SMS Moltke, c.1914-1917

SMS Moltke, c.1914-1917

SMS Moltke, c.1914-1917

This rather blury picture shows the Moltke class battlecruiser SMS Moltke at sea some time before her torpedo nets were removed in 1917.


History

From May 11th to June 29th, 1912, the Moltke undertook a trip to North America with the small cruiser SMS Stettin . They ran from Kiel via Ponta Delgada to Cape Henry , where they met the station cruiser SMS Bremen . The cruisers entered the Hampton Roads together , where they were received on June 3 by the US Atlantic fleet in the presence of US President William Howard Taft . On 8./9. June moved the division under the command of Rear Admiral Hubert von Rebeur-Paschwitz to New York, where Moltke and Stettin began their march back to Germany via Vigo on June 13th .

First World War

The Moltke experienced its first war missions on November 3 and December 16, 1914. Here, together with the Seydlitz, it shelled the English cities of Yarmouth and Hartlepool . On January 24, 1915, she took part in the battle on the Dogger Bank. On August 19, 1915, the Moltke was torpedoed in the Baltic Sea by the British submarine E1 during the second advance into the Riga Bay . After restoration, she was involved in the bombardment of Lowestoft and Great Yarmouth on April 24 and 25, 1916 .

On May 31, 1916, the Moltke was the fourth ship of the 1st reconnaissance group under Vice Admiral Franz von Hipper to take part in the sea ​​battle on the Skagerrak . After the failure of his flagship SMS Lützow and after hours on a torpedo boat, Hipper finally switched to the Moltke .

When the Baltic Islands were occupied by German troops ( Albion Company ) in October 1917, the Moltke was the flagship of the large association formed for this purpose under the command of Vice Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt . On October 12, 1917, the Moltke, in association with the III. Squadron (four ships of the König class and SMS Bayern ) from 5:45 a.m. on the Russian battery No. 46 (four 15.2 cm guns) on Cape Ninnast (Estonian Ninase) on the east side of Tagga Bay (Estonian Tagalaht ) the north side of the island of Ösel to support the main landing of the army troops scheduled for 6 a.m.

On November 17, 1917, the Moltke arrived late on the battlefield during the second naval battle near Helgoland in association with the new battle cruiser Hindenburg . They were supposed to support the two large-line ships Kaiser and Kaiserin , which had rushed to the aid of the small cruiser Königsberg , which was hit by a 38 cm shell . The British then withdrew.

On April 23, 1918, the Moltke suffered a serious turbine accident before attempting to attack a British convoy in the North Sea near Norway. She had to be dragged back from the Oldenburg to Wilhelmshaven . On the way back, the Moltke was torpedoed by the British submarine E42 , but reached the port with 2100 t of water in the ship. The Moltke was in the shipyard until August .


Contents

Construction and commissioning

SMS Moltke was the first ship of the Bismarck class to be laid down. Construction began in July 1875 under the contract name Ersatz Arcona at the Imperial Shipyard in Danzig . The work on Moltke proceeded more slowly than on other ships of the class, as the state shipyards were not as experienced as the private shipbuilding companies such as Norddeutsche Schiffbau AG , which built the Bismarck . Logically, the Moltke was only launched as the fourth member of the class, which is why the class was named after the first completed ship, the Bismarck . Moltke was christened on October 18, 1877 by Admiral Albrecht von Stosch , first head of the newly founded Imperial Admiralty , in the presence of the ship's namesake, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke . The equipment work was completed in April 1878 and the commissioning took place on April 16. From April 28th to 29th, Moltke was transferred to Kiel, where her armament and other final pieces of equipment were installed. The test drives began on November 18th and were completed on December 21st.

Use in South America

On April 1, 1881, SMS Moltke was commissioned with their first assignment abroad in South America, which began on April 17. On July 14th, the ship reached Valparaíso to replace the previous stationary , the corvette Ariadne . Moltke then went to Coquimbo to protect the German residents from unrest due to the Peruvian victory in the saltpeter war . She reached the port on July 19th and stayed there until mid-September. In the following two months, Moltke visited several port cities in Peru and then went further north to visit several cities in Central America. On February 16, 1882, Moltke returned to Valparaíso and sailed again to Coquimbo on March 14. On May 17, she traveled from there to Montevideo from which was due to severe storms Strait of Magellan happen but only belatedly and thus achieved its goal until the end of June.

In Montevideo, SMS Moltke took the participants of the scientific expedition that Germany contributed to the first International Polar Year on board. The expedition was scheduled to spend a year on the island of South Georgia to make scientific observations on a range of phenomena, including perturbations in the geomagnetic field . Moltke left Montevideo with the expedition on board on July 23. More equipment was on board the HSDG - steamer SS Rio carried. The two ships arrived on the island on August 12 after getting into heavy seas and icebergs. It took more than a week to find a suitable landing site, and on August 21 the scientists disembarked in what is now Moltke Harbor on the north side of Royal Bay , named after the ship . On August 24, with the help of the crew, they finished unloading their equipment and setting up their accommodation, and on September 3, Moltke left for other tasks heading South America. Corvette Marie arrived the following year to bring the expedition back.

Moltke then sailed to Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands and returned from there to the west coast of South America. From October 20, she visited several Chilean ports and the Juan Fernández Islands . At the end of January 1883 she returned to Valparaíso, where she met the corvette Leipzig . From February 28, Moltke sailed north to travel the coasts of Peru and Ecuador . After his return to Valparaíso, Moltke received the order on July 8 to return to Germany. On her way through the Strait of Magellan, she conducted a survey of the coastal waters. On August 4th she met her successor Marie . After a stop on the Cape Verde Islands , she reached Kiel on October 2 and was decommissioned there on October 23.

Like all six ships in her class, she was reclassified as a cruiser frigate in 1884.

As a training ship 1885–1889

SMS Moltke was reactivated on April 15, 1885 as a training ship for naval cadets. She went on a training trip in the Baltic Sea and began a tour of Norwegian ports on May 20, which she then continued in Iceland with visits to Berufjörður and Reykjavik . On July 2, she arrived in Lough Swilly , Ireland , where she stayed for a month and then went to Portsmouth , where on August 15 she was ordered to return to Germany to join the Imperial Navy training squadron. From August 30th to September 23rd, Moltke took part in the annual fleet exercises and after completing the maneuvers went to the Kaiserliche Werft Kiel for maintenance on September 25th .

