivors of this golden age, Behind the Screen is destined to become a classic of film literature.


28 December 1944 - History


Pearl Harbor Pages
This section is being greatly expanded. Look for many new features in the future.

Pearl Harbor Before the Attack
Complete Listing Of American Vessels In Pearl Harbor December 7 1941
Map Of Pearl Harbor Showing Locations Of The Ships Of The U.S. Fleet December 7 1941. 690k (Large)

Japanese Pearl Harbor Attack Forces
Warships Of The Japanese Fleet That Attacked Pearl Harbor And Their Ultimate Fate.
NEW. Organization of the Japanese Air Attack Units On December 7 1941

Pearl Harbor The Photographs of the Attack
Air Raid Pearl Harbor, A Photographic History Of The Attack
57 Images Taken Before The Attack, During The Attack By Both Sides And The Aftermath Of The Attack
I will be adding many new images to this feature in the near furure, also Images of the salvage effort in the months after the attack.

The United States Military, December 7, 1941
UPDATED. Warships Of The United States Fleet And Their Location On December 7 1941
Warships Of The United States Asiatic Fleet And Their Location On December 7 1941
NEW. Locations Of The United States Army On December 7 1941
NEW. Locations Of The United States Army Airforce On December 7 1941

Note, I Have Started Work On Similar List's For The Japanese Army, Airforce and Navy. I Will Add These When Completed

Assorted Pearl Harbor Documents Of Interest
Two Letters From CINCPAC, Detailing Damage Received by vessels of the Pacific Fleet
The Attack Minute By Minute From The Deck Logs Of The Vessels In And Around Pearl Harbor December 7 1941(Long 118K)

Assorted Pearl Harbor Interests
Postal Covers of the Ship's and Commands of Pearl Harbor Provided by Mr Jon Burdett.

  • Tribute To US Naval VesselsLost At Sea During The Age Of Sail
  • TheDestroyers For Bases Deal Of 1940What We Got And What We Gave Up
  • UPDATED. Complete List OfUS Warships Lost During W.W.II
  • U. S. Naval Chronology Of World War II, As Transcribed by Larry Jewell.
    Preface - 1939 - 1940 - 1941 - 1942 - 1943 - 1944 - 1945
  • DetailedGuide For Obtaining Information On Ships, Crew Rosters, Photos And War Diaries

To Obtain Information Or To Submit Information Or Comments, E-mail Instructions


Ford : Fairlane victoria 55 ford gasser 430 lincoln powered old skool

55 ford fairlane gasser. app 2,000 mile since build solid ca black plate car. featured in gasser wars magazine #87, seen in other mags including hot rod delux best of show winner from gasser magazine. 52 ford F-1 front frame clip new spring bushings tilt front end motor set back app 8" removeable dog house radiused rear wheel wells new rubber, window channels and tinted side glass, power door windows, professionally straightened and polished stainless trim, re-chromed bumper, new door handles, tail lites. professionally hand lettered [can be compounded off]. chrome15 x 7 15 x 10 supreme wheels M&H 28 - 11.5 - 15 cheater slicks. cloth bucket seats rubber floor mats 4 point roll bar. sun oil pressure, water temp, trans temp gauges sun-pro volt gauge, sun 7K red football dash mounted tach with converted EB9A sending box. 58 chevy fuel tank [ moves fuel weight to RR wheel] 1/2 fuel line 3/8 return line holley red pump, canister filter. 57 ford 9" rear [buyer can choose type and ratio]. new driveshaft - HD solid u-joints, custom lift bars, rebuilt C-4 trans with full manual forward pattern, NOS hurst slap shifter, aluminum deep pan, large cooler, 8" Edge 2600 stall converter. speed way tube axle, 40 ford spindles, 4 wheel disc brakes. 59 ford steering box [cross steer] aluminium cross flow radiator no overheating issues. mini starter and power gen altinator. buyer can choose either mild or wild 430 Lincoln motor wild JE forged 103 pistons NOS crankshaft company beamed "nitro rods" HV oil pump and drive rod. oil passages drilled out for better oiling. isky 505 T roller cam 290 dur 580 lift howards pin oiling roller lifters smith bros 3/8 HD push rods Harland sharp bushed roller tip rocker arms hard chrome shafts mondello ported cylinder heads SS valves PC seals dual springs titanium 10 deg retainers 2 1/8 headers NOS drag fast collector boxes. runs on high test unleaded. runs high 7's low 8's in 1/8 mile mild jahns 9.7 cast pistons rebuilt rods mild isky EE-200 flat tappet solid lifter cam 258 dur 450 lift or stock hyd cam rebuilt heads hard seats adj FE rocker arms [with isky cam] HV pump - hd drive rod oil holes enlarged 1 3/4 tri y headers. choice of intakes, restored 8x2 weiand drag star - Stromberg 94's NOS eelco linkage,restored 6x2 edelbrock - Rochester 2 bbls progressive linkage, home made 2x4 tunnel ram 650 AFB's or single 4bbl holey or AFB. ignition- just re-freshed joe hunt mag with NOS Mallory solid wires or Mallory crab cap dual point - converted to pertronix or stock single point. will change to what ever combo you want. also available 2008 24' carson racer enclosed trailer 4 wheel electric brakes with built in metal work bench and cabinets $4800 NOTE if you use pay-pal for final payment YOU must pay their fees john 661 951 1862 eves pacific time with any questions - comments


Watch the video: Скончалась Елена Яковлева: Ее любили все..