Address to Congress on the Yalta (Crimea) Conference- Washington, DC March 1, 1945 - History

Address to Congress on the Yalta (Crimea) Conference- Washington, DC March 1, 1945 - History

Washington, DC
March 1, 1945

IT IS GOOD TO BE HOME.

It has been a long journey. I hope you will all agree that it was a fruitful one.

Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether it is entirely fruitful or not lies to a great extent in your hands. For unless you here in the halls of the American Congress- with the support of the American people- concur in the decisions reached at Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results.

That is why I have come before you at the earliest hour I could after my return. I want to make a personal report to you- and at the same time to the people of the country. Many months of earnest work are ahead of us all, and I should like to feel that when the last stone is laid on the structure of international peace, it will be an achievement for which all of us in America have worked steadfastly and unselfishly together.

I am returning from this trip-which took me as far as seven thousand miles from the White House-refreshed and inspired. [I was well the entire time. I was not ill for a second. Back in Washington, I heard all the rumors which occurred in my absence. Yes, I returned from the trip refreshed and inspired.] The Roosevelts are, as you may suspect, not averse to travel; we thrive on it.

Far away as I was, I was kept constantly informed of affairs in the United States. The modern miracle of rapid communication has made this world very small; we must always bear that in mind when we speak or think of international relations. I received a steady stream of messages from Washington, [I might say not only from the Executive Branch with all its Departments, but also from the Legislative Branch-its two Departments.] And, except where radio silence was necessary for security purposes, I could continuously send messages any place in the world. And, of course, in a grave emergency we could even have risked the breaking of the security rule.

I come from the Crimean Conference, my fellow Americans, with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace.

There were two main purposes in this Crimean Conference. The first was to bring defeat to Germany with the greatest possible speed and the smallest possible loss of Allied men. That purpose is now being carried out in great force. The German Army, and the German people, are feeling the ever-increasing might of our fighting men and of the Allied armies. Every hour gives us added pride in the heroic advance of our troops over German soil, toward a meeting with the gallant Red Army.

The second purpose was to continue to build the foundation for an international accord which would bring order and security after the chaos of the war, and would give some assurance of lasting peace among the nations of the world.

Toward that goal, a tremendous stride has been made.

At Teheran, over a year ago, there were long-range military Plans laid by the Chiefs of Staff of the three most powerful nations. Among the civilian leaders at Teheran, however, at, that time, there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion. No political arrangements were made-and none was attempted.

At the Crimean Conference, however, the time had come for getting down to specific cases in the political field.

There was on all sides at this Conference an enthusiastic effort to reach agreement. Since the time of the Teheran Conference there had developed among all of us a greater facility in negotiating with each other, which augurs well for the peace of the world. [We know each other better.]

I had never for an instant wavered in my belief that an agreement to insure world peace and security can be reached.

The lapse of time between Teheran and Yalta without conferences of civilian representatives of the three major powers has proved to be too long-fourteen months. During this long period, local problems were permitted to become acute in places like Poland and Greece and Italy and Yugoslavia.

Therefore we decided at Yalta that even if circumstances made it impossible for the heads of the three Governments to meet more often in the future, we could make sure that there would be more frequent personal contacts for the exchange of views. Accordingly, we arranged for periodic meetings of the foreign secretaries of Great Britain, Russia and the United States at intervals of three, or four months. I feel very confident that under this arrangement there will be no recurrence of the incidents which this winter disturbed the friends of world-wide collaboration.

When we met at Yalta, in addition to laying our strategic and tactical plans for the final and complete victory over Germany, there were other problems of vital political consequence.

First, there were the problems of occupation and control of Germany after victory, the complete destruction of her military power, and the assurance that neither Nazism nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and civilization of the world.

Second, there was the settlement of the few differences which remained among us with respect to the International. Security Organization after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. [As you remember, at that time I said we had agreed ninety per cent- a pretty good percentage. I think the other ten per cent was ironed out at Yalta.

"Third, there were the general political and economic problems common to all of the areas that had been or would be liberated from the Nazi yoke.

[There are special problems-we over here find it difficult to understand the ramifications of these problems in foreign lands. But we are trying to.]

Fourth, there were the special problems created by Poland and Yugoslavia.

Days were spent in discussing, these momentous matters. We argued; freely and frankly across, the table. But at the end, on every point, unanimous agreement was reached. And more important, even than the agreement of words, I may say we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together.

It was Hitler's hope that we would not agree-that some slight crack might appear in the solid wall of Allied unity that would give him and his fellow gangsters one last hope of escaping their just doom. That is the objective for which his propaganda machine has been working for many months.

But Hitler has failed.

Never before have the major Allies been more closely united not only in their war aim's but in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united with each other-and with all peace-loving nations-so that the ideal of lasting peace will become a reality.

The Soviet, British and United States Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings with each other, and conferred frequently with Marshal Stalin, with Prime Minister Churchill and with me, on the problems of coordinating the strategic and tactical efforts of all the Allied forces. They completed their plans for the final knock-out blows to Germany.

At the time of the Teheran Conference, the Russian front was so far removed from the American and British fronts that, while certain long-range strategic cooperation was possible, there could be no tactical, day-by-day coordination. [They were too far apart.]

But Russian troops have now crossed Poland and are fighting on the eastern soil of Germany; British and American troops are now on German soil close to the Rhine River in the west. It is a different situation today; a closer tactical liaison has become possible-for the first time in Europe and, in the Crimean Conference, this has been accomplished.

Provision was made for daily exchange of information between the armies under command of General Eisenhower and those under command of the Soviet marshals on the Eastern Front, and our armies in Italy-without the necessity of going through the Chiefs of Staff in Washington or London, as in the past.

You have seen one result of this exchange of information in the recent bombings by American and English aircraft of points which are directly related to the Russian advance on Berlin.

From now on, American and British heavy bombers will be used-in the day-by-day tactics of the war-in direct support of Soviet armies, as well as in the support of our own in the Western Front. They are now engaged in bombing and strafing in order to hamper the movement of German reserves, German materials, to the Eastern and Western Fronts from other parts of Germany and from Italy.

Arrangements were made for the most effective distribution of all available material and transportation to the places where they can best be used in the combined war effort-American, British and Russian.

Details of these plans and arrangements are military secrets; but they will hasten the day of the final collapse of Germany. The Nazis are learning about some of them already, to their sorrow. They will learn more about them tomorrow and the next day and every day.

There will be no respite for them. We will not desist for one moment from unconditional surrender.

[You know, I have always felt that common sense prevails in the long run-quiet overnight thinking. I think that's true in Germany just as much as it is here.] The German people, as well as the German soldiers, must realize that the sooner they give up and surrender, by groups or as individuals, the sooner their present agony will be over. They must realize that only with complete surrender can they begin to re-establish themselves as people whom the world might accept as decent neighbors.

We made it clear again at Yalta, and I now repeat-that unconditional surrender does not mean the destruction or enslavement of the German people. The Nazi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta Declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta Declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them-for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own skins, and to deceive their people into continued useless resistance.

We did, however, make it clear at the Conference just what unconditional surrender does mean for Germany.

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, France and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a separate zone of Germany-and the administration of the four zones will be coordinated in Berlin by a Control Council composed of representatives of the four.

Unconditional surrender also means the end of Nazism and of the Nazi Party-and all of its barbaric laws and institutions.

It means the termination of all militaristic influence in the public, private and cultural life of Germany.

It means for the Nazi war criminals a punishment that is speedy and just-and severe.

It means the complete disarmament of Germany; the destruction of its militarism and its military equipment; the end of its production of armament; the dispersal of all its armed forces; the permanent dismemberment of the German General Staff, which has so often shattered the peace of the world.

It means that Germany will have to make reparations in kind for the damage which has been done to the innocent victims of its aggression.

By compelling reparations in kind-in plants and machinery and rolling stock and raw materials-we shall avoid the mistake that we and other people made after the last war of demanding reparations in the form of money, which Germany could never pay.

We do not want the German people to starve, or become a burden on the rest of the world.

Our objective in handling Germany is -simple-it is to secure the peace of the future world. Too much experience has shown that that objective is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability towage aggressive war.

That objective will not harm the German people. On the contrary, it will protect them from a repetition of the fate which the General Staff and Kaiserism imposed on them before, and which Hitlerism is now imposing on them again a hundred-fold. It will be removing a cancer from the German body, which for generations has produced only misery and pain for the whole world.

During my stay at Yalta I saw the kind of reckless, senseless fury and destruction which comes out of German militarism. Yalta had no military significance of any kind, and no defenses.

Before the last war, it had been a resort for the Czars and for the aristocracy of Russia. Afterward, however, and until the attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler; the, palaces and villas of Yalta had been used as a rest and recreation center by the Russian people. The Nazi officers took them over for their own use, and when the, Red Army forced- the Nazis out of the Crimea, these villas were looted by the Nazis, and then nearly all of them were destroyed [by bombs placed on the inside]. And even the humblest of homes were not spared.

There was little left in Yalta but ruin and desolation.

Sevastopol was also a scene of utter destruction with less than a dozen buildings left intact in the whole city.

I had read about Warsaw and Lidice and Rotterdam and Coventry, but I saw Sevastopol and Yalta! And I know that there is not room enough on earth for both German militarism and Christian decency.

Of equal importance with the military arrangements at the Crimean Conference were the agreements reached with respect to a general international organization -for lasting world peace. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. There was one point, however, on which agreement was not reached at Dumbarton Oaks. It involved the procedure of voting, of voting in the Security Council.

At the Crimean Conference, the Americans made a proposal on this subject which, after full discussion, I am glad to say was unanimously adopted by the other two nations.

It is not yet possible to announce the terms of it publicly, but it will be in a very short time.

When the conclusions reached at the Crimean Conference with respect to voting in the Security Council are made known, I believe you will find them a fair solution of this complicated and difficult problem. They are founded in justice, and will go far to assure international cooperation in the maintenance of peace.

A Conference of all the United Nations of the world will meet in San Francisco on April twenty-fifth, 1945. There, we all hope, and confidently expect, to execute a definite charter of organization under which the peace of the world will be preserved and the forces of aggression permanently outlawed.

This time we shall not make the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to get the war over quickly, we work together to keep it from happening again.

[As you know, I have always been a believer in the document called the Constitution of the United States. I spent a good deal of time in educating two other nations of the world in the Constitution of the United States.]

I am well aware of the constitutional fact- as are all the - United Nations-that this charter must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate of the United States-as will some of the other arrangements made at Yalta.

The Senate of the United States, through its appropriate representatives, has been kept continuously advised of the program of this Government in the creation of the International Security Organization.

The Senate and the House of Representatives will both be represented at the San Francisco Conference. The Congressional delegates will consist of an equal number of Republican and Democratic members. The American delegation is in every sense of the word– bipartisan.

World peace is not a party question [I think that Republicans want peace just as much as Democrats] any more than is military victory.

When our Republic was threatened, first by the Nazi clutch for world conquest in 1940, and then by the Japanese treachery of 1941, partisanship and politics were laid aside by nearly every American; and every resource was dedicated to our common safety. The same consecration to the cause of peace will be expected by every patriotic American, and -by every human soul overseas.

The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation. It cannot be an American peace, or a British peace, or a Russian, or a French or a Chinese peace. It cannot be a peace of large nations or of small nations. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world.

It cannot be a structure of complete perfection at first. But it can be a peace-and it will be a peace-based on the sound and just principles of the Atlantic Charter-on the concept of the dignity of the human being-on the guarantees of tolerance and freedom of religious worship.

As the Allied Armies have marched to military victory, they have liberated peoples whose liberties had been crushed by the Nazis for four years, and whose economy had been reduced to ruins by Nazi despoilers.

There have been instances of political confusion and unrest in these liberated areas-as in Greece and Poland and Yugoslavia and other places. Worse than that, there actually began to grow up in some of them vaguely defined ideas of "spheres of influence" which were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. If allowed to go unchecked, these developments might have had tragic results.

It is fruitless to try to place the blame for this situation on one particular nation or another. It is the kind of development which is almost inevitable unless the major powers of the world continue without interruption to work together and assume joint responsibility for the solution of problems which may arise to endanger the peace of the world.

We met in the Crimea, determined to settle this matter of liberated areas. I am happy to confirm to the Congress that we did arrive at a settlement-a unanimous settlement.

The three most powerful nations have agreed that the political and economic problems of any area liberated from Nazi conquest, or any former Axis satellite, are a joint responsibility of all three Governments. They will join together, during the temporary period of instability after hostilities, to help the people of any liberated area, or of any former satellite state, to solve their own problems through firmly established democratic processes.

They will endeavor to see to it that interim governing authorities are as representative as possible of all democratic elements in the population, and that free elections are held as soon as possible.

Responsibility for political conditions thousands of miles overseas (no longer be Avoided by this great nation. [Certainly I don't want to live to see another war.] As I have said, it is a smaller world. The United States now exerts a vast influence in the cause of peace throughout all the world. [What we people over here are thinking and talking about is in the interest of peace, because it's known all over the world. The slightest remark in either house of Congress is known all over the world the following day.] We will continue to exert that influence only if we are willing to continue to share in the responsibility for keeping the peace. It would be our own tragic loss were we to shirk that responsibility.

Final decisions is these areas are going to be made jointly; and therefore they will often be a result of give-and-take compromise. The United States will not always have its way one hundred per cent-nor will Russia, or Great Britain. We shall not always have ideal solutions to complicated international problems, even though we are determined continuously to strive toward the ideal. But I am sure that-under the agreements reached at Yalta-there will be a more stable political Europe than ever before.

Of course, once there has been a free expression of the people's will in any country, our immediate responsibility ends with the exception only of such action as may be agreed on by the International Security Organization.

The United Nations must also begin to help these liberated areas adequately to reconstruct their economy so that they are ready to resume their place in the world, The Nazi war machine has stripped, them of raw materials and machine tools and trucks and locomotives. They have left their industry stagnant, and much of the agricultural areas are unproductive.

To start the wheels running again is not a mere matter of relief. It is to the national interest of all of us to see that these liberated areas are again made self-supporting and productive, so that they do not need continued relief from us.

One outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allies in the liberated areas was the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish question was a potential source of trouble in post-war Europe, and we came to the Conference determined to find a common ground for its solution. We did.

Our objective was to help create a strong, independent and prosperous nation [-that's the thing we must always remember, those words, agreed to by Russia, by Britain and by me, the objective of making Poland a strong, independent and prosperous nation-] with a Government ultimately to be selected by the Polish people themselves.

To achieve that objective, it was necessary to provide for. the formation of a new Government, much more representative than had been possible while Poland was enslaved. Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing Provisional Government in Poland on a broader democratic basis, so as to include democratic leaders now in Poland and those abroad. This new, reorganized Government will be recognized by all of us as the temporary Government of Poland.