On October 1st, Moltke rejoined the training squadron and on October 11th went on the next training trip to the West Indies. In São Vicente , Cape Verde, the voyage was interrupted from November 13th to 30th as tensions arose between Germany and Spain over competing claims to the Carolines in the central Pacific. After the conflict was resolved, the squadron continued its voyage, visiting a number of ports in the Caribbean and then returned to Wilhelmshaven on March 27, 1886 , where the squadron was disbanded. In April Moltke went to the Kaiserliche Werft Kiel again for an overhaul. In the following year, the training squadron was re-formed with Moltke and took part in the fleet maneuvers in August and September as II. Division . On October 14th, the squadron began the winter training run , which led it again to the West Indies and ended on March 30th, 1887 in Wilhelmshaven.

In 1887 Moltke stayed in Kiel to take part in a celebration to mark the start of construction on the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal . She then took part again in the annual fleet maneuvers and, from October 1, in the winter training drive of the training squadron into the Mediterranean. In December, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm visited the ships in Sanremo . On April 10, 1888, Moltke returned to Wilhelmshaven and eight days later went to Kiel for another overhaul. This was followed by a voyage to Russian and Scandinavian ports in the summer of 1888. The annual fleet maneuvers followed in August and September and on September 29, the winter training voyage began again in the Mediterranean, which took place after participating in the celebrations for the 25th anniversary of King George I's throne . of Greece from October 27 to November 5 in Piraeus and visits to some ports in the Ottoman Empire in Asia Minor and Egypt on April 16, 1889 in Wilhelmshaven. The squadron was disbanded and Moltke decommissioned on April 30th.

1889-1897

In mid-1889 the ship was brought to the Kaiserliche Werft in Kiel for extensive renovation work. The renovation included a new boiler system , new rapid fire guns and accommodation for up to 50 cadets and 210 cabin boys. In addition, the rigging was reduced. On January 1, 1891, she was officially added to the list of school ships and put back into service on April 7. The namesake of the ship Field Marshal Moltke, who died three weeks later, and Kaiser Wilhelm II were present when the ship was put back into operation. Moltke began another training trip on June 15 with visits to the West Indies, La Guaira and Bahía Blanca . On the way back she made on June 13, 1892 in Norfolk and in early August on the Isle of Wight for the Cowes regatta station. Here she was the escort ship for Wilhelm II. On board his yacht Hohenzollern , before she went on to Kiel on August 9 and immediately joined the fleet maneuvers. On September 30, the ship was decommissioned after its completion.

SMS Moltke returned to the service on April 5, 1893 and carried out training in the Baltic Sea that lasted until June 8. During this time she suffered a serious accident on May 24th when the steamship SS Helene collided with one of Moltke's dinghies, which capsized and six cabin boys were killed. Moltke joined the annual fleet maneuvers in August and September as part of the III. Division on. The winter training drive began on October 14th and led into the Mediterranean. On January 21, 1894, Moltke visited Piraeus , where she was visited by Wilhelm II, his sister Sophia of Prussia and her husband, Crown Prince Constantine of Greece . Wilhelm arranged the visit against objections from Chancellor Leo von Caprivi , who had refused a friendship visit because the Greek government had stopped payments for foreign loans, including many from Germany.

A week later Moltke went to Corfu , where she stayed for four weeks until she received the order to travel to Abbazia to bring Empress Friedrich , who lived in the spa there , to Fiume , where she met the Austro-Hungarian on March 29th Emperor Franz Joseph I met. Franz Joseph I also came on board on April 6th to travel to Pola and inspect the Austro-Hungarian Navy . Moltke brought Empress Frederick from 16 to 18 April after Venice , where the Italian King Umberto I met. On April 28, Moltke began the return journey to Germany and arrived in Kiel on June 18. On August 14, she returned to the training squadron, which became the 2nd squadron during the naval maneuvers. The annual winter training drive followed on September 25, this time to the West Indies, and ended on March 22, 1895.

In the summer of 1895, SMS Moltke undertook individual training trips in the Baltic Sea, which were interrupted in June by the celebration of the opening of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. She then visited Edinburgh and returned to Germany for the annual fleet maneuvers in August and September. A week later the winter training voyage began in the Mediterranean. During her stay in Cadiz , she was ordered to travel to Smyrna in the Ottoman Empire as soon as possible , as unrest in the region threatened the Germans in the city. She arrived there on November 15th and joined the Aviso Loreley , the station ship there. In January 1896, Moltke was withdrawn to continue her training duties and visit numerous ports in the Mediterranean region, including Messina , Haifa , Port Said and Naples . She returned to Kiel on March 23 and went to the shipyard for another overhaul.

In 1896, the training year began on May 12th with a training voyage in the Baltic Sea, followed by visits to Great Britain and Ireland from June 26th. During this voyage, Moltke ran aground in the Hebrides on July 17th, but was able to free himself without damage. She came back to Kiel on August 2nd. The annual fleet maneuvers followed as part of the III. Division and from September 26 the winter training drive to the West Indies. During the stop in Madeira , Moltke was again ordered to the Ottoman Empire on the Syrian coast to protect German interests in the area threatened by unrest. Her sister ships Stosch , Stein and Gneisenau also took part in this operation. The mission ended on February 10, 1897 and Moltke went from Alexandria to Wilhelmshaven, which the ship reached on March 17. This was followed by another visit to the shipyard in Kiel from April 14, 1897.

1898-1903

The ship was not put back into service until April 5, 1898. The training trips in the Baltic Sea had to be canceled on June 16 because of a measles outbreak in the ship's crew. In July, a tour of Norwegian ports began with stops in Larvik , Bergen and Odda , where on July 7th she met the Hohenzollern and the small cruiser Hela on the emperor's annual north country voyage. Moltke and Hohenzollern then went to Drontheim , before Moltke went alone to Lerwick on the Shetland Islands . She arrived back in Kiel on July 30th. In the second half of August she served in the V Division in the fleet maneuvers. On September 3, she left for the West Indies on a winter training trip. While in the area, she was posted to Havana because of fear of unrest in Cuba following the US victory over Spain in the Spanish-American War . Her presence proved to be unnecessary and so she returned to Kiel on January 10, 1899, where she arrived on March 23.

From May 24, 1899, Moltke undertook another cruise in the Baltic Sea, followed by another training voyage to the West Indies from July 5. South American ports such as Rio de Janeiro were also the destination of this trip. From December 22nd to 29th she stayed in Charlotte Amalie on the Danish island of Saint Thomas . From January 10-20, 1900, she was the first German warship to visit New Orleans . She then returned to Germany and reached Kiel on March 25th in Kiel. Training trips in the Baltic Sea followed again from May to September with visits to Stockholm , Copenhagen and Stavanger . On September 17th, she undertook another training trip to the Mediterranean. During their stay in Gibraltar from October 9 to 14, the crew members organized a memorial service in the city's cemetery where the victims of the crew of the corvette Danzig from the battle of Tres Forcas were buried. On December 7th, Moltke stopped in Beirut , where her commanding officer attended a ceremony at the grave of Saladin in Damascus . She visited other ports in the region and crossed the Dardanelles on January 24, 1901 with the permission of Sultan Abdülhamid II . The return journey began on January 30th and on February 24th the ship returned to Kiel.

After the subsequent overhaul, Moltke carried out a hydrographic investigation of the Adlergrund from May 21 , where the ship of the line Kaiser Friedrich III. Ran aground earlier this year and was badly damaged. The survey ended on June 18, and on August 1, the annual training cruise began, which began with visits to Copenhagen and the Faroe Islands and continued as far as the West Indies, where a conflict between Venezuela and Colombia threatened Germany's economic interests in the region. She left the area on December 19 and reached Baltimore on January 24 . A delegation from the ship then visited Washington, DC , where they were received by President Theodore Roosevelt . After visiting Annapolis , the location of the US Naval Academy , she returned to Europe, was present in Dartmouth at the laying of the foundation stone of the new building at the Royal Naval College and finally reached Kiel on March 20.

In 1902 and 1903 Moltke undertook training trips again in the Baltic Sea and in the Mediterranean. In 1904, the Baltic Sea training trips were followed by another trip to the West Indies and the United States, which ended on March 17, 1905 in Kiel, where it was shut down on March 31 for an overhaul.

As a submarine tender

SMS Moltke remained out of service until April 4, 1907 and then made training trips in the Baltic Sea for the last time, followed by a trip to South America with visits to Rio de Janeiro and the West Indies. On March 23, 1908, she returned to Kiel, where she was decommissioned on April 7. Her place in the training squadron was taken by the great cruiser Hertha . Moltke was deleted from the sea register on October 24, 1910 and assigned to the submarine school in Kiel. She was converted into a barge and renamed Acheron on October 28, 1911 in order to be able to use her name for the battle cruiser Moltke , which had just been put into service. Acheron served in this capacity until it was sold for scrapping on July 7, 1920.


Design

General characteristics

The Moltke-class ships were 186.6 m (612 ft 2 in) long overall, 29.4 m (96 ft 5 in) wide, and had a draft of 9.19 m (30 ft 2 in) fully loaded. The ships displaced 22,979 t (22,616 long tons) normally, and 25,400 t (24,999 long tons) fully loaded. [8] The Moltke-class ships had 15 watertight compartments and a double bottom that ran for 78% of the keel of the ships. They were considered to handle well, with gentle movement even in heavy seas. However, they were slow to answer the helm and were not particularly maneuverable. The ships lost up to 60% speed and heeled 9 degrees at full rudder. [lower-alpha 4] The ships had a standard crew of 43 officers and 1010 men. While Moltke served as the I Scouting Squadron flagship, she was manned by an additional 13 officers and 62 men. While serving as the second command flagship, the ship carried an additional 3 officers and 25 men to the standard complement. [9]

Propulsion

Moltke and Goeben were powered by four-shaft Parsons turbines in two sets and 24 coal-fired Schulz-Thornycroft boilers, divided into four boiler rooms. [1] The boilers were composed of one steam drum and three water drums apiece, [6] and produced steam at 16 standard atmospheres (240 psi). After 1916, the boilers were supplemented with tar-oil. [lower-alpha 5] The Parsons turbines were divided into high- and low-pressure pairs. [6] The low-pressure turbines were the inner pair, and were placed in the aft engine room. The high-pressure turbines were on either side of the low-pressure pair, and were located in the forward wing rooms. The turbines powered four propellers, 3.74 m (12.3 ft) in diameter. [8]

The ships' power-plants delivered a rated 51,289 shaft horsepower (38,246 kW) and a top speed of 25.5 knots (47.2 km/h 29.3 mph). However, in trials Moltke attained 84,609 shp (63,093 kW)and a top speed of 28.4 knots (52.6 km/h 32.7 mph) Goeben ' s power-plant produced only a slightly lower horsepower and top speed. [5] At 14 knots (26 km/h 16 mph), the ships had a range of 4,120 nautical miles (7,630 km 4,740 mi). [6] The Moltke-class ships were equipped with 6 turbo generators that delivered 1,200 kW (1,600 hp) of power at 225 volts. [6] The ships were designed to carry 1,000 tons of coal, although in practice they could store up to 3,100 tons. Fuel consumption on the six-hour forced trial was 0.667 kilogram per horsepower/hour at 75,744 shp (56,482 kW), and .712 kg per hp/hr at 70,300 shp (52,400 kW), respectively for the two ships. [8]

Armament

The main armament was ten 28 cm (11 in) SK L/50 [lower-alpha 6] guns in five twin turrets. The guns were placed in Drh.L C/1908 turret mounts these mountings allowed a maximum elevation of 13.5 degrees. [1] This elevation was 7.5 degrees less than in the preceding Von der Tann, and, as a consequence, the range was slightly shorter, at 18,100 m (19,800 yd), than the 18,900 m (20,700 yd) of Von der Tann ' s guns. In 1916, during a refit, the elevation was increased to 16 degrees, for an increased range of 19,100 m (20,900 yd). [5] One turret, Anton, was located fore, two aft (Dora turret superfiring over Emil), and two, Bruno and Cäsar, were wing turrets mounted en echelon. The guns fired armor-piercing and semi-armor-piercing shells, which both weighed 302 kg (670 lb). The guns could fire at a rate of 3 rounds per minute, and had a muzzle velocity of 895 m/s (2,940 ft/s). A total of 810 of these shells were stored aboard the ship. [1]

The ships' secondary armament consisted of twelve 15 cm (5.9 in) SK L/45 cannon, mounted in the MPL C/06 mounts as in Von der Tann. The guns had a total of 1800 shells, at 150 per gun. The 15 cm guns had a range of 13,500 m (14,800 yd) at construction, although this was later extended to 18,800 m (18,373 yd). [1] Initially, twelve 8.8 cm (3.5 in) SK L/45 guns were also fitted to defend the ships against torpedo boats and destroyers, but these were later removed, with the guns in the aft superstructure replaced with four 8.8 cm Flak L/45 guns. [5]