However, the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will be pledged to hold a free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.

Throughout history, Poland has been; the corridor through which attacks on Russia; have been made. Twice in this generation, Germany has struck at Russia through this corridor. To insure European security. and world peace, a strong and independent Poland is necessary.

The decision with respect to the boundaries of Poland was a compromise [-I didn't agree with all of it by any means, but we could go as far as Britain wanted in certain areas, as far as Russia wanted in certain areas, and we could go as far as I wanted in certain areas---it was a compromise] under which the Poles will receive compensation in territory in the north and west in exchange for what they lose by the Curzon Line [in the east]. The limits of the western border will be permanently fixed in the final Peace Conference. [We know, roughly, that it will include in the new strong Poland quite a large slice of what is now called Germany.] It was agreed that a large coastline should be included. [Also that East Prussia-most of it-will go to Poland and the comer of it will go to Russia. Also ... I think Danzig would be a lot better if it were Polish.]

It is well known that the people east of the Curzon Line are predominately White Russian and Ukrainian; and the people west of the line are predominately. Polish, [except in that part of East Prussia and East Germany which will go to the new Poland]. As far back as 1919 the representatives of the Allies agreed that the Curzon Line represented a fair boundary between the two peoples. [You must also remember that there was no Poland, there had not been any Polish Government, before 1919, for a great many generations.]

I am convinced that the agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent and prosperous Polish State.

The Crimean Conference was a meeting of the three major military powers on whose shoulders rest the chief responsibility and burden of the war. Although, for this reason, France was not a participant in the Conference, no one should detract from the recognition that was accorded of her role in the future of Europe and of the world.

France has been invited to accept a zone of control in, Germany, and to participate as a fourth member of the Allied Control Council of Germany.

She has been invited to join as a sponsor of the International Conference at San Francisco next month.

She will be a permanent member of the International Security Council together with the other four major powers.

And, finally, we have asked that France be associated with us in our joint responsibility over the liberated areas of Europe.

Agreement was reached on Yugoslavia, as announced in the communique´, and is in process of fulfillment. [But it is not only that, but in some other places we have to remember there are a great number of prima donnas in the world, who all wish to be heard. Before anything will be done, we may have a little delay while we listen to more prima donnas.]
Quite naturally, the Crimean Conference concerned itself only with the European War and with the political problems of Europe -and not with the Pacific War:
At Yalta, however, our Combined British and American Staffs made their plans to increase the attack against Japan.

The Japanese war lords know that they are not being overlooked. They have felt the force of our B-29s, and our carrier planes. They have felt the naval might of the United States, and do not appear very anxious to come out and try it again.

The Japs know what it means to hear that "the United States Marines have landed." And we can add, having Iwo Jima in mind: "The situation is well in hand."

They also know what is in store for the homeland of japan now that General MacArthur has completed his magnificent march back to Manila, and Admiral Nimitz is establishing his air bases right in the back yard of Japan itself-in lwo Jima.

[But, lest somebody else lay off work in the United States, I can repeat what I have said, even in my sleep-a short sentence-"We haven't won the wars yet," with an "s" on "wars".]

It is still a tough, long road to Tokyo. The defeat of Germany will not mean the end of the war against japan. On the contrary, America must be prepared for a long and costly struggle in the Pacific.

But the unconditional surrender of japan is as essential as the defeat of Germany-if our plans for world peace are to succeed. For Japanese militarism must be wiped out as thoroughly as German militarism.

On the way back from the Crimea I made arrangements to meet personally King Farouk of Egypt, Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia, and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Our conversations had to do with matters of common interest. They will be of great mutual advantage because they gave us an opportunity of meeting and talking face to face, and of exchanging views in personal conversation instead of formal correspondence.

[Of the problems of Arabia, I learned more about that whole problem, the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem, by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes than I could have learned in exchange of two or three dozen letters.]

On my voyage, I had the benefit of seeing our Army and Navy and Air Force at work.

All Americans would feel as proud of our Armed Forces as I am, if they could see and hear what I did.

Against the most efficient professional soldiers, sailors and air. men of all history, our men stood and fought-and won.

This is our chance to see to it that the sons and grandsons of these gallant fighting men do not have to do it all over again in a few years.

The Conference, in the Crimea was a turning point in American history. There will soon be presented to the Senate and the American people a great decision which will determine the fate of the United States– and of the world– for generations to come.

There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.

I know that the word "planning" is not looked upon with favor ' in some quarters. In domestic affairs, tragic mistakes have been made by reason of lack of planning; and on the other hand, many great improvements in living, and many benefits to the human race, have been accomplished as a result of adequate, intelligent planning-reclamations of desert areas, developments of whole river valleys, provision for adequate housing.

The same will be true in relations between nations. For the second time, this generation is face to face with the objective of preventing wars. To meet that objective, the nations of the world will either have a plan or they will not. The groundwork of a plan has now been furnished, and has been submitted to humanity for discussion and decision.

No plan is perfect. Whatever is adopted at San Francisco will doubtless have to be amended time and again over the years, just as our own Constitution has been.

No one can say exactly how long any plan will last. Peace can endure only so long as humanity really insists upon it, and is willing to work for and sacrifice for it.

Twenty-five years ago, American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which they fought and suffered. We failed them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world to survive.

The Crimean Conference was a successful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells the end of the system of unilateral action and exclusive alliances and spheres of influence and balances of power and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries-and have failed.

We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join


Voices of World War II, 1937-1945

Among the audiovisual holdings of the National Archives are more than 50,000 sound recordings, the bulk of which date from the 1930's to the present.

From the 1930's are recordings of performances of the Federal Theater and Music Projects of the Works Projects Administration. Beginning in the late 1930's, covering World War II, and continuing to the present, are recordings of press conferences, panel discussions, interviews, and speeches promoting and explaining policies and programs of some 65 Federal agencies. Additional recordings relating to World War II include German, Japanese, and Italian propaganda broadcasts, American propaganda broadcasts in many languages, and news coverage of decisive campaigns of the war.

Stemming mainly from the postwar period are recordings of meetings of Government boards and committees and Government-sponsored conferences. Another major category consists of the oral arguments before the Supreme Court during the 1955-68 sessions. Other types of recordings on deposit include entertainment broadcasts (usually supporting some Federal activity), documentaries and dramas relating to U. S. history, recordings of political conventions and campaigns, and extensive news coverage recordings of events such as the Hindenburg disaster.

The sound recordings listed in this leaflet are representative of the many recordings in the Audiovisual Archives Division that relate to World War II. They are in chronological order, and the speaker and the subject or occasion of each speech are identified. Where appropriate, highlights have been quoted to further identify the speech. The back cover of this leaflet constitutes a form for ordering tape reproductions of the sound recordings. To order a specific recording, print the date, the name of the speaker, the italicized number that follows the item description, and the cost of the reproduction in the proper columns on the order form. Information on recordings not included in this list is available from the Audiovisual Branch of the National Archives.

Unless indicated otherwise, all tapes are recorded at 7.5 I.P.S. (inches per second).

An asterisk following a description means that the recording is subject to copyright and/or other restrictions imposed by the agency-of-transfer or by the donor. Information about restrictions on such a recording and instructions for acquiring clearance can be obtained by writing to the Audiovisual Archives Division, National Archives, Washington, DC 20408.

Recordings (Arranged By Date)

1937, October 5. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Quarantine" speech at Chicago, Ill,: ". the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course." 30 min. RLxA30

1938, February 6. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, "Trade, Prosperity and Peace," an address on the reciprocal trade program. 13 min. 59-1

1938, July 14. President Roosevelt, address at Treasure Island, San Francisco, Calif.: "We fervently hope for the day when the other leading nations of the world will realize that their present course must inevitably lead to disaster." 30 min. RLxA51

1938, August 18. President Roosevelt, address at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario: "We in the Americas are no longer a far away continent, to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm." 15 min. 200(R)-189

1938, September 12. Adolf Hitler, address on the Sudeten Germans before a Nazi Congress in Nuremburg. (In German, with English recapitulations at intervals in the speech.) American commentator H. V. Kaltenborn discusses speech and its potential effect on world peace.* 30 min. 48-163

1939, February 20. German-American Bund leader Fritz Kuhn, address to a Bund rally, Madison Square Garden, New York, N.Y.: "We, the German-American Bund, organized as American citizens with American ideals and determined to protect ourselves, our homes, our wives and children against the slimy conspirators who would change this glorious republic into the inferno of a Bolshevik paradise. " (Excerpt recordings of entire speech and rally are available.) 14 min. 131-71, parts 33, 34, 35, 36

1939, September 3. President Roosevelt, fireside chat after Germany's invasion of Poland: "This nation will remain a neutral nation, but l cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. . As long as it remains within my power to prevent, there will be no black-out of peace in the United States." 16 min. RLxA76

1939, September 19. Hitler, address in Danzig audience cheers and sings "Deutschland ueber Alles," the German national anthem, and the "Horst Wessel Lied" at the end of speech. (In German.) 76 min. 242-182

1939, September 19. Excerpt from Hitler's address in Danzig. Topics Hitler discusses include propaganda against him, the German people's strength and others' weakness, his hatred of war, Germany's attack on Poland and conformity to the rules of warfare, the Versailles Treaty, the Danzig people's suffering after Danzig's separation from the Reich, and Danzig's unity with the German Reich audience cheers and sings "Deutschland ueber Alles" and the "Horst Wessel Lied." (In German, with English recapitulations at intervals in the speech.) 22 min. 48-295

1939, September 21. President Roosevelt, address before a joint session of Congress, convened in special session upon his call, urging repeal of arms embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1937 and enactment of measures governing American shipping, trade with belligerents, and travel on ships of belligerents. 90 min. RLxA77

1939, October 30. "Deutschland ueber Alles" and the "Horst Wessel Lied," sung at a German-American Bund rally in the Hippodrome, New York, NY 4 min. 131-73, part 14

1940, May 19. Charles A. Lindbergh, radio address on America's air defense, broadcast from Washington, D. C.* 15 min. 200(R)-38

1940, May 19. Winston Churchill, first address to the nation as Prime Minister of Great Britain, broadcast from London: "Behind us, behind the armies and fleets of Britain and France, gather a group of shattered states and bludgeoned races. upon all of whom the long night of barbarism will descend, unbroken even by a star of hope, unless we conquer, as conquer we must, as conquer we shall." Elmer Davis of CBS analyzes the speech following the broadcast.* 15 min. 200(R)-37

1940, May 24. King George VI, Empire Day address, broadcast from London: "It is not mere territorial conquest the enemy is seeking, it is the overthrow, complete and final, of the Empire and of everything for which it stands, and after that the conquest of the world." * 15 min. 200(R)-39

1940, May 26. President Roosevelt, fireside chat on national defense: "At this time, when the world--and the world includes our own American Hemisphere--is threatened by forces of destruction, it is my resolve and yours to build up our armed defenses." 30 min. 200(R)-40

1940, June 10. Benito Mussolini, reading Italy's declaration of war against Great Britain and France. (In Italian.) 15 min. 242-84

1940, June 10. President Roosevelt, address at the University of Virginia: "On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor. . we will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense." 30 min. RLxA-86

1940, October 16. President Roosevelt, radio address on Selective Service Registration Day: "We are mobilizing our citizenship, for we are calling on men and women and property and money to join in making our defense effective. Today's registration for training and service is the keystone in the arch of our national defense." 6 min. 200(R)-201A

1940, October 29. President Roosevelt, radio address on the occasion of the drawing of numbers under the Selective Service Act of 1940, Washington, D. C.: ". our democratic army has existed for one purpose only: the defense of our freedom." 14 min. 200(R)-201B

1940, December 29. President Roosevelt, fireside chat on national security: "There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. We must be the great arsenal of democracy." 42 min. 200(R)-83

1941, January 6. President Roosevelt, annual message to Congress: "In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression--everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way--everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want--which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants- everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear--which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor--anywhere in the world." 40 min. 200(R)-206

1941, February 24. Raymond E. Willis, U. S. Senator from Indiana, speaking against the lend-lease bill. 15 min. 200(R)-36

1941, March 15. President Roosevelt, address at annual dinner of White House Correspondents' Association: "The light of democracy must be kept burning." 30 min. 200(R)-205

1941, March 29. President Roosevelt, radio address from the U.S.S. Potomac to Jackson Day dinners: ". .. the time calls for courage and more courage." 15 min. 200(R)-205B

1941, April 30. President Roosevelt, radio address on the occasion of his purchase of the first defense savings bond and stamps. 7 min. 200(R)-205A

1941, May 16. Ignace Jan Paderewski, President of the Council of Poland and former Prime Minister of Poland, public service broadcast urging Americans to buy U. S. defense savings bonds and discussing his experience in war-torn Europe, the German invasion of Poland, and the need to defeat Germany. 16 min. 56-58

1941, July 4. President Roosevelt, Fourth of July address at Hyde Park, NY: ". the United States will never survive as a happy and fertile oasis of liberty surrounded by a cruel desert of dictatorship." 6 min. 200(R)-204B

1941, September 1. President Roosevelt, Labor Day radio address: ". we shall do everything in our power to crush Hitler and his Nazi forces." l0 min. 200(R)-204C

1941, September 9. "Paul Revere" (Douglas Chandler, an American citizen), propaganda broadcast from the heart of Nazi Germany on the eve of the third anniversary of the Axis Pact. Chandler lauds the Axis victories and castigates the "opponents of world progress led by 'Churchill the Charlatan' and 'Roosevelt the Renegade.'" 15 min. 60-76

1941, September 11. President Roosevelt, fire-side chat on freedom of the seas: ". when you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him." 30 min. 200(R)-207

1941, December 7. KGU newsman's report from a rooftop in Honolulu to NBC in New York describing the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, damage suffered, and the fighting still in process. NBC newsmen read bulletins as they are received.* 15 min. 200(R)-54

1941, December 7. H. V. Kaltenborn analyzes the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.* 15 min. 200(R)-53

1941, December 8. President Roosevelt, address before a joint session of Congress asking that a state of war be declared between the United States and the Japanese Empire: "Yesterday, December 7, 1941 - a date which will live in infamy. " l3 min. 200(R)-49

1941, December 9. President Roosevelt, fireside chat to the nation following the declaration of war with Japan: "We are going to win the war and we are going to win the peace that follows." 29 min. 200(R)-210

1941, December 24. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, Christmas tree lighting ceremonies, White House, Washington, D. C. Roosevelt: "Our strongest weapon in this war is that conviction of the dignity and brotherhood of man which Christmas Day signifies-more than any other day or any other symbol." Churchill: "We may cast aside, for this night at least, the cares and dangers which besiege us and make for the children an evening of happiness in a world of storm."* 30 min. 200(R)-75