Moltke and Goeben were also armed with four 50 cm (20 in) torpedo tubes one fore, one aft, and two on the broadside, with 11 torpedoes stored. The torpedoes were of the G/7 model, which weighed 1,365 kg (3,010 lb) and carried a warhead weighing 195 kg (430 lb). The torpedoes had a maximum range of 9,300 m (10,200 yd) at 27 knots (50 km/h), and 4,000 m (4,400 yd) when set at 37 knots (69 km/h). [10]

Armor

The ships were equipped with Krupp cemented armor. The level of armor protection for the Moltke class was increased from the Von der Tann design, to 10 cm (3.9 in) in the forward main belt, 27 cm (10.6 in) in the citadel, and 10 cm (3.9 in) aft. The casemates were protected by 15 cm (5.9 in) vertically and 3.5 cm (1.4 in) on the roofs. The forward conning tower was protected by 35 cm (14 in), and the aft tower had 20 cm (7.9 in) of armor. The turrets had 23 cm (9.1 in) on the face, 18 cm (7.1 in) on the sides, and 9 cm (3.5 in) on the roofs. The deck armor and sloping armor were both 5 cm (2.0 in), as was the torpedo bulkhead around the barbettes. The torpedo bulkhead was 3 cm (1.2 in) in other, less critical areas. [2] As with Von der Tann, the armor was Krupp cemented and nickel steel. [8]


Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War

Research into the origins of the First World War, like the work undertaken on most controversial historical topics, is subject, at least to some extent, to the dictates of scholarly fashion. Thus, it was that, not so long ago, much of the writing on this issue focused on the cultural factors that, it is said, predisposed the people of Europe to rush headfirst towards the precipice. The role of such amorphous ideas as personal or national honour, male desire, or even the enthusiasm for sacrifice implicit in the discordant music and jarring ballet of Stravinsky's prophetic Frühlingsopfer (Rite of Spring) all attracted their share of historical attention, much to the profit of our overall understanding of the roots of this conflict.(1) In recent years, however, attention has shifted away from such areas and there has emerged, instead, a considerable reawakening of interest in the possibility that it was military and strategic factors that precipitated the outbreak of war in 1914. Examples of major scholarly works in this field abound. Thus, for instance, David Herrmann and David Stevenson have both evaluated the impact that competition in armaments had on great power relations. Niall Ferguson has scrutinised the economic and fiscal bases of national armed rivalry. Jack Snyder and Stig Förster have examined the destabilising role of those military doctrines that emphasised offensive battle tactics and short wars. John Maurer has explored the place of deterrence and deterrence failure in the international system. And, in Holger Afflerbach's study of Erich von Falkenhayn, we have seen a major re-evaluation of the part played in promoting conflict by one of the key military figures of this period.(2) It is this historiographical context - viz. a growing and vibrant revitalisation of military history - which provides the backdrop to Annika Mombauer's new monograph on Helmuth von Moltke, the younger. It is against this rich literature that her work on Imperial Germany's last peacetime Chief of the Great General Staff and first military leader of the Great War must be located and evaluated.

It should be clearly stated at the very outset that, while the field of military history in which Dr Mombauer's study is situated is a growing one - possibly even becoming a crowded one - this in no way detracts from the fact that hers is a book of the utmost importance. To some extent, this reflects the nature of her topic. The younger Moltke is a figure just crying out for systematic study and careful re-evaluation. For, notwithstanding the importance of his position as the strategic head of Europe's most influential military power, his career has not been subject to the detailed investigations that have been made of his more colourful or illustrious contemporaries. Indeed, he has generally been marginalised by historians, many of whom have all too readily accepted the negative portrait of Moltke painted after his death by those of his fellow generals looking to find a scapegoat for Germany's failure to win a quick victory in the First World War. Accordingly, in much of the literature Moltke is depicted as an unremarkable man and as a weak and ineffectual leader, whose main contribution to German national life was to undermine his country's chances of military success in 1914. So pervasive has been this trend that, in recent years, only Arden Bucholz has offered any new insights into Moltke's performance as a military commander. However, as this was done as part of a broader study of the Prussian Great General Staff and its work across several decades, Bucholz's book could not - and, indeed, did not - single out Moltke for special examination.(3) Thus, in producing this new monograph - a study that focuses solely and exclusively on Moltke and his role - Dr Mombauer has remedied this glaring deficiency in the historical literature.

Yet, the fact that she has produced a forensic study of a neglected figure, would not, in itself, make her book so remarkable, were it not for the fact that her research relentlessly undermines most of the existing preconceptions that surround her principal subject. If historians have generally ignored the younger Moltke in the past on the grounds of his lack of influence, Dr Mombauer's findings will certainly ensure that he receives a good deal more attention in the future. For, she proves quite conclusively that Moltke was not the inconsequential figure that we have generally been led to believe. On the contrary, the Chief of the Great General Staff possessed considerable influence over Kaiser Wilhelm II and was also able to impress his views strongly upon several leading civilian politicians in Germany's so-called 'responsible government', such as Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg and State Secretary at the Foreign Office Gottlieb von Jagow.

Moreover, that he had access to such people and was able to exercise his powers of persuasion upon them was no trivial matter because, as Dr Mombauer conclusively shows, Moltke was an ardent warmonger determined to ensure that Germany resorted to the ultima ratio regis at the very earliest suitable occasion. Consequently, he took full advantage of his proximity to both the Kaiser and the Chancellor repeatedly to proffer military information and specialist advice that was geared to persuading them that the policy of the German Reich should be to engineer a European war as soon as possible. To this end, during his tenure of office, and particularly in the years from 1912 to 1914, he ceaselessly informed them that the armaments programmes of Germany's enemies were such that, while the Reich was in a favourable position to back up its foreign policy by a resort to arms at that time, after 1916 this could no longer be done with any guarantee of success. War, if it were to come, he insisted, had to come immediately, while it was still likely to end in a German victory. Wait too long - even as short a span as two years - and Germany would be vulnerable to its enemies and unable to enforce its demands. This was a message that, as Dr Mombauer demonstrates, had a telling effect on German foreign policy, especially in the summer of 1914.

And yet, it was not the mere fact that he was pushing for war that makes Moltke interesting, so much as the fact that he advocated a conflict in defiance of his own fears about the likely outcome of such hostilities. For, while Moltke proclaimed the need for an immediate resort to arms loudly and repeatedly to the senior policymakers in the German government, it is, nevertheless, quite clear from Dr Mombauer's work that he actually harboured very considerable doubts about the validity of the advice that he was giving. Despite all of his professions that Germany had to go to war soon because the 'favourable' military circumstances in which the Reich then found itself would inevitably fade away, the Chief of the Great General Staff nevertheless expected the coming war, even if it were to be launched immediately, to be a long and arduous one. Indeed, he was painfully conscious that in an age of 'people's wars', conflict between great powers pitted not only armies, but entire populations and economies against each other, had the potential to lead the combatants to financial ruin, and would almost certainly be of prolonged duration. Yet, he never shared this knowledge with Germany's civilian politicians, even though he was aware that they expected a future European war to last months rather than years. Moreover, this decision to keep his fears to himself was a deliberate one, for he knew full well that Germany's political leaders would only accept his logic about the desirability of war if they were unaware of what the reality entailed. Such was the 'criminal irresponsibility' of his actions: he promoted a war that he was far from certain could be won by deliberately creating false expectations of the likely outcome.

As a result of all the evidence that she has uncovered - and it must be acknowledged that the archival base of this study is very impressive - it is none too surprising that Dr Mombauer concludes that the younger Moltke played a significant part in causing the First World War. It was, after all, his misleading expert advice and constant badgering that created the strong belief among German leaders that war was a viable option that they had to seize in the here and now or forego forever. As Kurt Riezler, the chancellor's private secretary, recorded retrospectively in 1915 (p.212): 'Bethmann can blame the coming of the war . on the answer that Moltke gave him.. He did say yes! We would succeed.' This is not to absolve the Reich's political leadership from their share of responsibility for the war. As Dr Mombauer acknowledges, many of them were inherently receptive to Moltke's message and took little convincing that war should not be shirked in 1914. Yet, whether they would have taken this view if Moltke had shared with them his expectations of the nature of the coming war is another matter. By never making his fears known to them, he ensured that German foreign policy never had to be formulated in the cold light of day.

Where does this leave the historiography on the origins of the First World War? Dr Mombauer's book offers copious new grounds for believing that the war was started principally by actions taken in Berlin, many of them by a man whose role has previously been rather downplayed. In this light, the marginalization of Moltke is, clearly, no longer tenable. Rather, it must be acknowledged that Moltke was a major figure in Germany's decision-making elite, whose influence, unfortunately, was far reaching. In particular, he did everything that he conceivably could to make war likely and, in the end, sadly for Germany and Europe, succeeded. On this point, the evidence that Dr Mombauer has collected is unambiguous and utterly compelling.

Her material also suggests a number of refinements need to be made to some existing theories about the background to the war. Niall Ferguson's recent suggestion, for example, that there was too little militarism in Germany before 1914 and that larger German army increases would have made the Reich leadership feel more secure and less inclined to war does not seem likely given Dr Mombauer's profile of Moltke's Weltanschauung. As she says (p. 180), it is more plausible that 'increased spending would only have made them more confident and bellicose, and hence precipitated war even sooner.' In a different vein, her research (esp. pp. 100-5) suggests that it might be worth looking again at Adolf Gasser's ideas on the scrapping of the eastern deployment plan (Grosse Ostaufmarsch), as her material offers some confirmation of his notion that this action shows that a decision against prolonged peace had been taken in 1912/13.

This is not the only area in which the book makes some interesting contributions to existing debates. Despite the fact that the title suggests that the scope of the work is confined to the origins of the war, the study actually continues into the early war years. Thus, in addition to assessing Moltke's contribution to the military outcome to the July Crisis, Dr Mombauer also evaluates his part in the failure of the so-called Schlieffen plan. This is, of course, an old controversy, but Dr Mombauer is, nevertheless, able to bring a genuinely fresh eye to it. Starting from the premise that there was a Schlieffen plan, Terrance Zuber's recent claims notwithstanding (4) that it was Moltke's job to update this plan on a regular basis, that his revisions made sense in the light of the changing circumstances of the European military scene, and that Moltke's actions reflected the fact that he was not a victim of the 'short war illusion', she is able to provide a more balanced perspective to the German reverse at the Marne. This result, which played a major part in ensuring that the First World War would be a prolonged 'total war', was in many respects the culmination of all of Moltke's fears. Once again, however, this fact merely serves to place his actions in pushing so strenuously for war into the sharpest relief.

In conclusion, this study makes a very significant contribution to the scholarship on both Wilhelmine Germany and the military pre-history of the Great War. In the current state of research, it is clearly the definitive statement on the role and career of the younger Moltke as Chief of the Great General Staff. I suspect that it will remain as such for a long time to come.


History of SMS Karlsruhe

SMS Karlsruhe and her three sister ships &ndash SMS Emden, Königsberg and Nürnberg &ndash were vast improvements on their predecessors. Coal was carried in longitudinal side-bunkers, which added extra protection against attack to the internal areas of ship. Oil was stored in tanks within the double-bottom of the ships.

Karlsruhe was commissioned into the High Seas Fleet in November 1916. She served in the II Scouting Group alongside SMS Königsberg and Nürnberg. The ships patrolled the Heligoland Bight in the North Sea, protecting minesweepers against British light forces.

Between September and October 1917 SMS Karlsruhe was involved in Operation Albion, planned to eliminate the Russian naval forces holding the Gulf of Riga in the Baltic Sea.

During the operation SMS Karlsruhe was one of five cruisers of the II Scouting Group commanded by Kontreadmiral (Rear Admiral) von Reuter, who would later give the order to scuttle the German Fleet in Scapa Flow.

She led the transport of German troops during the operation, including a bicycle brigade. For the remainder of Operation Albion the cruiser acted as a scout and protector for the IV Battle Squadron as its battleships destroyed the Russian shore batteries.

SMS Karlsruhe undertook a sortie to protect the light cruisers SMS Bremse and Arcona in April 1918 when they laid offensive mines off the Norwegian coast in advance of an operation to intercept Allied convoys. This
operation was called off when the battlecruiser Moltke lost a propeller.

She guarded the coast of Flanders in October 1918 as the Germans evacuated the U-boat and destroyer bases at Zeebrugge and Bruges.

The ship was the only one of the class the Germans managed to scuttle in Scapa Flow as SMS Nürnberg and Emden were both beached by the British.

The wreck was sold in 1962 and partially broken up underwater between 1963 and 1965.