1941, December 25. British refugee children in the United States, Canada, and South Africa exchanging Christmas greetings with their parents in Great Britain.* 30 min. 200(R)-71

1941, December 26. Prime Minister Churchill, address to a joint session of Congress: "I cannot help reflecting that if my father had been American and my mother British, instead of the other way 'round, I might have got here on my own." 40 min. 200(R)-74

1941, December 28. "Berlin to North America," German radio broadcast in English, communique from the Fuehrer's headquarters: Supreme Commander's report on German military operation, read by an unidentified announcer "Lord Haw Haw" (William Joyce), propaganda broadcast to Great Britain. 30 min. 262-21439

1942, February 19. Italian radio broadcast, including a 15-minute speech by Ezra Pound entitled "Power": "The President hath power. The President has no legal power to enter into devious and secret agreements with foreign powers. To send the boys from Omaha to Singapore to die for British monopoly and brutality is not the act of an American patriot." * 36 min. 262-24390

1942, February 22. CBS public service program to stimulate homefront support of the war effort: Sgt. Alvin C. York, World War I veteran, speaks from Knoxville, Tenn., and Richard Martin Scheuns, Sr., German-American veteran of World War I, speaks from Memphis, Tenn. Barry Kroger, narrator.* 30 min. 48-325

1942, February 22. Mary Anderson, Director of the Women's Bureau, Department of Labor, radio broadcast on women's contributions and value to the war effort, their prewar difficulties in obtaining jobs in industry, the types of positions women fill, and equal wages for men and women. 18 min. 48-360

1942, February 23. President Roosevelt, fireside chat on the progress of the war: ". we must keep on striking our enemies wherever and whenever we can meet them. . . . Never before have we been called upon for such a prodigious effort. Never before have we had so little time in which to do so much." 36 min. 200(R)-211

1942, April 28. President Roosevelt, fireside chat on the Seven-Point Economic Stabilization Program: "The price for civilization must be paid in hard work and sorrow and blood." 34 min. at 3.75 I.P.S. 48-329

1942, May 8. Vice President Henry Wallace. address at dinner of the Free World Association, Commodore Hotel, New York, NY, entitled "What Are We Fighting For?": "This is a fight between a slave world and a free world. . The world must make its decision for a complete victory, one way or another." 40 min. 208-2

1942, May 30. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, speech at Memorial Day ceremony, Arlington National Cemetery, "None of us can afford to think of ourselves. None of us can dare to do less than his full part in the common effort. " 35 min. 200(R)-78

1942, June 12. President Roosevelt, radio appeal for support of the scrap rubber campaign, held because the Japanese had cut off ca.92 percent of the U. S. rubber supply. 8 min. 200(R)-212B

1942, July 23. Secretary of State Hull, "What America Is Fighting For," an address on U. S. war aims. 44 min. 59-4

1942, August 6. President Roosevelt, remarks on presentation under lend-lease of a submarine chaser to Queen Wilhelmina for the Dutch Navy, Washington Navy Yard: "We, too, are fighting for our freedom and it is natural and right that The Netherlands and the United States have joined hands in the common struggle." 4 min. 200(R)-212A

1942, September 7. President Roosevelt, Labor Day fireside chat on the cost of living and the progress of the war: "If the vicious spiral of inflation ever gets under way, the whole economic system will stagger." 30 min. 200(R)-214

1942, September 16. President Roosevelt, remarks on the transfer under lend-lease of a submarine chaser to Norway: "If there is anyone who still wonders why this war is being fought, let him look to Norway." 5 min. 200(R)-213A

1942, November 8. John R. Richards, Supervisor of Gas Rationing, Office of Price Administration (OPA), Raymond Berry, chairman of the Detroit Board of Commerce, Royce Howes, Detroit Free Press, and George Cushing, WJR moderator, radio discussion of gasoline rationing in the Detroit area and its effect on warworkers and war production followed by a bulletin announcing the Allied invasion of North Africa. 30 min. 188-5

1942, November 19. Leon Henderson, OPA Administrator, James Kennedy, chairman of the War Price and Rationing Board of Middleboro, Mass., Mrs. Arthur W. Flint, and Luther R. Harris, radio discussion of fuel-oil rationing in the New England area and converting oil heating units to coal. 15 min. 188-141

1942, November. Corp. John F. Barctek relating the rescue of himself, Capt. Eddie Rickenbacker, and other crew members of a flying fortress after they had drifted for 22 days on a raft in the Pacific. 7 min. 407-5

1942, December 10. OPA Administrator Henderson answering consumers' questions about rationing and rent and price controls. 15 min. 188-144

1942, December 31. Paul O'Leary, OPA Deputy Administrator in Charge of Rationing, discussing the new point-rationing system of canned and packaged foods. 15 min. 188-146

1943, February 18. Madame Chiang, wife of Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Chinese Republic, address to a joint session of Congress on American-Chinese relations and the war effort. 25 min. 12-11

1943, May 2. President Roosevelt, fireside chat on the Federal seizure of the coal mines to prevent a strike: "There can be no one among us-no one faction-powerful enough to interrupt the forward march of our people to victory." 30 min. 208-94

1943, May 7. Joseph Goebbels, propaganda minister of the Third Reich, address at funeral of Viktor Lutze, S.A. leader of Hanover. (In German.) 30 min. 262-203

1943, May 14. Prime Minister Churchill, radio address to the British Home Guard from the White House, Washington, D. C.* 15 min. 200(R)-128

1943, May 19. Prime Minister Churchill, address before a joint session of Congress: "For more than five hundred days-every day a day we have toiled and suffered and dared, shoulder to shoulder against the cruel enemy-we have acted in close combination or concert in many parts of the world, on land, on sea, and in the air."* 58 min. 200(R)-129

1943, June 10. President Roosevelt, address on the transfer under lend-lease of a submarine chaser to the Greek Government, Washington Navy Yard: "Today, Greece is a gaunt and haggard sample of what the Axis is so eager and willing to hand to all the world." 5 min. 200(R)-217A

1943, July 28. President Roosevelt, fireside chat on the progress of the war and plans for peace: "The massed, angered forces of common humanity are on the march. . . . The first crack in the Axis has come. The criminal, corrupt Fascist regime in Italy is going to pieces." 30 min. 200(R)-223

1943, October 4. Heinrich Himmler. head of the Gestapo and SS, at a meeting of SS major generals held in Posen, occupied Poland, speaking of German suffering and loss of life in Russia and openly expressing his determination to eliminate European Jews. (Excerpt of speech: in German.) 15 min. 242-229

1943, December 24. President Roosevelt. Christmas Eve fireside chat on Teheran and Cairo Conferences: "Keep us strong in our faith that we fight for a better day for humankind." 30 min. 200(R)-221

ca. 1943 Dillon S. Meyer. Director of the War Relocation Authority, interviewed by an unidentified NBC newsman, discussing the relocation of approximately 110,000 Japanese-Americans from the west coast of the United States to 10 relocation centers in seven States. Topics include the administration living conditions, educational and medical facilities, and staffing of the centers.* 14 min. 210-12

ca. 1943. J. William Fulbright. Congressman from Arkansas and U S. delegate, to the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, speaking of Nazi destruction of educational facilities in conquered countries, the need to help conquered peoples reconstruct their educational systems when they are liberated, and congressional support of the Conference. 8 min. 208-324

ca. 1943. Harriet Elliot. Associate Administrator in Charge of the Consumer Division. OPA, explaining to women how to conserve products needed for the war effort. 12 min. 48-35

1944, March 11. Lord Halifax. British Ambassador to the United States: "Lend-lease was born of a great conviction and a great need. . How could the United States help Britain to carry on to a victory that was as vital to her and to the world as it was to us? The President and his advisers found the answer to the question in lend-lease." 8 min. 208-332

1944, April 5. Wendell Wilkie, statement of withdrawal from the presidential race after being defeated in the Wisconsin Republican primary. 6 min. 200(R)-108

1944, June 5. President Roosevelt, fireside chat on the fall of Rome: "The first of the Axis capitals is now in our hands. One up and two to go!" 15 min. 200(R)-224

1944, June 6. President Roosevelt. prayer for the success of the Normandy invasion and for eventual world peace. 8 min. 208-110A

1944, June 12. President Roosevelt, fireside chat opening the Fifth War Loan Drive and reporting on the progress of the war. 15 min. 200(R)-222A

1944, August. Glenn Perry: "There can be no question that the war in Europe has been shortened by the Allied landings on the Mediterranean coast of France. . . . It seems reasonable to hope that all of France will be liberated by Allied military might before the holiday that Americans call Thanksgiving Day."* 7 min. 208-310

1944, June. Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, report on American B-29 bomber strikes against the Germans and Japanese. 3 min. 208-318

1944, July 20. President Roosevelt, address broadcast from a Pacific-coast naval base to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Ill.. accepting a fourth-term nomination. 20 min. 200(R)-142

1944, July 27. Berlin broadcast to Allied forces: war news: "Surpassing the Enemy's Head Start." by Reich Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels, read by a Nazi commentator: "Home Sweet Home," a program consisting of American music and comments by "Midge," Mildred Elizabeth Gillars. an American citizen dubbed "Axis Sally" by the GIs. 60 min. at 3.75 I.P.S. 262-09315

1944, August 14. "Zero Hour," Japanese broadcast to Allied forces in the South Pacific: music war news and commentary music with "Ann the Orphan," Iva Toguri D'Aquino, a Japanese-American, dubbed "Tokyo Rose" by the GIs news from the United States, including news of the presidential campaign music and commentary. 35 min. 262-107

1944, August 31. Warren Austin, U. S. Senator from Vermont, speaking on world peace, following the World Security Conference at Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D. C. 8 min. 208-277

1944, August. Jennings Randolph, Congressman from West Virginia and chairman of the House District Committee, congratulating the French people on the liberation of Paris. 5 min. 208-307

1944, September 22. John Cooper, NBC war correspondent, report from a navy cruiser in the Pacific describing the action aboard the ship during the first landing of U. S. troops on the island of Palau.* 12 min. 38-7

1944, October 5. President Roosevelt, radio address from the White House during presidential campaign: "The right to vote must be open to our citizens irrespective of race, color, or creed-without tax or artificial restriction of any kind." 30 min. 200(R)-112

1944, October 12. President Roosevelt, address on accepting the Four Freedoms Award, presented by the Italian-American Labor Council: "The American Army--including thousands of Americans of Italian descent--entered Italy not as conquerors, but as liberators. Their objective is military, not political. When that military objective is accomplished--and much of it has not yet been accomplished--the Italian people will be free to work out their own destiny, under a government of their own choosing." 7 min. 200(R)-227B

1944, October 21. President Roosevelt, radio address at dinner of the Foreign Policy Association, New York. N.Y.: "Peace, like war, can succeed only where there is a will to enforce it, and where there is available power to enforce it." 57 min. 200(R)-113

1944, December 29. Gen. Anthony C. McAuliffe recounting the German demand to surrender Bastogne, Belgium, which was held by the 101st Airborne Division against overwhelming odds, and his reply. "Nuts!" 2 min. 208-3

ca. 1944. "Soldiers with Coupons," a radio dramatization by the OPA explaining rationing, price controls, and their purposes. 15 min. 188-26

1945, January 20. President Roosevelt, fourth inaugural address, "We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community." (Roosevelt's wartime inauguration in order to save money, manpower, and materials, it was held in front of the White House rather than at the Capitol.) 30 min. 200(R)-147

1945, March 1. President Roosevelt. address to the Congress, reporting on the Yalta Conference and discussing the upcoming San Francisco Conference: "Twenty-five years ago, American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which they fought and suffered. We failed them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world again to survive." 60 min. 200(R)-148

1945, April 14. NBC announcer describing the arrival of President Roosevelt's funeral train at Union Station, Washington. D. C., and the procession from Union Plaza down Pennsylvania Avenue to the White House.* 2 hrs. 7 min. 208-134

1945, April 16. President Harry S. Truman, first official appearance before Congress as President: "With great humility I call upon all Americans to help me keep our nation united in defense of those ideals which have been so eloquently proclaimed by Franklin Roosevelt." 30 min. 200(R)-163

1945, April 25. President Truman, address opening the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations: ". I earnestly appeal to each and every one of you to rise above personal interests, and adhere to those lofty principles, which benefit all mankind." 15 min. 200(R)-165

1945, May 2. NBC newsman describing the signing of unconditional surrender by German forces in Italy at Caserta. April 29, 1945 (the first formal surrender since Allied troops entered Europe), and reading a statement issued by President Truman.* 17 min. 208-163

1945, May 30. Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, address urging Americans to take jobs in shipyards and to buy more war bonds. 8 min. 38-5

1945, June 18. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, report to a joint session of Congress on the war in Europe and Africa, the defeat of Germany, and British-American relations and discussion of what remained to be done to win the war in the Pacific. 28 min. 38-15

1945, August 9. President Truman, radio report to the American people on the Potsdam Conference and the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Japan. 30 min. 200(R)-149

1945, September 1. The surrender of Japan: Gen. Douglas MacArthur opens the surrender ceremony aboard the battleship U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay, presides over the signing, and closes the ceremony. Newscasters Webley Edwards and Merrill Mueller describe the proceedings. President Truman, address to the American people from the White House after the singing: "The thoughts and hopes of all America-indeed of all the civilized world-are centered tonight on the battleship Missouri. There on that small piece of American soil anchored in Tokyo Harbor the Japanese have just officially laid down their arms. They have signed terms of unconditional surrender." General MacArthur, proclamation of victory: "Today the guns are silent, a great tragedy has ended, a great victory has been won, the skies no longer rain death, the seas bear only calmness, men everywhere walk upright in the sunlight, the entire world lies quietly at peace, the whole mission has been completed." Admiral Nimitz, proclamation of victory: "On all naval vessels at sea and in port and at our many island bases in the Pacific, there is rejoicing and thanksgiving. A long and bitter struggle which Japan started so treacherously on December 7, 1941, is at an end." * 53 min. 200(R)-124

An up-to-date price list may be obtained by writing to the Audiovisual Archives Division (NNVM), General Services Administration, Washington, DC 20408.

This page was last reviewed on August 15, 2016.
Contact us with questions or comments.


The Truth About "The Sick Man At Yalta"

Steven Lomazow is the co-author (with Eric Fettmann) of FDR's Deadly Secret (PublicAffairs, January 2010).

The four years of research involved in writing my recent book with journalist Eric Fettmann, FDR&rsquos Deadly Secret, has brought to light a new degree of insight into the mental status of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the last year of his life and takes the understanding of his thought processes at Yalta to an entirely new level.

Unequivocally, Roosevelt was suffering from frequent episodic lapses of consciousness known to neurologists as complex partial seizures. They were witnessed and reported by dozens of observers, and our book includes graphic descriptions by the likes of Secretary of Labor Francis Perkins, New York Times editor Turner Catledge and Senator Frank Maloney of Connecticut. Perhaps the most dramatic and historically important of all was only recently discovered in the Walter Trohan papers at the Herbert Hoover Library in Iowa.

A January 5, 1948 memo to the editor of the ChicagoTribune by reporter Orville &ldquoDoc&rdquo Dwyer reports his interview with a Doctor Louis E. Schmidt, a very close friend and confidante of Roosevelt&rsquos daughter Anna (then in her second marriage to reporter John Boettinger):

The doctor told me that from what Anna has outlined to him Franklin D. Roosevelt was for a long time before he died&mdashand particularly when he went to Yalta and Tehran (sic)&mdashsuffering from hemorrhages of the brain. The doctor said he died &ldquofrom a big hemorrhage&rdquo but for several years before his death he had a lot of &ldquolittle hemorrhages,&rdquo small blood vessels bursting in his brain. When these burstings occurred&mdashand they were frequent during his last years&mdashhe would be unconscious (completely out) although sitting up and apparently functioning for periods of from a few seconds to several minutes. Dr Schmidt said he has no doubt from his conversations with Anna that these were occurring regularly at the time he was meeting with Churchill and Stalin and holding other momentous conferences of the utmost importance to the United States. He said the effect would be that he would be cognizant of what was going on, then suddenly lose the thread completely for anywhere from a few seconds to two or three minutes&mdashand that he could not possibly have known what was going on in between.

Through the eyes of a neurologist, this remarkable account tells a dramatic story. First, it is clear that Anna, who was kept in the dark about the whole truth of her father&rsquos health, misinterpreted the seizures as &ldquoburstings,&rdquo what today we would call transient ischemic attacks or TIAs. This misinterpretation was compounded by Trohan when he reported them to Dr. Karl Wold, who created a firestorm by reporting them in a long article in Look Magazine in 1948.

Even more importantly, the Dwyer memorandum accurately reflects the historical importance and true impact of President Roosevelt&rsquos neurological behavior at the end of his life. The report is by no means unique, but it does reflect the observations of one closest of all to &ldquothe boss.&rdquo Perkins describes the seizures (which she also did not recognize as such) as &ldquofrequent&rdquo and occurring for &ldquoa few years.&rdquo

Aside from these frank lapses of consciousness, it is highly probable that less severe episodes had a noticeable yet tangible transitory effect on Roosevelt&rsquos mental performance. This, combined with the panoply of other medical problems he had, explains quite well how certain observers found him lucid and competent while others met with a quite different state of affairs. It also explains a globally diminished ability to multitask, quite significant in a man who prided himself as the ultimate &ldquohub of the wheel&rdquo in virtually every important matter of policy. Also to be factored into the equation is a greatly diminished ability to read due to a rapidly expanding malignant brain tumor.

With the preceding in mind, the proceedings and aftermath of Yalta can be considered in an entirely new context. It is unlikely that FDR gave away very much at all with respect to Western Europe at Yalta. The Curzon Line had been established as the eastern border of Poland at Teheran, and, by the time of Yalta, Stalin had already recognized the Lublin puppet government. Churchill had been talking to Stalin for months about &ldquospheres of influence&rdquo in the Balkans and his report to Parliament upon his return from the Crimea was equally or more optimistic than that of Roosevelt&rsquos address to congress on March 1. Roosevelt&rsquos blind spot for the (non-cancerous) malignancy of &ldquoUncle Joe&rdquo far predated any mental compromise.

Where Roosevelt&rsquos health did have a significant impact at Yalta was with respect to China. On February 8, 1945 at 3:30 pm, Joseph Stalin walked into a private meeting with Roosevelt and in thirty minutes, without the knowledge or consent of its leader, took everything that China had spent fourteen years and over twenty million lives fighting for. It is unlikely that a mentally intact president would have agreed to such an accommodation. The implications with respect to future American/Chinese/Soviet relations were monumental.

In October 1943, Stalin informed Secretary of State Cordell Hull that the Soviets would enter the war against Japan as soon as Germany was defeated and asked for nothing in return, reaffirming this promise at Teheran a few weeks later. Despite this, a secret agreement, specifically excluded from the final communiqué, was drafted and signed by the heads of the three Yalta participants, with the consent of American General George Marshall, Admirals King and Leahy, but over the objection of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden:

  1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia shall be preserved:
  2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz: (a) the southern portion of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it be returned to the Soviet Union, (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored, (c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and Southern Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria
  3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

As Don Lohbeck succinctly underscores:

By this agreement &ldquoRoosevelt and Churchill signed to the Soviet Union not only &ldquopre-eminent interests&rdquo in the great Manchurian port of Dairen and full control of the naval base which protects it, but also &ldquopre-eminent interests&rdquo in the railroads which lead from the Soviet Union to Dairen and split Manchuria from the northwest to the south.

Stalin&rsquos intentions about Manchuria were quite clear, evidenced by the statement &ldquothe President [sic] will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshall [sic] Stalin,&rdquo that refers directly to a delay, agreed to by Roosevelt (on the pretense of a possible security leak in the Chiang Government), in even informing Chiang of the agreement until after the Soviets had transferred twenty-five divisions to the Manchurian border. These troops would ultimately serve to secure the surrender of Japanese war materiel to Communist forces, directly contrary to the American policy that only the Nationalists should receive them.

The China agreement was excluded from the final official protocol of the conference. Likewise, no mention of it, or China whatsoever, was made by Roosevelt in his March 1 report to Congress, despite its having the most radical and long-standing influence upon the future of the world of any decision made at Yalta. Roosevelt instead cryptically announced:

I think the Crimean Conference &hellip ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action the exclusive alliances the spheres of influence, the balances of power and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries &ndash and have always failed.

The exact opposite was the case. Worse yet, the two Americans with the greatest understanding of the long-term consequences of the agreement, Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley and Chiang&rsquos chief of staff, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, were not present or previously consulted! It was also withheld from Douglas MacArthur, the military commander of the Pacific theatre.

Aware of it were Averill Harriman, who facilitated the negotiations, translator and future Ambassador Charles &ldquoChip&rdquo Bohlen, State Department advisor (and later convicted Soviet spy) Alger Hiss, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including George Marshall, who had demanded Soviet entry into the Pacific war at any price. It was also soon known to pro-communist and pro-imperialist members of the State Department. Roosevelt&rsquos close advisor at Yalta and future secretary of state in the Truman administration, James F. &ldquoJimmy&rdquo Byrnes, was kept completely in the dark.

After getting wind of the agreement, Hurley set out for Washington. The State Department &ldquotold him that no such agreement had been made&rdquo (emphasis in text). With his characteristic Oklahoma cowboy panache, &ldquowith my ears back and my teeth skinned, to have a fight about what had been done,&rdquo he went to the White House. He had not seen Roosevelt for over six months and was taken aback by the president&rsquos physical condition. &ldquoWhen the President [sic] reached up that fine, firm, strong hand of his to shake hands with me, what I found in my hand was a very loose bag of bones&hellip the skin seemed to be pasted down on his cheek-bones and you know, all the fight I had in me went out.&rdquo

At first, Roosevelt flatly denied that any agreement had been made. Hurley refused to blame his leader for the blunder:

The sickness of death was already upon President Roosevelt when he attended the Yalta Conference&hellip I am certain that he believed he was telling the truth when he said that no secret agreement such as I described had been entered into at Yalta.

Afterwards, he met with continued resistance from the pro-communist elements in the State Department, claiming that by accepting British and Soviet spheres of influence, FDR had repudiated the principles of the Atlantic Charter and being &ldquotaken advantage of [in] (his) physical and mental condition, just as he had been imposed at Yalta (emphasis in text).&rdquo

On into March, Hurley continued to press the issue, finally prevailing upon Roosevelt to allow him to examine the records from Yalta, in turn discovering the secret &ldquoAgreement Regarding Japan&rdquo that he perceived as &ldquosecretly sabotaging, setting aside and cancelling every principle and objective for which the United States professed to be fighting World War II. He questioned the right of America to give away portions of territory of another sovereign nation.&rdquo

The president admitted that Hurley&rsquos fears appeared justified and gave him a special directive to go to London and Moscow to speak with Churchill and Stalin to &ldquoameliorate the betrayal of China and return to the traditional American policy in the Far East.&rdquo

In a letter to Atlantic Monthly on September 28, 1950, Hurley wrote:

There is a tendency now to charge the Yalta Secret Agreement to President Roosevelt. President Roosevelt is dead, but I can say that he is not guilty. He was a very sick man at Yalta,* and the surrender of China to the Communists in the Secret Agreement of Yalta was engineered by the officials of the American State Department under the brilliant leadership of a young American, Alger Hiss.

Wedemeyer had a similar experience. Accompanying Hurley on his return from China in February, after stopping en route to meet with MacArthur in Manila, he arrived in Washington in March to meet with his commander-in-chief. Like Hurley, he was &ldquoshocked&rdquo at Roosevelt&rsquos physical appearance and demeanor. Catching the president in the midst of one of his frequent seizures:

His color was ashen, his face drawn and his jaw drooping. I had difficulty in conveying information to him because he seemed in a daze. Several times I repeated the same idea because his mind did not seem to retain or register.

As Roosevelt&rsquos mind began to clear, conversation turned to active support of independence of Indochina from the French, then to China itself. The president mentioned that Chiang had sent communications in praise of Wedemeyer&rsquos efforts and Wedemeyer, in turn, expressed confidence that Chiang had been most cooperative in supporting Chinese participation in the war effort. When he raised the issue that the Communists would undoubtedly cause problems as soon as the war ended, he noted &ldquo(Roosevelt) did not seem to understand what I was talking about.&rdquo

Shortly afterwards, Wedemeyer met over lunch with Secretary of War Stimson, reassuring him of Chiang&rsquos sincerity in restoring order to China despite a less than optimal knowledge of modern military techniques. He also signed off on Ambassador Hurley&rsquos efforts to remove certain (pro-communist) members of his staff at the embassy. The secretary then pressed him for his opinion on Roosevelt&rsquos health, to which he replied that he was &ldquoshocked to find that the President [sic] seemed to be in Never-Never land&rdquo most of the time he spent with him, picking nervously at his food and going off on tangents. Then, &ldquothe Secretary admonished me not to mention the President&rsquos [sic] physical condition to anyone.&rdquo

Even the staunch Roosevelt supporter Robert Sherwood, while unabashedly defending Roosevelt&rsquos decisions at Yalta concerning Poland and the United Nations, admitted:

Only at the end of seven days of long meetings, covering a wide range of tremendous subjects, did he make a concession which, in my belief, he would not have made if he had not been tired out and anxious to the negotiations relative to Russia&rsquos entry into the war with Japan.

He further sustained the objection of diplomat Sumner Welles, quoting him directly:

[T]he restoration to Russia of the right formerly possessed by the Imperial Russian Govermnents to dominate Manchuria through control of the Chinese Eastern and Southern Manchurian railroads, and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base&hellip.make it altogether impossible for a new unified China to exercise full sovereignty within Manchuria, all the more objectionable in view of China&rsquos absence from the conference table where they were decided.

Sherwood cited the statement &ldquothe heads of the Three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated,&rdquo as &ldquothe most assailable point in the entire Yalta record,&rdquo noting &ldquoif China had refused to agree to any of the Soviet claims, presumably the U.S. and Britain would have been compelled to join in enforcing them.&rdquo

An enhanced knowledge of Franklin Roosevelt&rsquos health is essential to the understanding of the processes of his decision making. Nowhere is this more evident than with the events that occurred at and following Yalta.

*This is the first use of the term &ldquoSick Man at Yalta&rdquo, which Hurley later publicly reiterated in his 1951 testimony before a committed of the House of Representatives. Hurley deserves full credit for coining this ignominious term.


Yalta Conference ends

On February 11, 1945, a week of intensive bargaining by the leaders of the three major Allied powers ends in Yalta, a Soviet resort town on the Black Sea. It was the second conference of the 𠇋ig Three” Allied leaders—U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin𠅊nd the war had progressed mightily since their last meeting, which had taken place in Tehran in late 1943.

What was then called the Crimea conference was held at the old summer palace of Czar Nicholas II on the outskirts of Yalta, now a city in the independent Ukraine. With victory over Germany three months away, Churchill and Stalin were more intent on dividing Europe into zones of political influence than in addressing military considerations. Germany would be divided into four zones of occupation administered by the three major powers and France and was to be thoroughly demilitarized and its war criminals brought to trial. The Soviets were to administer those European countries they liberated but promised to hold free elections. The British and Americans would oversee the transition to democracy in countries such as Italy, Austria and Greece.

Final plans were made for the establishment of the United Nations, and a charter conference was scheduled to begin in San Francisco in April.

A frail President Roosevelt, two months from his death, concentrated his efforts on gaining Soviet support for the U.S. war effort against Japan. The secret U.S. atomic bomb project had not yet tested a weapon, and it was estimated that an amphibious attack against Japan could cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. After being assured of an occupation zone in Korea, and possession of Sakhalin Island and other territories historically disputed between Russia and Japan, Stalin agreed to enter the Pacific War within two to three months of Germany’s surrender.

Most of the Yalta accords remained secret until after World War II, and the items that were revealed, such as Allied plans for Germany and the United Nations, were generally applauded. Roosevelt returned to the United States exhausted, and when he went to address the U.S. Congress on Yalta he was no longer strong enough to stand with the support of braces. In that speech, he called the conference 𠇊 turning point, I hope, in our history, and therefore in the history of the world.” He would not live long enough, however, to see the iron curtain drop along the lines of division laid out at Yalta. In April, he traveled to his cottage in Warm Springs, Georgia, to rest and on April 12 died of a cerebral hemorrhage.

On July 16, the United States successfully tested an atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert. On August 6, it dropped one of these deadly weapons on Hiroshima, Japan. Two days later, true to its pledge at Yalta, the Soviet Union declared war against Japan. The next day, the United States dropped another atomic bomb on Nagasaki, and the Soviets launched a massive offensive against the Japanese in Manchuria. On August 15, the combination of the U.S. atomic attacks and the Soviet offensive forced a Japanese surrender. At the end of the month, U.S. troops landed in Japan unopposed.

When the full text of the Yalta agreements were released in the years following World War II, many criticized Roosevelt and Churchill for delivering Eastern Europe and North Korea into communist domination by conceding too much to Stalin at Yalta. The Soviets never allowed free elections in postwar Eastern Europe, and communist North Korea was sharply divided from its southern neighbor.

Eastern Europe, liberated and occupied by the Red Army, would have become Soviet satellites regardless of what had happened at Yalta. Because of the atomic bomb, however, Soviet assistance was not needed to defeat the Japanese. Without the Soviet invasion of the Japanese Empire in the last days of World War II, North Korea and various other Japanese-held territories that fell under Soviet control undoubtedly would have come under the sway of the United States. At Yalta, however, Roosevelt had no guarantee that the atomic bomb would work, and so he sought Soviet assistance in what was predicted to be the costly task of subduing Japan. Stalin, more willing than Roosevelt to sacrifice troops in the hope of territorial gains, happily accommodated his American ally, and by the end of the war had considerably increased Soviet influence in East Asia.