  • Nationality: German
  • Launched: 31 January 1916
  • Commissioned: 15 November 1916
  • Builder: Kaiserliche Werft, Kiel (Imperial Dockyard, Kiel)
  • Construction No: 41
  • Type: Light Cruiser
  • Subtype/class: Königsberg Class
  • Displacement (Standard): 5,440 tonnes
  • Displacement (Full Load): 7,125 tonnes
  • Length Overall: 112m *
  • Beam: 12m
  • Draught: 6.32-5.96m
  • Complement: 475
  • Material: Steel
  • Cause Lost: Scuttled
  • Date lost: 21st June 1919. 1550 hrs
  • Casualties: 0
  • Propulsion: Ten coal-fired and two oil-fired double-ended marine-type boilers. Two sets marine-type turbines (high-pressure turbines worked by geared transmission). Two propellers
  • Fuel: 1,340 tonnes coal, 500 tonnes oil
  • Power: 55,700 shp** maximum
  • Speed: 27.7 knots maximum
  • Armour: ranges from 20-60mm (position dependent), control tower 100mm (on the sides)
  • Armament: 8 x 15cm guns, 2 x 8.8cm guns, 2 x 50cm deck-mounted torpedo tubes, 2 x 50cm lateral submerged torpedo tubes, 200 deck-mounted mines

* Measurements taken from ship's plans
**shp - shaft horsepower

NB: Horsepower is generally given in maximum and design. The former indicates the maximum output of the individual ship under trial conditions and the latter the design output (generally common to all ships of the class).


SMS Moltke, c.1914-1917 - History

The world has suffered from a lot of wars. We lost a considerable number of humans and learned different things from wars. Although war seems like destruction and conflict, yet we learn a lot of stuff from a war. There are two significant wars till now including world war one and world war two. We also had some other battles which were between different countries and territories. World war one was isolated between 1914 and 1918. This was the biggest war of that time. All previous wars were not to its level. Several types of advanced weapons and vehicles were used in this war. This war was started with only some misunderstandings and technological advancements. But ended up to be the most dangerous war of all time. According to studies and history, more than 16 million people died during the world war one. It was really a great loss. The reason behind such loss was the big number of countries involved in this war. Italy, United States, Russia, and France were the counties who fought together. These countries were against the central powers. Central powers include Bulgaria, Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman empire.

In such a huge war, some great weapons and machines were in use. Those were considered the best at that time. It also included battleships which played a vital role in the world war one. There were hundreds of warships which were used to fight against the enemies. All of these battleships were brilliantly loaded with heavy machinery. There were also latest weapons, and armor. If you are a real fan of war machinery, you are at the right place. Today, we will discuss some of the great battleships of world war one.

FS Bouvet

FS Bouvet was one of the best battleships used in the world war one. It was used by the French navy a few years ago before the world war one started. It was used for different assignments, shipments, and other navy tasks. There were two versions of FS Bouvet battleship. The birth date of FS Bouvet is 1898. Just after some time of its release, the French navy though of changing some features. After that, there were a lot of adjustments made in it. They added better weapons capabilities, tank capacities, and ally’s safety. All of these things increased the capabilities of the ship.

The average speed of FS Bouvet was 18 knots. It was good enough as compared to other similar battleships. It had a crew capacity of 710 and considerable ability to take tanks and other war machinery. It was the best ship among others. Later on, it was used in world war one by the French navy, and they got the best from this ship.

HMS Indefatigable

HMS Indefatigable

Let’s talk about HMS Indefatigable battleship which was used by Britain navy. It was built in 1911. Its design was one of the best models at that time. The early 1900s battleship designs influenced HMS Indefatigable. They were specially created for ultimate war experiences. It was operated by Britain navy and used for several purposes after its launch. HMS Indefatigable was added in the list of all available battleships.

With 4x shafts, massive weapon integration and a large crew, HMS Indefatigable was a non-defeat able ship. There were a lot of guns mounted on the different decks of the ship. There were missile launchers and well placed midships too. This was an amazing ship as it defeated several other ships without any issue. Its average speed was 25 knots. The crew capacity was 800. Its good range also made it one of the best battleships that Britain navy had.

Benedetto Brin

Benedetto Brin

Benedetto Brin was an Italian battleship which was widely used in world war 1. It was launched in 1901. It was based on the Regina Margherita class. That class was specially built for open water conflicts. This battleship had amazing capabilities. From ship capacities to weapons integration, Benedetto Brin was perfect. It also had all procedures for crew safety. Its total length was 139 meters. It had the capability to achieve the maximum speed of 20 knots.

The main feature of this battleship was 12-inch guns which made this ship non defeat-able. These 12-inch guns were designed for extreme conflicts and situations. The crew handled the boat with these guns. Furthermore, the other weapons capacity was good enough to make this ship on the go. Protection was considered a top priority while making it. So, it had enough armory to protect the crew on the board. Unfortunately, it lost a main part in the explosion which was caused on the board by sabotage.

HMS Bellerophon

HMS Bellerophon

HMS Bellerophon was the lead class battleship of the Royal Navy UK. In this battleship, all of the advanced technologies were used to beat the German. This battleship also defeated other ships in the open water war. It was ready to use on 1907 by the Royal Navy. It had the crew capacity of around 735. The length of HMS Bellerophon was 527 feet. It was one of the fastest battleships of the Royal Navy. It was specially designed for naval warfare to defeat other ships.

As compared to other ships, it had more deck space, more weapon integration. It also had advanced ways to get the fastest possible speed while in the conflict. No other battleship had the capability to stop the guns of HMS Bellerophon. A number of heavy guns were there on the deck which were used to take the opponent down within seconds. This ship destroyed a major part of the German fleet. It means HMS Bellerophon played an important role in the world war 1. It was all due to its amazing power and outstanding features.

FS Bretagne

FS Bretagne was a battleship used by the French navy. It was launched on 21 April 1913. It was one of the three ships which were launched for navy purposes. All of the three ships were in use for several wars especially in world war one. It had the length of 166 meters and the crew capacity of 1133. It was one of the best battleships at the French navy dock. The best thing about FS Bretagne was its gun capacity and integration. Several big guns were there on its front deck which had to defend it from the enemy attack.

Another great thing about FS Bretagne battleship was its crew security. It was designed to remain for long times even in the open water warfare. FS Bretagne was sunk by British Royal Navy which also took the lives of more than 1000 sailors on it. At its time, the French navy took the latest weapons and equipment to construct it. This was a great fighting ship along with the other two ships which were also utilized with it. Unfortunately, it couldn’t last for very long and destroyed by British royal navy in the war.