April

By Y. C. JAMES YEN, China's Mass Education Pioneer

Delivered before the Rotary Club of Chicago, April 3, 1945

(With text of original non-aggression pact.)

By JOHN W. HANES, Chairman, Executive Committee, United States Lines

Delivered before the Academy of Political Science, New York City, April 5, 1945

By EVERETT CASE, President of Colgate University

Delivered before The Academy of Political Science, New York City, April 5, 1945

By EDWARD R. STETTINIUS, JR., U. S. Secretary of State

Delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, April 6, 1945

By FRANK G. TYRRELL, Judge, Los Angeles Municipal Court

Delivered before the Center for International Understanding, Los Angeles. Cal., April 7, 1945

By H. V. EVATT, Australian Minister for External Affairs

Delivered before the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, April 9, 1945

By ARTHUR BESSE, President, National Association of Wool Manufacturers, New York, N. Y.

Delivered before the Sales Executives Club of New York, April 10, 1945

By SAMUEL D. JACKSON, Former Senator from Indiana

Broadcast from Westinghouse Radio Station WOWO, Fort Wayne, Ind., April 12, 1945

By JAMES M. LANDIS, Dean, Law School of Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

Delivered before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa., April 13, 1945

By FREDERIC R. COUDERT, President, American Society of International Law

Delivered before the American Society of International Law, Washington, D.C., April 13, 1945

By PHILIP C. NASH, President, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio

Delivered before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa., April 13, 1945

By HERBERT HOOVER, Former President of the United States

Delivered before the Foreign Policy Association, Philadelphia, Pa., Broadcast over the National Broadcasting System, April 17, 1945

By FELIX MORLEY, President, Haverford College, Haverford, Pa.

Delivered before the Chamber of Commerce, Youngstown, Ohio, April 26, 1945

By 1st LT. NEWTON L. MARGULIES, Assistant Judge Advocate, Jefferson Barracks, Mo.

Delivered before the Downtown Optimists Club, St. Louis, Mo., April 27, 1945

By JAN CIECHANOWSKI, Polish Ambassador to the United States

Delivered at a meeting of the United American and Polish Societies, Commemorating the 154th Anniversary of the Adoption of the Polish Constitution, Baltimore, Md., May 6, 1945

United States Department of State Bulletin.

By HENRY E. ROSSELL, President, Cramp Shipbuilding Company

Delivered before the Technology Club of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, May 15, 1945

By EAMON de VALERA, Prime Minister of Eire

Broadcast over Radio Eireann, May 16, 1945

By DR. JAMES P. ADAMS, Provost of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Delivered before the Adult Education Institute, Detroit, Mich., May 16, 1945

By MALCOLM W. BINGAY, Editorial Director, The Detroit Free Press, Detroit, Michigan

Delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan, May 16, 1945

By MERRYLE STANLEY RUKEYSER, Journalist,

Delivered before the Chicago Federated Advertising Club, Chicago, Ill., May 24, 1945

By RALPH A. BARD, Under Secretary of the Navy

Delivered before Citizens Committee For Military Training of Young Men, Inc, New York, N. Y., May 25, 1945

By LUIS MUNOZ-MARIN, President of the Senate of Puerto Rico

Broadcast over Columbia Broadcasting Network, May 26, 1945

By GENERAL ALEXANDER A. VANDEGRIFT, U.S.M.C., Commandant of the U. S. Marine Corps

Delivered before the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce, Brooklyn, N. Y., May 28, 1945

By FRED SMITH, V. P., American Broadcasting Co., Former Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury

Delivered before the New York Employing Printers' Association, New York, May 28, 1945

By CLARE BOOTHE LUCE, Congresswoman from Connecticut

Broadcast over Blue Network, Tuesday, May 29, 1945

By ROBERT A. TAFT, Senator from Ohio

Delivered at Memorial Day Ceremony, Gettysburg "National Cemetery, May 30, 1945

By LT. JAMES H. CASE, JR., USNR, Commanding Officer, Navy V-12 Unit, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, Indiana

Memorial Day Address, Crawfordsville, Indiana, May 30, 1945

By DR. VIRGIL M. HANCHER, President, State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

Delivered before the Graduating Class of the University of Illinois, Urbana, Ill., June 3, 1945

By NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, President, Columbia University, New York, N. Y.

Delivered at the 191st Commencement of Columbia University, New York City, June 5, 1945

By ALFRED M. LANDON, Ex-Governor of Kansas

Delivered before the Rotary Club, Manhattan, Kansas, June 7, 1945

By THOMAS E. DEWEY, Governor of New York

Delivered at a Seventh War Loan Organization Dinner, New York City, June 7, 1945

By GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces

Delivered at the Guildhall, London, England, June 12, 1945

By BRIGADIER GENERAL ARTHUR E. EASTERBROOK, Commanding the Santa Ana Army Air Base, Santa Ana, Cal.

Delivered before The Los Angeles Breakfast Club, and broadcast over station KFWB, Los Angeles, Cal., June 13, 1945

By DR. ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, President, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

Convocation address delivered at the Commencement Exercises of the University of Chicago, June 15, 1945

By GENERAL DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces

Delivered at Dinner Given in His Honor by the City of New York, June 19, 1945

By IRVING LEHMAN, Chief Judge, New York Court of Appeals

Delivered at Dinner in Honor of General Eisenhower by the City of New York, June 19, 1945

By SPRUILLE BRADEN, American Ambassador to Argentina

Delivered before the British Chamber of Commerce in the Argentine Republic, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 19, 1945

By DR. MONROE E. DEUTSCH, Acting President of the University of California.

Delivered at Commencements, University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, June 23 and 24, 1945

By EARL BRANDT, Economist, Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Stanford University, California

Delivered before the Commonwealth Club of California, San Francisco, Cal., June 22, 1945 broadcast over Station KLX, June 24, 1945 and delivered before the San Francisco Branch of the U. S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, Treasure Island, July 11, 1945

By JAN MASARYK, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Chief of the Czechoslovak Delegation to the United Nations Conference, San Francisco, Cal.

Delivered at the close of the San Francisco Conference, June 26th, 1945

By ROY F. HENDRICKSON, Deputy Director General, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration


Address to Congress on the Yalta (Crimea) Conference- Washington, DC March 1, 1945 - History

The FDR Memorial was the fourth presidential monument and was added in 1997. In August 1955, ten years after FDR died, Congress made a commission to create a Roosevelt Monument he was the 32nd president. The memorial is halfway beween the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials. These are along the Tidal Basin. There were many design competitions over the years and in 1978 a 7.5 acre design made by Lawrence Halprin was chosen.

1. "This Generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny…" Acceptance Speech to the Democratic National Convention for Renomination as Presidential Candidate for a Second Term, Philadelphia, PA, June 27, 1936.

2. "No Country, however rich, can afford the waste of its human resources. Demoralization caused by vast unemployment is our greatest
extravagance. Morally, it is the greatest menace to our social order. Second Fireside Chat on Government and Modern Capitalism, Washington, D.C., September 30, 1934.

3. "I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a New Deal for the American People." Speech before the 1932 Democratic National Convention FDR's nomination as Presidential Candidate, Chicago, IL, July,2, 1932.

4. "Among American citizens there should be no forgotten men and no forgotten races." Address at the Dedication of the New Chemistry Building, Howard University, Washington, D.C., October 26, 1936.

5. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." First Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., March 4,1933.

6. "Men and nature must work hand in hand. The throwing out of balance of the resources of nature throws out of balance also the lives of men." Message to Congress on the Use of Our Natural Resources, Washington, D.C., January 24, 1935.

7. "In these days of difficulty, we Americans everywhere must and shall choose the path of social justice,the path of faith, the path of hope and the path of love toward our fellow men." Campaign Address, Detroit, Michigan, October 2, 1932.

8. "I never forget that I live in a house owned by all the American people and that I have been given their trust." Fireside Chat on Economic Conditions, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1938.

9. "I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished. The test of our progress is not whether we add more to the abundance of those who have much it is whether we provide enough for those who have too little." Second Inaugural Address, Washington, D.C., January 20, 1937.

10. "It is time to extend planning to a wider field, in this instance comprehending in one great project many states directly concerned with the basin of one of our greatest rivers."Message to Congress suggesting the Tennessee Valley Authority, April 10, 1933.

11. "I propose to create a Civilian Conservation Corps to be used in simple work, more important, however, than the material gains will be the moral and spiritual value of such work." Message to Congress on Unemployment Relief, Washington, D.C., March 21, 1933.

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12. "We must scrupulously guard the civil rights and civil liberties of all our citizens, whatever their background. We must remember that any oppression, any injustice, any hatred, is a wedge designed to attack our civilization." Greeting to the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, Washington, D.C., January 9, 1940.

13. "We must be the great arsenal of Democracy." Fireside Chat on National Security, Washington, D.C., December 29, 1940.

14. "We have faith that future generations will know that here, in the middle of the twentieth century, there came a time when men of good will found a way to unite, and produce, and fight to destroy the forces of ignorance, and intolerance, and slavery, and war." Address to White House Correspondents' Association, Washington, D.C., February 12, 1943.

15. "They (who) seek to establish systems of government based on the regimentation of all human beings by a handful of individual rulers call this a new order. It is not new and it is not order." Address to the Annual Dinner for White House Correspondents' Association, Washington, D.C., March 15, 1941.

16. "I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded.I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed.I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war." Address at Chautauqua, NY, August 14, 1936.

17. "More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars." Undelivered Address prepared for Jefferson Day to be delivered April 13, 1945.

18. "Unless the peace that follows recognizes that the whole world is one neighborhood and does justice to the whole human race, the germs of another world war will remain as a constant threat to mankind." Address to White House Correspondents' Association, Washington, D.C., February 12, 1943.

19. "Freedom of speech. Freedom of worship. Freedom from want. Freedom from fear." Address to the Annual Dinner for White House Correspondents' Association, Washington, D.C., March 15, 1941.

20. "The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world." Address before Congress on the Yalta Conference, Washington, D.C., March 1, 1945.

21. "The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. Let us move forward with strong and active faith." Undelivered Address prepared for Jefferson Day to be delivered April 13, 1945.


Introductory note

Beginning with the year 1950, American Foreign Policy , a companion series to Foreign Relations of the United States , provides systematic coverage of the principal messages, addresses, statements, reports, and of certain of the diplomatic notes exchanged and treaties made in a given period that indicate the scope, goals, and implementation of the foreign policy of the United States. For the immediately preceding years, 1945–1949 inclusive, the present series, Foreign Relations , will provide under this heading a brief indication of certain major documents in these categories. This listing does not purport to be complete, of course, and as a rule items dealing primarily with United States relations with particular countries will be noted in the compilations for those countries. Many of the items cited below are also referred to in appropriate compilations in the various volumes for the year.

I. Major Public Statements of American Foreign Policy

The State of the Union: Annual Message of the President ( Roosevelt ) to the Congress, January 6, 1945. The portions of the address dealing with foreign affairs are printed in the Department of State Bulletin (hereinafter cited as Bulletin ), January 7, 1945, pp. 22–28. The complete text is printed as House Document 1, 79th Congress.

America’s Place in World Affairs: Address by the Under Secretary of State ( Grew ) at the New York Times Hall, New York, January 17, 1945. Bulletin , January 21, 1945, pp. 87–90.

Report on the Crimean (Yalta) Conference: Message delivered by the President ( Roosevelt ) before a joint session of the Congress, March 1, 1945. Bulletin , March 4, 1945, pp. 321–326, 361.

Statement by the Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) Upon Return From Conferences in the Crimea and at Mexico City, March 10, 1945. Bulletin , March 11, 1945, pp. 393–394.

United Nations Will Write Charter for a World Organization: Address by the Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York, April 6, 1945. Ibid ., April 8, 1945, pp. 605–607.

The Economic Basis for Lasting Peace: Address by the Secretary of State ( Stettinius ), April 4, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 598–599.

Address by the President ( Truman ) before a joint session of the Congress, April 16, 1945. Address delivered on the day following the funeral of President Roosevelt . Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman , April 12 to December 81, 1945 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 1–6. For text of a Proclamation by President [Page VIII] Truman , and for other statements relating to the death of President Roosevelt , see Bulletin , issue of April 15, 1945.

Address by the President ( Truman ) to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, April 25, 1945. Delivered from the White House by direct wire. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman , 1945 , pp. 20–23.

Unconditional Surrender of Germany: Radio Address by the President ( Truman ), May 8, 1945, with related statements and a Proclamation. Bulletin , May 13, 1945, pp. 885–889.

Report on the San Francisco Conference: Address by the Secretary of State ( Stettinius ), broadcast May 28, 1945. Ibid ., June 3, 1945, pp. 1007–1013.

Special Message of the President ( Truman ) to the Congress on Winning the War With Japan: Message read before the Senate and the House of Representatives on June 1, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 999–1006.

Letter from the President ( Truman ) to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the Defense Aid Program, June 4, 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman , 1945 , pp. 102–103.

Statement by Cordell Hull , Senior Adviser to the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference. Issued to the press on June 26, 1945, at Bethesda, Maryland. Bulletin , July 1, 1945, pp. 13–14.

Address by the President ( Truman ) in San Francisco at the Closing Session of the United Nations Conference, June 26, 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman , 1945 , pp. 138–144.

Address by the President ( Truman ) Before the Senate Urging Ratification of the Charter of the United Nations, July 2, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 153–155.

Statement by the President ( Truman ) Announcing the Use of the Atomic Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 197–200.

Radio Report by the President ( Truman ) to the American People on the Potsdam Conference, August 9, 1945. Delivered from the White House. Ibid ., pp. 205–214.

Radio Address by the President ( Truman ) to the American People After the Signing of the Terms of Unconditional Surrender by Japan, September 1, 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman , 1945 , pp. 254–257.

Special Message of the President ( Truman ) to the Congress on Atomic Energy, October 3, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 362–366.

Report on First Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers: Address by the Secretary of State ( Byrnes ), October 5, 1945. Radio broadcast from Washington. Bulletin , October 7, 1945, pp. 507–512. Statement by the Secretary of State ( Byrnes ) on the Meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, October 2, 1945. Released to the press on October 3. Ibid ., p. 513.

Restatement of Foreign Policy of the United States: Address by the President ( Truman ), October 27, 1945. Delivered in Central Park, New York, in connection with the celebration of Navy Day. Bulletin , October 28, 1945, pp. 653–656.