Giulio Cesare

Giulio Cesare was an Italian battleship which was launched in 1911. Giulio Cesare was a first-class battleship which served both world wars. It had the length of 186 meters, and the beam was 28 meters. It was a mighty battleship. Its design was able to work in tough conditions. Several navy technologies were also included such as guns, shields, and missiles.

The best thing about Giulio Cesare battleship was its power. Its power was 31000 horsepower. It tells us how powerful its engines were. Such incredible engines gave it the capability of working with the fastest speed. The crew capacity of this battleship was 1000. In world war one, Giulio Cesare played a vital role. It also served the second world war. yet the activities were considerably less in the second world war. Later on, this battleship was passed to the Soviets. However, we can say that Giulio Cesare battleship served the Italian royal navy for a long time.

IJN Fuso

IJN Fuso was a dreadnought battleship which served the Japanese navy in both world wars. Two warships were made of the same type to serve the world war 1 and other fights. The IJN Fuso was 205-meter-long. IT had the capacity of carrying 1198 crew. The surface speed of IJN Fuso was 23 knots. It was a considerable speed for a dreadnought battleship. When the British navy suggested the name dreadnought, IJN Fuso was made on the same theme. It was called a dreadnought ship which had ultimate capabilities.

The best thing about this ship was its armor and speed. Its speed was 23 knots. The armor of IJN Fuso was good enough. It was able to protect hundreds of crew people who served in the battle. Another interesting thing about IJN Fuso was its battle class. It was included in several classes like fast battleships class and Pre-dreadnought class. This battleship was also used for world war 2. In world war two, IJN Fuso met its fate during the battle of Surigao Strait.

SMS Schleswig-Holstein

SMS Schleswig-Holstein was a pre-dreadnought class battleship originated in the German navy. It was launched in 1905. It was one of the most powerful battleships built by imperial Germany. It had some fantastic specifications like outstanding armor capabilities and good speed. Different types of amours were integrated into this ship to give it a maximum of protection in war. However, unfortunately, it was sunk in 1944.

It was also one of the battleships which fought world war one and survived. It also served the navy in world war two until it sunk in 1944. Its powerful coal-fed steam engines were capable of giving it the speed of 17 knots. It was a whole new class of fighting surface battleships. The SMS Schleswig-Holstein battleship participated in different small and big wars. Every time, it defended the holders and did a great job. Later on, several warships were created on the basis of SMS Schleswig-Holstein.

HMS King Edward VII

HMS King Edward VII was the lead battleship of the class pre-dreadnought battleships. It was the best battleship in its class. That’s the reason why its name was Kind Edward. It was ready to use in 1903 with the length of 138-meter, the draft of 8.15 meters and beam of 24 meters. The crew capacity of HMS King Edward VII was 775. Its top speed was 18.5 knots.

Besides all of its specifications, it was great for the open water wars. It served several conflicts and wars. Every time, it performed well. It was used for protecting the crew, fighting with the opponents and managing the in-war tasks. In the pre-dreadnought class of British royal navy, there were several battleships. However, HMS King Edward VII was the best one. Another great cause of its popularity was its all big gin title. The integrated guns were so good. This battleship could easily beat any of the other battleship.

SMS Moltke

SMS Moltke was the lead battleship of Moltke class battlecruisers. It was ready to use in 1908. It served for imperial German navy in the world war one. The crew capacity of this battleship was 1053. The top speed of SMS Moltke battlecruiser was 28 knots which was the best speed at that time. Most of the battleships had an average speed of 20 to 25 knots. However, the SMS Moltke had 28 knots of speed. This speed made it the lead battleship of Moltke class battlecruisers.

Two ships were there to fight against the British dreadnoughts. SMS Moltke was one of those ships. It fought against the British ships as well as served other wars and conflicts. It was one of the only battleships which served a lot of battles and survived. The great armor and weapon integrations played a functional role to win battleship.

Tags: world war 1 battleships, german world war 1 battleships, world war 1 battleships facts, british battleships of world war 1, world war 1 american battleships


Contents

During a May 1907 conference, the Germany Navy Office decided to follow up the Von der Tann unique battlecruiser with an enlarged design. [ 3 ] The 44 million marks allocated for the 1908 fiscal year created the possibility of increasing the size of the main guns from the 28 cm (11 in) weapons of the preceding design to 30.5 cm (12 in). However, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, along with the Construction Department, argued that increasing the number of guns from 8 to 10 would be preferable, as the 28 cm guns had been deemed sufficient to engage even battleships. Tirpitz also argued that, given the numerical superiority of the Royal Navy's reconnaissance forces, it would be more prudent to increase the number of main guns, rather than increase their caliber. [ 3 ] The General Navy Department held that for the new design to fight in the battle line, 30.5 cm guns were necessary. Ultimately, Tirpitz and the Construction Department won the debate, and Moltke was to be equipped with ten 28 cm guns. It was also mandated by the Construction Department that the new ships have armor protection equal or superior to Von der Tann ' s and a top speed of at least 24.5 knots (45.4 km/h). [ 3 ]

During the design process, there were many weight increases due to growth in the size of the citadel, armor thickness, additions to the ammunition stores, and the rearrangement of the boiler system. It was originally planned to build only one ship of the new design, but due to the strains being put on the Navy design staff, it was decided to build two ships of the new type. [ 3 ] They were assigned under the contract names of "Cruiser G" and "Cruiser H". As Blohm & Voss made the lowest bid for "Cruiser G", the company also secured the contract for "Cruiser H". The former was assigned to the 1908–09 building year, while the latter was assigned to 1909–10. [ 4 ]

The contract for "Cruiser G" was awarded on 17 September 1908, under building number 200. The keel was laid on 7 December 1908, and the ship was launched on 7 April 1910. "Cruiser G" was commissioned on 30 September 1911 as SMS Moltke. [ 1 ] The ship's namesake was Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army in the mid 19th century. [ 5 ] "Cruiser H" was ordered on 8 April 1909 with the building number 201. The ship's keel was laid on 12 August 1909 the hull was launched on 28 March 1911. After fitting-out, "Cruiser H" was commissioned on 2 July 1912 as SMS Goeben. [ 1 ] The ship was named for August Karl von Goeben, a Prussian general who served during the Franco-Prussian War. [ 6 ]


SMS Helgoland

In the run-up to World War 1 (1914-1918), Germany and Britain squared off in an arms race to gain superiority where possible. A prime portion of the acquisitions for both sides were in warships of which many types were taken into service and intended to offer the slightest of advantages needed in a future naval fight. One product of the period for the Imperial German Navy became the Helgoland-class, a group of four-strong surface combatants (formally classified as "Dreadnought" battleships) built from 1908 to 1912 and in commissioned service from 1911 to 1920. All four would take part in The Great War and, rather amazingly, all four would survive to see its end in 1918. The ships of the class were SMS Helgoland herself and sisters SMS Ostfriesland, SMS Thuringen, and SMS Oldenburg.