Neighboring Nations in One World: Address by the Secretary of State ( Byrnes ), New York, October 31, 1945. Ibid ., November 4, 1945, pp. 709–711.

World Cooperation: Address by the Secretary of State ( Byrnes ), Charleston, South Carolina, November 18, 1945. Ibid ., November 18, 1945, pp. 783–786.

America’s Policy in China: Statement by the Secretary of State ( Byrnes ) on December 7, 1945, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, answering charges made by Patrick J. Hurley , former Ambassador to China, against the Department of State and the Foreign Service. Ibid ., December 9, [Page IX] 1945, pp. 930–933. See also Mr. Byrnes ’ statement at a news conference on November 28, ibid ., December 2, 1945, pp. 882–883.

United States Policy Toward China: Statement by the President ( Truman ), released to the press by the White House on December 16, 1945. Bulletin , December 16, 1945, pp. 945–946.

Special Message of the President ( Truman ) to the Congress Recommending the Establishment of a Department of National Defense, December 19, 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman , 1945 , pp. 546–560.

Statement and Directive by the President ( Truman ) on Immigration to the United States of Certain Displaced Persons and Refugees in Europe, December 22, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 572–578.

II. The Implementation of American Foreign Policy

a. the organization and activities of the department of state

A chart showing the organization of the Department as of May 1, 1945, is printed in the Bulletin , May 13, 1945, pp. 898–899.

The resignation of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. , as Secretary of State was accepted by President Truman on June 27 for texts of a letter by the President and a statement by Mr. Stettinius on accepting appointment as Representative of the United States to the United Nations, both dated June 27, 1945, see ibid ., July 1, 1945, pp. 15–16.

Arrangements for recruitment of commissioned Foreign Service officers from among men and women of the armed forces were announced by the Department on June 29 ibid ., pp. 38–39.

James F. Byrnes , of South Carolina, was commissioned as Secretary of State on July 2 and entered upon duties July 3. For text of remarks by Mr. Byrnes on taking the oath of office at the White House, see ibid ., July 8, 1945, p. 45.

For information concerning the representation by the United States of foreign interests, as of July 28, with tables arranged according to countries represented and according to United States diplomatic and consular offices, see ibid ., July 29, 1945, pp. 144–149. For additional information, see William M. Franklin , Protection of Foreign Interests: A Study in Diplomatic and Consular Practice (Department of State publication 2693 1947).

The resignation of Joseph C. Grew as Under Secretary of State was accepted by President Truman on August 16 for texts of letters by the President, Secretary of State Byrnes , and Mr. Grew , see the Bulletin , August 19, 1945, p. 271.

Dean G. Acheson , of Connecticut, was commissioned Under Secretary of State on August 16 and entered upon duties the same day.

Patrick J. Hurley resigned as Ambassador to China on November 27.

On November 27 the White House announced that the President had appointed General of the Army George C. Marshall as his personal envoy to China with personal rank of Ambassador.

The former Secretary of State, Cordell Hull , was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on December 10. A message from Mr. Hull , read by Lithgow Osborne , American Ambassador in Norway, to the president and members of the Nobel Committee of the Storting, was issued to the press by the Department of State on December 10, 1945.

For a general discussion of the situation of the Department and the Foreign Service in the immediate postwar period, see “The Future of the Foreign Service”, a radio broadcast of December 29, Bulletin , December 30, 1945, pp. 1048–1054.

b. assignment of additional duties to the department of state

1. International Information .

By Executive Order 9608 (10 Federal Register 11223), August 31, 1945, President Truman provided for the termination of the Office of War Information and the transfer to the Department of State of its international information functions as well as the foreign information functions of the Office of Inter-American Affairs. In a statement released to the press on that date the President noted that “the nature of present-day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs” ( Bulletin , September 2, 1945, pp. 306–307).

For statements on the role of an international information service in the conduct of foreign relations, by William Benton , Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (on October 16) and the House Appropriations Committee (on October 17), see ibid ., October 21, 1945, pp. 589–595. For text of a radio broadcast by Mr. Benton and others on “Our International Information Policy”, December 15, see ibid ., December 16, 1945, pp. 947–954, and for a statement by Mr. Benton , “Plans for International Information Service”, released to the press on December 28, see ibid ., December 30, 1945, pp. 1045–1047.

On December 31 Secretary of State Byrnes addressed to President Truman a letter describing certain proposals for an overseas information service for text, see ibid ., January 20, 1946, pp. 57–58.

2. Research and Intelligence .

President Truman wrote on September 20, 1945, to Secretary of State Byrnes that he had that day signed an Executive Order (No. 9621 10 Federal Register 12033) transferring to the Department of State the activities of the Research and Analysis Branch and the Presentation Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. The order, effective October 1, abolished the O.S.S. and transferred its remaining activities to the War Department. The President added that the transfer [Page XI] would provide the Secretary of State “with the resources which we have agreed you will need to aid in the development of our foreign policy, and will assure that pertinent experience accumulated during the war will be preserved and used in meeting the problems of the peace.” The President further stated that he particularly desired the Secretary of State “to take the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity … through the creation of an interdepartmental group, heading up under the State Department, which would formulate plans for my approval.” For texts of the Executive Order and of the President’s letters of September 20 to the Secretary of State and to Major General William J. Donovan , Director of the Office of Strategic Services, see the Bulletin , September 22, 1945, pp. 449–450.

The appointment of Colonel Alfred McCormack as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence was announced on September 27, 1945 ( ibid ., September 30, 1945, p. 499).

For additional information, see “A National Intelligence Program”, a radio broadcast of December 22, ibid ., December 23, 1945, pp. 987 ff.

3. Foreign Economic Functions, and Functions with Respect to Surplus Property in Foreign Areas .

  • “( a ) The administration of the Act of March 11, 1941, as amended, entitled ‘An Act further to promote the defense of the United States and for other purposes.’
  • “( b ) The participation of the United States in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, as defined in Executive Order No. 9453 of July 6, 1944.
  • “( c ) Activities in liberated areas with respect to supplying the requirements of and procuring materials in such areas under paragraph 4 of the said Executive Order No. 9380.
  • “( d ) The gathering, analysis, and reporting of economic and commercial information, insofar as such functions are performed abroad.
  • “( e ) The planning of measures for the control of occupied territories.
  • “( f ) The administration of Allocation No. 42/398 of February 1, 1943 from the appropriation, ‘Emergency Fund for the President, National Defense, 1942 and 1943.’”

The remaining functions of the F.E.A. were transferred to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Department of Commerce, and the Department of Agriculture.

Part II of Executive Order 9630 assigned to the Department of State additional functions as a disposal agency for all surplus property in foreign areas, excepting certain vessels.

For text of the Executive Order, see 10 Federal Register 12245, or Bulletin , September 30, 1945, pp. 491–492.

c. foreign economic policy—trade and tariffs

Documents relating to Lend-Lease operations in connection with particular countries are printed in the compilations for those countries. On the program as a whole, see:

Proposed Extension of the Lend-Lease Act: Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and International Conferences ( Acheson ), February 8, 1945, before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives. Bulletin , February 11, 1945, p. 189.

Signing of the Third Lend-Lease Act: Statement by the President ( Truman ), April 17, 1945. Ibid ., April 22, 1945, p. 773.

Current Lend-Lease Problems: Statements by the Acting Secretary of State ( Grew ), May 14, and the Secretary of State ( Stettinius ), May 15, 1945. Ibid ., May 20, 1945, pp. 940–941.

The President’s News Conference of May 23, 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Harry S. Truman , 1945 , pp. 67–68.

Lend-Lease Matters: Defense-Aid Appropriation Estimate: Letter from the President ( Truman ) to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, June 4, transmitting letter of June 1 from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to the President. Bulletin , June 10, 1945, pp. 1061–1063.

Discontinuance of Lend-Lease Operations: White House press release, August 21, 1945. Ibid ., August 26, 1945, p. 284.

Statement by the Secretary of State ( Byrnes ), August 31, 1945. Ibid ., September 2, 1945, pp. 332–333.

The President’s News Conference of August 23, 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman , 1945 , pp. 234–235.

Lend-Lease and Postwar Reconstruction. Section 18 of Special Message of the President ( Truman ) to the Congress Presenting a 21-Point Program for the Reconversion Period, September 6, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 305–307.

The 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd quarterly reports of operations under the Lend-Lease Act transmitted by the President to the Congress, covering the year 1945. House documents 189, 279, 432, and 663, 79th Congress.

The Bretton Woods Proposals: International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Message of the President ( Roosevelt ) to the Congress, February 12, 1945. Bulletin , February 18, 1945, pp. 220–222.

International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and International Conferences ( Acheson ) before the Committee on Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives, March 7, 1945. Bulletin , March 11, 1945, pp. 409–410.

Bretton Woods: A Monetary Basis for Trade: Address by Mr. Acheson , April 16, 1945. Ibid ., April 23, 1945, pp. 738–742.

General Policy Statement of the Export-Import Bank of Washington. Released to the press September 11, 1945. Ibid ., September 23, 1945, pp. 441–446.

The Necessity for Foreign Investment: Address by Willard L. Thorp , Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, at New York, November 20, 1945. Ibid ., November 25, 1945, pp. 829–832.

On December 27 there were signed in the Department of State the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Fred M. Vinson , Secretary of the Treasury, signed the two agreements on behalf of the United States. For a description of the ceremony and for text of a statement by Mr. Vinson , see ibid ., December 30, 1945, pp. 1058–1059.

Recommendation for Renewal of Trade Agreements Act: Message of the President ( Roosevelt ) to the Congress, March 26, 1945. Bulletin , April 1, 1945, pp. 531–533.

United States Policy Regarding Commodity Agreements: Address by the Director of the Office of International Trade Policy ( Haley ), at New York, April 5, 1945. Ibid ., April 8, 1945, pp. 638–642.

Renewal of Trade Agreements: Statements by the Secretary of State ( Stettinius ) and the Assistant Secretaries of State for Economic Affairs ( Clayton ) and for American Republic Affairs ( Rockefeller ) before the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives, April 18, 1945. Ibid ., April 22, 1945, pp. 748–759. Testimony of Charles P. Taft , Director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy, May 12, 1945. Ibid ., May 13, 1945, pp. 905–910.

Private Barriers to International Trade: Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Clayton ) before a joint session of the Senate special committee investigating petroleum resources and the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 11, 79th Congress, May 17, 1945. Ibid ., May 20, 1945, pp. 933–938.

Statements by the Acting Secretary of State ( Grew ) on May 26 and June 20 concerning the approval of the trade-agreements bill by the House of Representatives and the Senate. Ibid ., May 27, 1945, p. 955, and June 24, 1945, p. 1149.

Renewal of Trade Agreements Act: Statement by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs ( Clayton ) before the Finance Committee of the Senate, May 30, 1945. Ibid ., June 3, 1945, pp. 1024 ff.

Relaxation of Export Controls: Statement released to the press by the Foreign Economic Administration, September 10, 1945. Ibid ., September 16, 1945, pp. 397–400.

The Future of International Economic Relations: Address by Clair Wilcox , Director of the Office of International Trade Policy, at Milwaukee Wisconsin, November 22, 1945. Ibid ., November 25, 1945, pp. 833–836.

Formulation and Implementation of Foreign Oil Policies: Assignment of Petroleum Officers on a Global Basis. Letters exchanged between the Petroleum Administrator for War ( Ickes ) and the Secretary of State ( Byrnes ) letters dated September 10 and November 21, respectively. Ibid ., December 2, 1945, pp. 894–895.

d. foreign war relief activities

Letter from the President ( Truman ) to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting Reports on Foreign War Relief Activities, July 17, 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman 1945 , pp. 173–174. The reports of the American Red Cross and the War Refugee Board and the report on status of appropriations and allocations are printed in House Document 262, 79th Congress.

The Repatriation Program: Statement by the Acting Secretary of State ( Grew ), August 5, 1945. Bulletin , August 5, 1945, pp. 162–164.

Letter from the President ( Truman ) to the Commanding General, United States Forces, European Theater ( Eisenhower ), Transmitting Report of Earl G. Harrison on Displaced Persons in Europe, Especially in Germany and Austria, August 31, 1945. Ibid ., September 30, 1945, pp. 455–463. Reply by General Eisenhower , October 8, 1945. Ibid ., October 21, 1945, pp. 607–609.

Statement by the President ( Truman ) on the European Relief and Rehabilitation Program, September 17, 1945. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman , 1945 , pp. 321–324.

Special Message of the President ( Truman ) to the Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, November 13, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 464–467.

Statement by the President ( Truman ) on the Problem of Jewish Refugees in Europe, November 13, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 467–469.

Letter from the President ( Truman ) to the British Prime Minister ( Attlee ) Concerning the Need for Resettlement of Jewish Refugees in Palestine, November 13, 1945. Ibid ., pp. 469–470.

Immigration to the United States of Certain Displaced Persons and Refugees in Europe: Statement by the President ( Truman ), with attached Directive by the President. Released to the press by the White House on December 22. Bulletin , December 23, 1945, pp. 981–984.

e. report on atrocities and war crimes

Report from Justice Robert H. Jackson , Chief of Counsel for the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, to the President ( Truman ). Released to the press by the White House on June 7, 1945. Bulletin , June 10, 1945, pp. 1071–1078. For additional information, see Report of Robert H. Jackson , United States Representative to the International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945 (Department of State publication 3080 1949).

f. report on the status of countries in relation to the war

Status of Countries in Relation to the War, August 12, 1945. Compiled by Katherine Elizabeth Crane , Division of Research and Publication. Bulletin , August 12, 1945, pp. 230–241. Lists countries at war signatories of the Declaration by United Nations, January 1, 1942, and adherents to the Declaration signatories to the Charter of the United Nations and countries in a state of armistice relations and in a state of surrender.


FDR: Last Address to Congress

President Roosevelt delivered this message to a joint session of Congress after returning from a war conference at Yalta with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. The three had discussed plans for the continuing war and the post-war world. In this speech, FDR made an unusually candid remark about his disability in order to explain why he was speaking seated at a table rather than from the House rostrum.

(Photo: )

March 1, 1945

President Roosevelt delivered this message to a joint session of Congress after returning from a war conference at Yalta with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. The three had discussed plans for the continuing war and the post-war world. In this speech, FDR made an unusually candid remark about his disability in order to explain why he was speaking seated at a table rather than from the House rostrum. -Stephen Smith

Transcript

Senators and representatives, I have the great pleasure, the high privilege, and distinguished honor of presenting to you the president of the United States.

Mr. Roosevelt looks back, nods.

Members of the Congress, I hope that you will pardon me for this unusual posture of sitting down during the presentation of what I want to say, but I know that you will realize that it makes it a lot easier for me not to have to carry about ten pounds of steel around on the bottom of my legs and also because of the fact that I have just completed a fourteen-thousand-mile trip.