SMS Helgoland was built by the specialists of Howaldtswerke Werft of Kiel and named after the small archipelago of the North Sea - "Heligoland" off the northwest coast of Germany. The vessel saw its keel laid down on November 11th, 1908 with launching had on September 25th of the following year. Commissioned into service on August 23rd, 1911, the warship was ready for action by the time of World War 1 - which began August of 1914.

At the time of their commissioning, the Helgoland-class were the first of the Imperial German Navy to take on the 12" (30.4cm / 304mm) naval gun as main armament and the last "three-funneled" warship group taken into service. The type succeeded the Nassau-class group built from 1907 to 1910 and in commission from 1909 to 1919. Four of this Dreadnought battleship group were completed as well. Taken as a whole, the Helgoland-class was a slight improvement over the preceding Nassau warships - which operated with 11" guns at the main battery.

The complete armament suite involved 12 x 30.5cm main guns, 14 x 15cm secondary guns, and 14 x 8.8cm tertiary guns. 6 x 50cm torpedo tubes were also fitted. Of note regarding the main gun battery was hexagonal placement of the six turrets surrounding the hull superstructure. Two turrets were set to each side of the ship with another seated fore and the remainder aft. Each showcased a twin-gunned arrangement and gave the ship considerable flexibility for engaging targets at any angle.

Power was from 15 x Boiler units feeding 4-cylinder vertical triple-expansion steam engines developing 27,617 horsepower driving 3 x Shafts astern. Maximum speed in ideal conditions would reach nearly 21 knots (20.8 kts) and range while treading water at 10 knots was 5,500 nautical miles (6,330 miles).

Aboard was a crew of 42 officers with 1,027 sailors/enlisted personnel. Armor protection reached 12" at the belt, another 12" at the primary turrets, and 2.5" at the deck. Well armed and armored, Helgoland presented itself as a major foe on the high seas.

SMS Helgoland formed part of the vaunted "High Seas Fleet" of Germany which competed directly against the might of the British "Grand Fleet". Helgoland began service by patrolling across the North Sea and countered the Russian threat in the Baltic Sea for a time. She supported actions at the Battle of the Gulf of Riga during August of 1915 - an Allied victory - which took place from August 8th until August 20th.

The major contest involving Helgoland became the famous Battle of Jutland - the grand engagement of both German and British fleets in what became an indecisive battle claimed as a victory for both sides. The battle took place on May31st through June 1st, 1916 with the British losing more ships to the enemy though the German fleet was now more-or-less contained for the remainder of the war. Helgoland took damage in the action but lived to fight another day.

As with other ships of the German fleet, SMS Helgoland was intended for the final suicidal push against the British Navy to gain better surrender conditions for Germany by 1918. However this assault never took place due to mutiny and sabotage within the ranks - and the end of the war, by way of the Armistice, followed in November of 1918, bringing about an end to the Imperial German Navy threat in the region.

Helgoland joined her three sisters in being stripped of their war-making capabilities and were handed over to the British as prizes. She was removed from active service on December 16th, 1918 and her name was struck from the Naval Register on November 5th, 1919. The British took formal ownership of the vessel on August 5th, 1920 and the hull was scrapped in 1921 - she was gone in full by 1924.


Moltke-class battlecruiser

The Moltke class was a class of two battlecruisers of the German Imperial Navy built between 1909–1911. Named SMS Moltke and SMS Goeben, they were similar to the previous battlecruiser Von der Tann, but the newer design featured several incremental improvements. The Moltkes were slightly larger, faster, and better armored, and had an additional pair of 28 cm guns. Both ships served during World War I. The ships were scuttled on 21 June 1919 to prevent their seizure by the Allies. Goeben was retained by the new Turkish government after the war. She remained on active service with the Turkish Navy until being decommissioned on 20 December 1950. The ship

About Moltke-class battlecruiser in brief

The Moltke class was a class of two battlecruisers of the German Imperial Navy built between 1909–1911. Named SMS Moltke and SMS Goeben, they were similar to the previous battlecruiser Von der Tann, but the newer design featured several incremental improvements. The Moltkes were slightly larger, faster, and better armored, and had an additional pair of 28 cm guns. Both ships served during World War I. The ships were scuttled on 21 June 1919 to prevent their seizure by the Allies. Goeben was retained by the new Turkish government after the war. She remained on active service with the Turkish Navy until being decommissioned on 20 December 1950. The ship was sold to M. K. E. Seyman in 1971 for scrapping. She was towed to the breakers on 7 June 1973, and the work was completed in February 1976. In 1952, when Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the ship was assigned the hull number B70. It was unsuccessfully offered for sale to the West German government in 1963. The former was assigned to the 1908–09 building year, while the latter was assigned for 1909–10 building year. The keel was laid on 7 December 1908, and launched on 7 April 1910 as SMS Moltk. The Ship’s namesake was Field Marshal Helmuth von moltke, the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army in the mid-19th century. After fitting out, the hull was launched on 28 March 1911, and she was commissioned on 28-out-out of 1911.

She served with the Ottoman Empire as a member of the Central Powers until being stricken from the Navy register on 14 November 1954. She is now a museum ship in Istanbul, Turkey, with the name “Moltk” or “Geben” in honor of the former Chief of the Army’s Field Staff, Field Marshal von Moltkel, who was killed in action during the Second World War. She also served as a training ship with the German Navy. She has been preserved at the Museum of Naval History and Science in Düsseldorf, Germany, where she is on display as part of a permanent collection of naval memorabilia. She had a top speed of 24.5 knots and a top armor protection equal or superior to Von derTann’s and a armor thickness of 1.5 meters. The vessel was scrapped in February 1973, after being sold to a German company. She remains in the museum’s collection today, but has been dismembered and is being used to house a museum museum in the city of Duesseldorfer, Germany. The hull number of the ship is B70, and it is currently being used as a museum vessel by the German Museum of Military History and Culture. The name of the Ship’s hull is “Gibraltar”, after the Battle of the Gulf of Riga, which took place in the Baltic Sea in 1914.


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