First of all, I want to say, it is good to be home.

It has been a long journey. I hope you will also agree that it has been, so far, a fruitful one.

Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether it is entirely fruitful or not lies to a great extent in your hands. For unless you here in the halls of the American Congress- with the support of the American people—concur in the general conclusions reached at Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results.

And that is why I have come before you at the earliest hour I could after my return. I want to make a personal report to you —and, at the same time, to the people of the country. Many months of earnest work are ahead of us all, and I should like to feel that when the last stone is laid on the structure of international peace, it will be an achievement for which all of us in America have worked steadfastly and unselfishly—together.

I am returning from this trip—that took me so far—refreshed and inspired. I was well the entire time. I was not ill for a second, until I arrived back in Washington, and there I heard all of the rumors which had occurred in my absence. [Laughter] Yet, I returned from the trip refreshed and inspired. The Roosevelts are not, as you may suspect, averse to travel. We seem to thrive on it!

As far away as I was, I was kept constantly informed of affairs in the United States. The modern miracles of rapid communication have made this world very small. We must always bear in mind that fact, when we speak or think of international relations. I received a steady stream of messages from Washington—I might say from not only the executive branch with all its departments, but also from the legislative branch in its two departments—and except where radio silence was necessary for security purposes, I could continuously send messages any place in the world. And of course, in a grave emergency, we could have even risked the breaking of the security rule.

I come from the Crimea Conference with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace.

There were two main purposes in this Crimea Conference. The first was to bring defeat to Germany with the greatest possible speed, and the smallest possible loss of Allied men. That purpose is now being carried out in great force. The German Army, and the German people, are feeling the ever-increasing might of our fighting men and of the Allied armies. Every hour gives us added pride in the heroic evidence, heroic advance of our troops in Germany—on German soil—toward a meeting with the gallant Red Army.

The second purpose was to continue to build the foundation for an international accord that would bring order and security after the chaos of the war, that would give some assurance of lasting peace among the Nations of the world.

That goal too…in that goal, toward that goal, a tremendous stride was made.

At Teheran, a little over a year ago, there were long-range military plans laid by the Chiefs of Staff of the three most powerful Nations. Among the civilian leaders at Teheran, however, at that time, there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion. No political arrangements were made- and none was attempted.

At the Crimea Conference, however, the time had come for getting down to specific cases in the political field.

There was on all sides at this Conference an enthusiastic effort to reach an agreement. Since the time of Teheran, a year ago, there had developed among all of us a—what shall I call it?—a greater facility in negotiating with each other, that augurs well for the peace of the world. We know each other better.

I have never for an instant wavered in my belief that an agreement to insure world peace and security can be reached.

There were a number of things that we did that were concrete—that were definite. For instance, the lapse of time between Teheran and Yalta without conferences of representatives, of civilian representatives of the three major powers has proved to be too long–fourteen months. During that long period, local problems were permitted to become acute in places like Poland and Greece and Italy and Yugoslavia.

Therefore, we decided at Yalta that, even if circumstances made it impossible for the heads of the three Governments to do it, to meet more often in the future, we would make sure that arranging, that there would be more frequent personal contacts for the exchange of views, between the Secretaries of State and the Foreign Ministers of these three powers.

We arranged for periodic meetings at intervals of three or four months. And I feel very confident that under this arrangement there will be no recurrences of the incidents which this winter disturbed the friends of world-wide cooperation and collaboration.

When we met at Yalta, in addition to laying our strategic and tactical plans for the complete and final military victory over Germany, there were other problems of vital political consequence.

For instance, first, there were the problems of the occupation and control of Germany- after victory- the complete destruction of her military power, and the assurance that neither the Nazis nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and the civilization of the world.

Secondly—again for example—there was the settlement of the few differences that remained among us with respect to the International Security Organization after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. As you remember, at that time, I said that we had agreed ninety percent. Well, that’s a pretty good percentage. I think the other ten percent was ironed out at Yalta.

Third, there were the general political and economic problems common to all of the areas which that would be in the future or had been liberated from the Nazi yoke. This is a very special problem. We over here find it difficult to understand the ramifications of many of these problems in foreign lands, but we are trying to.

Fourth, there were the special problems created by a few instances such as Poland and Yugoslavia.

Days were spent in discussing these momentous matters and we argued freely and frankly across the table. But at the end, on every point, unanimous agreement was reached. And more important even than the agreement of words, I may say we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together.

Of course, we know that it was Hitler’s hope—and the German war lords’—that we would not agree- that some slight crack might appear in the solid wall of Allied unity, a crack that would give him and his fellow gangsters one last hope of escaping their just doom. That is the objective for which his propaganda machine has been working for many months.

Never before have the major Allies been more closely united —not only in their war aims but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united with each other-and with all peace-loving Nations- so that the ideal of lasting peace will become a reality.

The Soviet, British, and United States Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings with each other. They conferred frequently with Marshal Stalin, and with Prime Minister Churchill and with me, on the problem of coordinating the strategic and tactical efforts of the Allied powers. They completed their plans for the final knock-out blows to Germany.

At the time of the Teheran Conference, the Russian front, for instance, was removed so far from the American and British fronts that, while certain long-range strategic cooperation was possible, there could be no tactical, day-by-day coordination. They were too far apart. But Russian troops have now crossed Poland. They are fighting on the Eastern soil of Germany herself British and American troops are now on German soil close to the Rhine River in the West. It is a different situation today from what it was fourteen months ago a closer tactical liaison has become possible for the first time in Europe—and, in the Crimea Conference, that was something else that was accomplished.

Provision was made for daily exchange of information between the armies under the command of General Eisenhower on the western front, and those armies under the command of the Soviet marshals on that long eastern front, and also with our armies in Italy—without the necessity of going through the Chiefs of Staff in Washington or London as in the past.

You have seen one result of this exchange of information in the recent bombings by American and English aircraft of points which are directly related to the Russian advance on Berlin.

From now on, American and British heavy bombers will be used—in the day-by-day tactics of the war—and we have begun to realize, I think, that there is all the difference in the world between tactics on the one side, and strategy on the other—day-by-day tactics of the war in direct support of the Soviet armies, as well as in the support of our own on the western front.

They are now engaged in bombing and strafing in order to hamper the movement of German reserves, German materials to the eastern and western fronts from other parts of Germany or from Italy.

Arrangements have been made for the most effective distribution of all available material and transportation to the places where they can best be used in the combined war effort- American, British, and Russian.

Details of these plans and arrangements are military secrets, of course but they are going to hasten, this tying of things in together is going to hasten the day of the final collapse of Germany. The Nazis are learning about some of them already, to their sorrow. And I think all three of us at the Conference felt that they will learn more about them tomorrow and the next day- and the day after that!

There will be no respite for them. We will not desist for one moment until unconditional surrender.

You know, I’ve always felt that common sense prevails in the long run—quiet, overnight thinking. I think that is true in Germany, just as much as it is here.

The German people, as well as the German soldiers must realize that the sooner, the sooner they give up and surrender by groups or as individuals, the sooner their present agony will be over. They must realize that only with complete surrender can they begin to reestablish themselves as people whom the world might accept as decent neighbors.

We made it clear again at Yalta, and I now repeat that unconditional surrender does not mean the destruction or enslavement of the German people. The Nazi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them—they are working at it day and night for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own skins, and deceive their people into continued and useless resistance.

We did, however, make it clear at the Conference just what unconditional surrender does mean for Germany.

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States. Each of these Nations will occupy and control a separate zone of Germany—and the administration of the four zones will be coordinated, coordinated in Berlin by a Control Council composed of representatives of the four Nations.

Unconditional surrender means something else. It means the end of Nazism.

It means the end of the Nazi Party—and of all its barbaric laws and institutions.

It means the termination of all militaristic influence in the public, private, and cultural life of Germany.

It means for the Nazi war criminals a punishment that is speedy and just—and severe.

It means the complete disarmament of Germany the destruction of its militarism of its military equipment the end of its production of armament the dispersal of all its armed forces the permanent dismemberment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world.

It means that Germany will have to make reparations, reparations in kind for the damage which has been done to the innocent victims of its aggression.

By compelling reparations in kind—in plants, in machinery, in rolling stock, and in raw materials- we shall avoid the mistake that we and other people, other Nations made after the last war, the demanding of reparations in the form of money which Germany could never pay.

We do not want the German people to starve, or to become a burden on the rest of the world.

Our objective in handling Germany is simple—it is to secure the peace of the rest of the world now and in the future. Too much experience has shown that that objective is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability to wage aggressive warfare.

Now, these objectives will not hurt the German people. On the contrary, they will protect them from a repetition of the fate which the General Staff and Kaiserism imposed on them before, and which Hitlerism is now imposing upon them again a hundredfold. It will be removing a cancer from the German body politic which for generations has produced only misery and only pain to the whole world.

During my stay in, in Yalta, I saw the kind of reckless, senseless fury, the terrible destruction that comes out of German militarism. Yalta, on the Black Sea, had no military significance of any kind. It had no defenses.

Before the last war, it had been a resort, a resort for people like the Czars and princes and for the aristocracy and the hangers-on. However, after the Red Revolution, and until the attack on the Soviet Union by Hitler two years ago, the palaces and the villas of Yalta had been used as a rest and recreation center by the Russian people.

The Nazi officers took these former palaces and villas- took them over for their own use. That was the only reason that the so-called former palace of the Czar was still habitable, when we got there, was that it had been given—or he thought it had been given— to a German general for his own property and his own use. And when Yalta was so destroyed, he kept soldiers there to protect what he thought would become his own, nice villa. It was a useful rest and recreation center for hundreds of thousands of Russian workers, farmers, and their families, up to the time that it was taken again by the Germans. The Nazi officers took these places for their own use, and when the Red Army forced the Nazis out of the Crimea—just almost just a year ago last April I think it was– all of the villas were looted by the Nazis, and then nearly all of them were destroyed by bombs placed on the inside. And even the humblest of the homes of Yalta were not spared.

There was little left of it except blank walls—ruins—destruction.

Sevastopol—that was a fortified port, about forty or fifty miles away—there again was a scene of utter destruction—a large city with great navy yards and fortifications- I think less than a dozen buildings were left intact in the entire city.

I had read about Warsaw and Lidice and Rotterdam and Coventry—but I saw Sevastopol and Yalta! And I know that there is not room enough on earth for both German militarism and Christian decency.

Let’s go on with a story which I hope to do under an hour.

Of equal importance with the military arrangements at the Crimea Conference were the agreements reached with respect to a general international organization for lasting world peace. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. There was one point, however, on which agreement was not reached. It involved the procedure of voting in the Security Council. I want to try to make it clear by making it simple. It took me hours and hours to get the thing straight in my own mind—and many conferences.

At the Crimea Conference, the Americans made a proposal, a proposal on this subject which, after full discussion was, I am glad to say, unanimously adopted by the other two Nations.

It is not yet possible to announce the terms of it publicly, but it will be in a very short time.

When the conclusions reached with respect to voting are made known, I think and I hope that you will find them fair, that you will find them a fair solution of this complicated and difficult problem, truly it’s a, you might almost say it’s a legislative problem. They are founded in justice, and will go far to assure international cooperation in the maintenance of peace.

There’s going to be held, as you know, after we’ve straightened that voting matter out. There’s going to be held in San Francisco a meeting of all the United Nations of the world on the 25th of April, next month. There, we all hope, and confidently expect, to execute a definite charter of organization upon which the peace of the world will be preserved and the forces of aggression permanently outlawed.

This time we are not making the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, as we fight together to win the war finally, we work together from keeping it from happening again.

I—as you know—have always been a believer in the document called the Constitution of the United States. And I spent a good deal of time in educating two other Nations of the world in regard to the Constitution of the United States. The charter has to be—and should be—approved by the Senate of the United States, under the Constitution. I think the other Nations all know it now. I am aware of that fact, and now all the other Nations are. And we hope that the Senate will approve of what is set forth as the Charter of the United Nations when they all come together in San Francisco next month.

The Senate of the United States, through its appropriate representatives, has been kept continuously advised of the program of this Government in the creation of the International Security Organization.

The Senate and the House of Representatives will both be represented at the San Francisco Conference. The Congressional delegates will consist of an equal number, and senatorial, of an equal number of Republican and Democratic members. The American Delegation is—in every sense of the word—bipartisan.

I think that world peace is not exactly a party question. I think that Republicans want peace just as much as Democrats.

It is not a party question—any more than is military victory—the winning of the war.

When the Republic was threatened, first by the Nazi clutch for world conquest back in 1940, ‘39 and then by the Japanese treachery in 1941, partisanship and politics were laid aside by nearly every American and every resource was dedicated to our common safety. The same consecration to the cause of peace will be expected, I think, by every patriotic American, and by every human soul overseas, too.

The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one Nation. It cannot be just an American peace, or a British peace, or a Russian, a French, or a Chinese peace. It cannot be a peace of large Nations- or of small Nations. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world.

It must be a structure of complete… It cannot be, what some people think, a structure of complete perfection at first. But it can be a peace—and it will be a peace—based on the sound and just principles of the Atlantic Charter—on the concept of the dignity of the human being—and on the guarantees of tolerance and freedom of religious worship.

As the Allied armies have marched to military victory, they have liberated people whose liberties had been crushed by the Nazis for four long years, whose economy has been reduced to ruin by Nazi despoilers.

There have been instances of political confusion and unrest in these liberated areas—that is not unexpected—as in Greece or in Poland or in Yugoslavia, and there may be more. Worse than that, there actually began to grow up in some of these places queer ideas of, for instance, “spheres of influence” that were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. If allowed to go on unchecked, these developments might have had tragic results in time.

It is fruitless to try to place the blame for this situation on one particular Nation or on another. It is the kind of development that is almost inevitable unless the major powers of the world continue without interruption to work together and to assume joint responsibility for the solution of problems that may arise to endanger the peace of the world.

We met in the Crimea, determined to settle this matter of liberated areas. Things that might happen that we cannot foresee at this moment might happen suddenly—unexpectedly—next week or next month. And I am happy to confirm to the Congress that we did arrive at a settlement—and, incidentally, a unanimous settlement.

The three most powerful Nations have agreed that the political and economic problems of any area liberated from Nazi conquest, or of any former Axis satellite, are a joint responsibility of all three Governments. They will join together, during the temporary period of instability—after hostilities—to help the people of any liberated area, or of any former satellite state, to solve their own problems through firmly established democratic processes.

They will endeavor to see, to see to it, that interim government, the people who carry on the interim government between occupation of Germany and by true independence, that such an interim government will be as representative as possible of all democratic elements in the population, and that free elections are held as soon as possible thereafter.

Responsibility for political conditions thousands of miles away can no longer be avoided I think by this great Nation. Certainly, I do not want to live to see another war. As I have said, the world is smaller— smaller every year. The United States now exerts a tremendous influence in the cause of peace. What we people over here are thinking and talking about is in the interest of peace, because it is known all over the world. The slightest remark in either House of the Congress is known all over the world the following day. We will continue to exert that influence, only if we are willing to continue to share in the responsibility for keeping the peace. It will be our own tragic loss, I think, if we were to shirk that responsibility.

The final decisions in these areas are going to be made jointly therefore and therefore they will often be a result of give-and-take compromise. The United States will not always have its way a hundred percent- nor will Russia nor Great Britain. We shall not always have ideal answers- solutions to complicated international problems, even though we are determined continuously to strive toward that ideal. But I am sure that under the agreements reached at Yalta, there will be a more stable political Europe and the parts of it than ever before.

Of course, once there has been a free expression of the people’s will in any country, our immediate responsibility ends- with the exception only of such action as may be agreed on in the International Security Organization that we hope to set up.

The United Nations must also soon begin to help these liberated areas adequately to reconstruct their economy, I don’t want them starving to death (?), so that they are ready to resume their places in the world. The Nazi war machine has stripped them of raw materials and machine tools and trucks and locomotives and things like that. They have left the industry of these places stagnant and much of the agricultural areas are unproductive. The Nazis have left a complete ruin or a partial ruin in their wake.

To start the wheels running again is not a mere matter of relief. It is to the national interest that all of, all of us, us see to it that these liberated areas are again made self-supporting and productive so that they do not need continuous relief from us. I should say that was an argument based on plain common sense.

One outstanding example of joint action by the three major Allied powers was the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish question was a potential source of trouble in postwar Europe- as it has been sometimes before and we came to the Conference determined to find a common ground for its solution. And we did- even though everybody does not agree with us, obviously.

Our objective was to help to create a strong, independent, and prosperous Nation. That is the thing we must always remember, those words, agreed to by Russia, by Britain, and by the me: the objective of making Poland a strong, independent, and prosperous Nation, with a government ultimately to be selected by the Polish people themselves.

To achieve that objective, it was necessary to provide for the formation of a new government much more representative than had been possible while Poland was enslaved. There were, as you know, two governments- one in London, one in Lublin—practically in Russia. Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing Provisional Government in Poland on a broader democratic basis, so as to include democratic leaders now in Poland and those abroad. This new, reorganized government will be recognized by all of us as the temporary government of Poland. Poland needs a temporary government in the worst way—an ad interim government, I think is another way of putting it.

However, the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will be pledged to holding a free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.

Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on Russia have been made. Twice in this generation, Germany has struck at Russia through this corridor. To insure European security and world peace, a strong and independent Poland is necessary to prevent that from happening again.

The decision with respect to the boundaries of Poland was, frankly, a compromise. I did not agree with all of it, by any means, but we did not go as far as Britain wanted, in certain areas we did not go so far as Russia wanted, in certain areas and we did not go so far as I wanted, in certain areas. It was a compromise. The decision, is not only a compromise, is one however, under which the Poles will receive compensation in territory in the North and West in exchange for what they lose by the Curzon Line in the East. The limits of the western border will be permanently fixed in the final Peace Conference. We know, roughly, that it will include—in the new, strong Poland—quite a large slice of what now is called Germany. And it was agreed, also, that the new Poland will have a large and long coast line, and many new harbors. Also, East Prussia most of it will go to Poland. A corner of it will go to Russia. Also, that the—what shall I call it?—the anomaly of the Free State of Danzig, I think Danzig would be a lot better if it were Polish.

It is well known that the people east of the Curzon Line-just for example, here is why I compromised— The people east of the Curzon Line are predominantly white Russian and Ukrainian—they are not Polish and a very great majority. And the people west of the line are predominantly Polish, except in that part of East Prussia and eastern Germany, which will go to the new Poland. As far back as 1919, representatives of the Allies agreed that the Curzon Line represented a fair boundary between the two peoples. And you must remember, also, that there was not Poland before, there had not been any Polish government before 1919 for a great many generations.

I am convinced that the agreement on Poland, under the circumstances, is the most hopeful agreement possible for a free, independent, and prosperous Polish state.

Now the Crimea Conference was a meeting of the three major military powers on whose shoulders rested chief responsibility and burden of the war. Although, for this reason, another nation would not be included, France was not a participant in the Conference, no one should detract from the recognition that was accorded there of her role in the future of Europe and the future of the world.

France has been invited to accept, this was on my second part of my motion, France has been invited to accept a zone of control in Germany, and to participate as a fourth member of the Allied Control Council of Germany.

She has been invited to join as a sponsor of the International Conference at San Francisco next month.

She will be a permanent member of the International Security Council together with the other four major powers.

And, finally, we have asked that France that she be associated with us in our joint responsibility over all the liberated areas all of them in Europe.

Of course there are a number of smaller things that I haven’t got time to go into on which an agreement was had and we hope things will straighten out.

Agreement was reached on Yugoslavia, as announced in the communique and we hope that it is in process of fulfillment. But, not only there but in some other places, we have to remember that there are a great many prima donnas in the world. All of them wish to be heard before anything becomes final, so we may have a little delay while we listen to more prima donnas.

Quite naturally, this Conference concerned itself only with the European war and with the political problems of Europe and not with the Pacific war.

In Malta, however, our combined British and American staffs made their plans to increase the attack against Japan.

The Japanese warlords know that they are not being over looked. They have felt the force of our B-29’s, and our carrier planes they have felt the naval might of the United States, and do not appear very anxious to come out and try it again.

The Japs now know what it means to hear that “The United States Marines have landed.”

And I think I can add that, having Iwo Jima in mind, “The situation is well in hand.”

They also know what is in store for the homeland of Japan now that General MacArthur has completed his magnificent march back to Manila [Applause] and now that Admiral Nimitz is establishing air bases right in the back yard.

But, lest somebody else lay off work in the United States, I can repeat what I have said—a short sentence—even in my sleep: “We haven’t won the wars yet”.

It is still a long, tough road to Tokyo. It is longer to go to Tokyo than it is to Berlin. We must be prepared for a long and costly struggle in the city.

But the unconditional surrender of Japan is as essential as the defeat of Germany. [Applause] I say that advisedly, with the thought in mind that that is especially true if our plans for world peace are to succeed. For Japanese militarism must be wiped out as thoroughly as German militarism.

On the way back from the Crimea, I made arrangements to meet personally King Farouk of Egypt, Halle Selassie, the Emperor of Ethiopia, and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Our conversations had to do with matters of common interest. They will be of great mutual advantage because they gave me, and a good many of us, an opportunity of meeting and talking face to face, and of exchanging views in personal conversation instead of formal correspondence.

For instance, on the problem of Arabia, I learned more about that whole problem—the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem—by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes, than I could have learned in the exchange of two or three dozen letters.

On my voyage, I had the benefit of seeing the Army and Navy and the Air Force at work.

[tape breaks up] I think, would feel as proud of our armed forces as I am, if they could see and hear what I did.

Against the most efficient professional soldiers and sailors and airmen of all history, our men stood and fought—and won.

I think this is our chance to see to it that the sons and the grandsons of these gallant fighting men do not have to do it all over again in a few years.

The Conference in the Crimea was a turning point- I hope in our history and therefore in the history of the world. There will soon be presented to the Senate of the United States and to the American people a great decision that will determine the fate of the United States—and I think therefore the fate of the world—for generations to come.

There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.

I know that the word “planning” is not looked upon with favor in some circles. In domestic affairs, tragic mistakes have been made by reason of lack of planning and, on the other hand, many great improvements in living. And many benefits to the human race, have been accomplished as a result of adequate, intelligent planning—reclamation of desert areas, developments of whole river valleys, and provision for adequate housing and a dozen different topics.

The same will be true in relations between Nations. For the second time in the lives of most of us this generation is face to face with the objective of preventing wars. To meet that objective, the Nations of the world will either have a plan or they will not. The groundwork of a plan has now been furnished, and has been submitted to humanity for discussion and decision.

No plan is perfect. Whatever is adopted at San Francisco will doubtless have to be amended time and again over the years, just as our own Constitution has been.

No one can say exactly how long any plan will last. Peace can endure only so long as humanity really insists upon it, and is willing to work for it- and sacrifice for it.

Twenty-five years ago, American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which they fought and suffered. We failed them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world again to survive again.

I think the Crimea Conference was a successful effort by the three leading Nations to find a common ground for peace. It spells or ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have always failed.

We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving Nations will finally have a chance to join.

And I am confident that the Congress and the American people will accept the results of this Conference as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that better world in which our children and grandchildren—yours and mine, the children and grandchildren of the whole world- must live, and can live.

And that, my friends, is the only message I can give you. But I feel it very deeply, as I know that all of you are feeling it today, and are going to feel it in the future.


Photo, Print, Drawing Crimean Conference--Prime Minister Winston Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Marshal Joseph Stalin at the palace in Yalta, where the Big Three met / /U.S. Signal Corps photo. b&w film copy neg.

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This collection of primary source documents discusses international relations during World War II and the years shortly after. It begins with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed in 1939 and ends with documents from the 1950&rsquos. The collection contains a wide variety of documents including agreements, memorandums, meeting minutes, cables, letters, diary entries, and military reports from WWII. The documents mainly come from Russian and Bulgarian archives. See also the End of the Cold War. (Image, Clement Attlee, Harry Truman, and Joseph Stalin at the Potsdam Conference, July 1945, NARA, Army Signal Corps Collection, USA C-186)

Secret Supplementary Protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939

Secret Texts of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939

Memorandum to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Troop Strength Orders for the Red Army, 9 May 1940

Memorandum to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU on Troop strength orders for the Red Army, May 9, 1940. Proposals for strengthening of Soviet armed forces.

Notes from the Meeting between Comrade Stalin and Economists Concerning Questions in Political Economy, 29 January 1941

Notes from L.A. Leont’ev's January 1941 meeting with Stalin, regarding drafts of two commissioned textbooks on political economy. Stalin gives his views on "planning", "wages", "fascism", and other issues.

Report by Vyshinsky to Molotov Concerning Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and the United States

Report by Vyshinsky to Molotov concerning trade and economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States, August 1941

State Defense Committee Decree No. 5859ss - On the Crimean Tatars

Acts of the Crimean Tatars during the Second World War and their subsequent punishment.

Report from Mikoyan to Stalin and Molotov regarding Lend-Lease shipments from the United States from 1 October 1941 to 1 May 1944

Report from Mikoyan to Stalin and Molotov, 21 May 1944, on Lend-Lease shipments from the United States between 1 October 1941 and 1 May 1944.

Letter No. 180 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King

Fu Bingchang (Foo Ping-sheung) relays his views on relations among the Great Powers, Soviet involvement in Xinjiang, and the rifts between the Nationalists and Communists within China.

Memorandum by George Kennan , 'Russia – Seven Years Later' (excerpt)

George Kennan describes Stalin's character, underlining the importance of his nationality, ignorance of the west, and his seclusion. Kennan further warns that Stalin's advisors are not interested in collaborating with western democracies, and that Russia's internal police regime is developed beyond its foreign policy.

Record of Meeting at the Kremlin, Moscow, 9 October 1944, at 10 p.m.

Churchill, Eden, Stalin, and Molotov discuss the leadership in Poland, Britains interests in Greece and Hong Kong, the actions of Romania and Bulgaria during the war, Turkey, the need for the Great Powers to exert influence on the Balkans to prevent small wars, the leadership of Italy, interests in Bulgaria and Romania, the dividing of Germany and Germany's future, and the American plans in the war against Japan.

Record of Meeting at the Kremlin, Moscow on 10 October 1944, at 7 p.m.

Eden and Molotov discuss the post-war situation in the Balkans, the installment of a Control Commission to influence Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Germany as well as the dividing of these countries and which Great Power should exert control on each country.

Record of Meeting Held at Spiridonovka House on 13 October at 5 p.m.

M. Mikolajczyk discusses the Polish memorandum regarding the reconstruction and internal affairs of post-war Poland, Stalin reprimands Mikolajczyk for the extralegal approval of this memorandum. Churchill defends the memorandum, Stalin criticizes it, and Mikolajczyk emphasizes Poland's sovereignty as well as the legitimacy of the underground government in occupied Poland. Contentious discussion on the issue of the Curzon Line between Stalin and Mikolajczyk--Churchill acts as a mediator.

Record of Meeting Held at the Kremlin on 17 October 1944, at 10 p.m.

Churchill and Stalin discuss the progress of the war in Europe and its brutality. They propose three alternative plans of German dismemberment and how German assets should be divided among the Allies. They discuss further punishments and reparations.

Minutes of the PWP CC Meetings on 22 October 1944

Bierut describes the meeting between Mikolajczyk, Stalin, and Churchill, discussing how Stalin rejected Mikolajczyk's memorandum on the Polish situation. Bierut, Churchill, and Stalin discuss the rebuilding of Poland: Churchill thinks reforms should be postponed until after the war, Stalin and Bierut disagree. Beirut and Mikolajczyk discuss the Curzon line and the PKWN. In a final meeting, Churchill, Stalin, and Bierut discuss Polands economy and infrastructure.

Letter No. 402 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King

The Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union, L.D. Wilgress, thoroughly reviews Soviet foreign policy in Europe, Asia, and in Latin America and its relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. Wilgress optimistically concludes that "the Soviet Government are desirous of co-operating fully with the other great powers."

Defense Ministry Intelligence Report on the Domestic Political Situation in Bulgaria

A Defense Ministry intelligence report on the domestic political developments for the month of October 1944. Among the discussed issues are the activities of the anti-communist opposition, the popular perception toward the Soviet occupation and the state of the armed forces.

Letter No. 425 from L.D. Wilgress, Canadian Embassy, Moscow, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, W.L. Mackenzie King

Conversation between General de Gaulle and Marshal Stalin Friday 8 December 1944

General de Gaulle discusses France's positions on the German question in terms of Germany's borders, disarmament, and alliances. De Gaulle insists that Germany's Western border should not extend past the Rhine and that the country should be disarmed militarily, economically, and morally. He argues that international alliances between the USSR and France should be multilayered, and should include some involvement United States. Stalin argues for the benefit of a tripartite pact between the USSR, France, and England. Stalin then describes a pact between the USSR and France to bolster Poland.

Letter from President Roosevelt to Stalin on an Acceptable Compromise Regarding the Composition of the Postwar Polish Government, 6 February 1945

Letter from President Roosevelt to Stalin on an Acceptable Compromise Regarding the Composition of the Postwar Polish Government discussing Soviet actions and the Polish government.

Yalta Conference Agreement, Declaration of a Liberated Europe

The text of the agreements reached at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin.

Act of Military Surrender, Germany

English text of the official act of military surrender to the Allied and Soviet forces signed by German High Command.


Watch the video: Soviet Documentary about Yalta Conference 1945 with subtitles